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This thesis aims to analyse how the Syrian business community has been transformed 
by the 2011 revolution and how this transformation has had an impact on Syrian 
business networks. The thesis draws on a range of previous literature on the Syrian 
business community and on business diaspora in order to set up a triadic analysis 
framework which includes the interrelations between the host country-home 
country-diaspora to analyse the transformation of expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, as well as using rich ethnographic material collected by 
the researcher through his nine months of field research in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan.  
 
The importance of this study lies in the great amount of capital and potential political 
economic influence of the Syrian business communities in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. 
Even though the economic and political strengths of the expatriate Syrian business 
community in these three countries have come to light since mid-2012, currently there 
are no studies focusing on the emergence of expatriate Syrian business communities. 
Furthermore, Syrian businessmen used to play important roles in Syria prior to their 
departures after 2011, and their ties with the Assad regime were considered to be 
symbiotic. The research not only demonstrates a case for the emergence of a 
war-induced business diaspora, but also retrospectively helps to establish a better 
understanding of the Syrian business community in the pre-2011 era and the 
businessmen’s reactions towards the unprecedented civil uprising, and later 
development in the host countries. 
 
It is argued that due to the prolongation and complication of the Syrian conflict, the 
Syrian business community is developing into a war-induced business diaspora in the 
countries to which they have relocated, and also played important roles in economic, 
philanthropic, and political fields in the host countries. Also, the former fragmented 
Syrian business networks have reorganised into more cooperative and 
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in this thesis remain mine alone. I also thank my second supervisor Dr Anthony 
Gorman for his experienced comments and supervision.  
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been able to complete this thesis. Even though the situation might have been 
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make a penny out of my pocket, many still treated me kindly and provided me with 
invaluable information. I appreciate all their help and hope they will have success in 
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This thesis follows the Arabic transliteration system from the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (IJMES).  
 
The well-known English names were applied for place names, such as the cities or countries.  
 





Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This thesis is about the Syrian businessmen who relocated from Syria to Turkey, 
Egypt, and Jordan after the eruption of the 2011 revolution inside Syria. The aim of 
this thesis is to analyse how the Syrian business community has been transformed 
from the reign of al-Assad since 1970 to the on going uprising which has been active 
since 2011 as a whole, and more specifically, how this transformation has impacted 
Syrian business networks. The present study will show that the Syrian business 
community is transforming into a war-induced business diaspora, and that the 
expatriate Syrian business networks are reorganising from fragmented networks – 
which were characterised by a large number of small networks that did not trust each 
other, but inside which, benefited from a great level of trust – into more cooperative 
and transnationalised networks. The meaning of diaspora in this thesis is based on 
Roger Brubaker’s definition: the people who disperse from their home countries to 
another, who are oriented toward the homeland while they are living in host lands, 
and who maintain the boundaries with the local people in the host countries.1 
Although the community of expatriate Syrian businessmen after 2011 cannot be 
considered a diaspora (since it has only just recently developed), the concept of 
diaspora can facilitate the analysis of the development of expatriate Syrian 
businessmen. The concept of diaspora has been argued to provide a deeper 
understanding of refugee lives and settlements, since the concept “can bridge the gap 
between pre-migration and post-migration.”2   
 
                                                          
1 Rogers Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28, no. 1 (2005): 1. 
2 Östen Ragnar Wahlbeck, “Kurdish Refugee Communities: The Diaspora in Finland and England” 
(PhD’s thesis, University of Warwick, 1997) 216. 
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Trust has been a primary focus on studies of the Syrian business community, 
especially regarding the regime–businessmen relationship, since trust crucially had an 
impact on the business behaviours of Syrian businessmen.3 Top ranking businessmen 
had symbiotic relationships with the Syrian regime, whereby the Syrian regime 
required the economic capital of its business community and the business community 
needed the regime’s support for their business operations.4 Nevertheless, in line with 
the historical context of Syria, the Syrian Sunni businessmen and the 
‘Alawites-dominated regime did not trust each other at the group level.5 This lack of 
trust was one of the factors which had influenced the Syrian businessmen either to run 
their businesses themselves or in the form of family-oriented ventures prior to 2011.6 
Haddad argued that in pre-revolution Syria, although the pattern of family business 
operations was not unique, the lack of trust between the regime and its business 
community reinforced family-oriented business behaviours. In 2001, out of the 24,753 
Syrian firms in the private sector, 20,047 (81%) had only between one and five 
workers.7 
 
Nevertheless, after the eruption of the 2011 revolution and with the prolonged and 
escalated conflict, millions of Syrians have been forced to leave Syria to other 
countries – among the millions of Syrian refugees who left, thousands have been 
businessmen. Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon have become the primary 
destinations to which the Syrian business elites have relocated, especially since 
                                                          
3 Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1997); 
Bassam Haddad, Business Networks in Syria: The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
4 Matthew Gray, “Political transformation, economic reform, and tourism in Syria,” in Mediterranean 
Tourism: Facets of Socioeconomic Development and Cultural Change, ed. Yorgos Apostolopoulos, Lila 
Leontidou, and Philippos Loukissas (London: Routledge, 2001) 139. 
5 Haddad, Business Networks in Syria, 38. 




mid-2012. There were also a few Syrian businessmen who had investment residential 
permits in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) prior to 2011 and have chosen to resettle 
there.     
 
Although studies on forced migration and refugees have described those forced 
migrants and refugees as resourceless or disadvantageous, this study will demonstrate 
a different perspective from the conventional understanding.8 Thousands of migrants 
and refugees belonged to the business class prior to their emigration and have stronger 
abilities to resettle in host countries and engage in various fields. Furthermore, the 
studies on business diaspora focus on the interest-driven business diaspora, except one 
research work regarding the Somalia business diaspora who left for Kenya due to 
domestic conflict.9 This thesis will demonstrate that the research on business diaspora 
should not be limited to the one formed due to economic consideration. Rather, under 
the context of conflict, a business diaspora can also form and develop resiliently in 
host countries and take part in various economic, charitable, or political activities.  
 
The scale of the emigration of Syrian business from Syria to its neighbouring 
countries after the eruption of the 2011 revolution was enormous and unprecedented 
in terms of the numbers of businessmen and of the capital outflow. Since the eruption 
of the 2011 Syrian revolution, Turkey has become one of the main countries for 
settlement of Syrian businessmen. It was reported that at the end of March 2013, 
                                                          
8 Matthew Howard and Matthew Hodes, “Psychopathology, Adversity, and Service Utilization of 
Young Refugees,” Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 39, no. 3 
(2000); Thomas De Vroome and Frank Van Tubergen, “The Employment Experience of Refugees in 
the Netherlands,” International Migration Review, 44, no.2 (2010). 
9 Kenneth Omeje and John Mwangi, “Business Travails in the Diaspora: the Challenges and Resilience 




Turkey-based Syrians had deposited $4 billion into Turkish banks, and that the capital 
of the Syrian businessmen in Turkey had grown sharply to $6.5 billion by the end of 
2013.10 It is believed that thousands of Syrian businessmen fled from Syria to Turkey 
after 2011 and that more than 10,000 Syrian companies were then established.11 In 
addition to Turkey, many Syrian businessmen chose Egypt as a primary place of 
settlement during the first phase of resettlement after the revolution had started in 
Syria. In mid-2012, the Vice Chairman of the Egyptian Investment Committee, Nevin 
El-Shafei, stated that “15,000 Syrian investors have investments in several sectors in 
Egypt, and the food industry accounts for almost half of the Syrian investments in 
Egypt.”12 In December 2012, according to ʿUmar al-Ḍabaʿ, the Coordinator of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Egyptian Society, Syrian businessmen 
established 20 spinning factories in Egypt, and the value of each factory varied from 
$10 million to $700 million. In Jordan, although the number of Syrian businessmen 
was not as great as in Turkey or Egypt, the importance was also not negligible. The 
number of the registered Syrian companies in Jordan accounted for 25% of the 9,024 
foreign registered companies in 2014.13 The number of Syrian restaurants in Jordan 
                                                          
10 Deborah Amos, “Syrian Financial Capital’s Loss Is Turkey’s Gain,” NPR, March 29, 2013, accessed 
March 8, 2017, 
http://www npr.org/2013/03/29/175622297/syrian-financial-capitals-loss-is-turkeys-gain; Mousa Al 
Omar, “liqāʾāt ṣarīḥa ḥawl rijāl al-aʿmāl wa-ḥaqīqat daʿmi-him li-l-shaʿb al-Sūrī ,” [Frank meetings 
about businessmen and the fact that they support the Syrian people] YouTube, December 22, 2013, 
accessed June 24, 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vxlr8sJQ2Uk. 
11“ʿadad al-sharikāt al-Sūriyya fī Turkiyā yatajāwwaz 10 ālāf sharika,” [Number of Syrian companies 
in Turkey exceeds 10,000 companies] Turk Press, December 4. 2015, accessed March 8, 2017, 
http://www.turkpress.co/node/12286. 
12 “Syrian Businesspeople Map.” 
13“sharikāt Sūriyya tuwāṣil al-hijra.. ilā al-Urdunn,” [Syrian companies continue to migrate.. to Jordan] 







reached 1100 in 2014, with total capital of about 15 million Jordanian dinars (around 
$21 million).14 
 
The massive emigration of Syrian businessmen is significant in terms of the capital 
they brought with them, and the large numbers of businessmen emigrating includes 
prominent business figures prior to the 2011 revolution. First, according to the 
Chairman of the Damascus Chamber of Industry, 150,000 businessmen have left 
Syria since the year of 2011.15 The news from the UAE ‘The National’ in February 
2012 indicates that “Close to 100 billion Syrian pounds (Dh 6.41bn), more than a fifth 
of all funds on deposit, have left the Syrian banking system since the conflict began 
last year,” which is worth around $2 billion.16 Second, thousands of Syrian-registered 
companies were established in the refugee countries following resettlement.17 Third, 
not only did modest, but low ranking businessmen leave Syria, but so did many 
top-ranking tycoons. At least 11 Syrian businessmen from the “100 prominent 
businessmen list” in 2010 left following the eruption of the revolution in 2011, 
including: Ghassān Karyam – former president and vice president of Aleppan 
Chamber of Industry; Muḥammad Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī – former president of Aleppan 
Chamber of Industry; ʿAdnān al-Nan – former president of Damascus countryside 
Chamber of Commerce; Muḥammad al-Shāʿir – former member of the Board of 
Directors of Damascus Chamber of Industry; ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Daʿbūl – whose family 
                                                          
14“thaqāfa al-ṭaʿām al-Sūrī taghzu al-mudun al-ʾUrduniyya min khilāl 1100 maṭʿam,” [Syrian food 
culture overrun in Jordanian cities through 1100 restaurants] Eqtsad, April 13 2015 accessed March 8, 
2017, http://www.eqtsad net/read/10033/. 
15 “Syrian Businesspeople Map,” Syrian Economic Forum, January 27, 2016, accessed March 15, 2017, 
http://www.syrianef.org/En/2016/01/syrian-businessmen-map/. 
16 Hadeel al Sayegh, “Billions in Bank Funds Take Flight from Syria,” The National, February 26, 
2012, accessed March 15, 2017,   
http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/billions-in-bank-funds-take-flight-from-syria. 
17 Anadolu Agency, “akbar 10 rijāl aʿmāl Sūrīyīn yahrabūn ilā Miṣr,” [Top 10 Syrian businessmen flee 




owns the strongest industrial cleaning trade mark ‘Madar’ in Syria; Khālid al-ʿUlabī – 
member of the People Assembly and an active member of the Aleppan Chamber of 
Industry and Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry; Ḥusayn Bādinjki – former 
president of Aleppan Chamber of Commerce; ʿAmmār Ṣabbāgh – from one of the 
biggest industrial and commercial families in Aleppo working in the field of blankets, 
real estate, and tourism, also owned the biggest shopping centre in Aleppo; Zuhayr 
Sayf – from an old industrial Syrian family in the ready-made clothing industry; Firās 
Ṭallās – the son of the former Syrian Defence Minister, Muṣṭafā Ṭallās, who was a 
business tycoon in the Syrian market; and Zuhayr Saḥlūl – from the biggest Syrian 
family working in money exchange.18 This suggests that not only did a great number 
of Syrian businessmen leave Syria during the revolution period, but also that there 
were businessmen who used to be rich and important economic players inside the 
country were also among the emigrants.  
 
This massive and rapid outflow of Syrian businessmen and their capital from Syria to 
neighbouring countries has not only had a significant impact on the Syrian economy, 
but has also led to the emergence of new expatriate Syrian business communities in 
the host countries. Furthermore, the emigration of top Syrian businessmen has 
challenged the former symbiotic relationship between the Syrian regime and the 
economic elites in the business community. For example, in addition to the 11 
prominent businessmen listed above who left Syria after 2011, many were politically 
opposed to the Bashar regime, including Ayman Asfari and Walīd al-Zuʿbi – who 
were also listed on the top 100 businessmen list and were based outside of Syria prior 
                                                          
18 Interviews and personal observation. 
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to the year of 2011 – as well as thousands of less influential Syrian businessmen who 
fled Syria.  
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The main research question of this thesis is: how has the Syrian business community 
been transformed from the reign of Assad through the 2011 uprising to the on-going 
exile as a whole, and more specifically, how has this transformation had an impact on 
Syrian business networks? In order to understand the transformation of the Syrian 
business community, the first question to be addressed is: what did the pre-revolution 
Syrian business community look like? From this, few more questions arise: what 
happened to the Syrian businessmen after the eruption of the revolution in 2011 and 
how did they react towards the unprecedented massive uprising in the country? How 
and why did they decide to flee Syria and resettle in other countries? What made them 
embark on different economic, philanthropic, or political activities and in which ways? 
These questions will be examined in three parts depending on the different 
spatiotemporal contexts: the Syrian business community in the pre-revolution period, 
the period from the eruption of the revolution to expatriation and further settlement in 
the host countries, and the post-settlement period from the onset of different activities 
in the host countries.  
 
First, in order to understand how the Syrian business community has been 
transformed from peace to conflict, a delineation of the former features of Syrian 
business community must be examined. The networking of Syrian businessmen used 
to be fragmented due to the political-economic environment within Syria.  
19 
 
Corruption combined with nepotism, legal insecurity accompanied by state 
intervention into businessmen’s activities, and a lack of efficiency and opaqueness in 
the public sectors were the three main factors that made this network fragmented. 
Nevertheless, Syrian businessmen had developed their own specific mechanisms such 
as non-interest loans and informal arbitrations to avoid dealing with the banking and 
judiciary systems that they did not trust. Furthermore, since the relationships between 
the Syrian regime and its business community used to be a crucial factor in deciding 
the results of the Syrian businessmen’s economic performance, it is important to 
categorise the Syrian businessmen into four groups based on their relationships with 
the Assad regime: ruling family, crony businessmen, strategic businessmen, and 
independent businessmen. As such, this will not only include the low-profile majority 
Syrian businessmen into the discussion, but this categorisation will also be used as a 
basis for analysing the different political reactions of the Syrian businessmen towards 
the 2011 revolution and how do they engage in political activities after they relocated 
into the host countries. In addition to economic activities, it is also important to 
demonstrate the active participation of Syrian businessmen in philanthropic works and 
the limited political participation in the pre-revolution era. Since the Syrian 
businessmen not only used to play important economic roles in Syria prior to the 
revolution, but they also provided important contributions to charities and participated, 
in a limited fashion, in the People’s Assembly election in the country prior to the 
revolution.19 The participation of Syrian businessmen in businesses, charities and 
politics in the pre-2011 Syria will be discussed later in the following chapter. The 
analysis of the pre-revolution Syrian business community will provide a primary basis 
                                                          
19 Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, “Limits of “Authoritarian Upgrading” in Syria: Private Welfare, 
Islamic Charities, and the Rise of the Zayd Movement,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
41, no. 4 (2009).  
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in order to trace the qualitative changes that happened to the Syrian business 
community through the 2011 event.  
 
Second, when the revolution started in Syria in 2011, former state-business 
relationships started to change from being symbiotic to the business class deserting 
their former patrons. Not only did some businessmen devote themselves to the 
anti-Assad campaign, but the massive outflow of Syrian businessmen also indicated 
this desertion of Syrian businessmen from their former patrons. The partial 
participation of the Syrian businessmen in the anti-Assad activities and the massive 
outflow of Syrian businessmen from Syria to its neighbouring countries deserve a 
deeper understanding to unpack the reasons behind this ‘betrayal.’ Furthermore, from 
the perspective of migration study, it has been argued that the context of the refugee 
community is important because it will, to a certain extent, affect later operations in 
the host countries.20 Thus, digging into the context of relocation and settlement can 
provide a more comprehensive understanding of why, how, and what the exiled 
Syrian businessmen went through during the revolution and the build up of their new 
lives in foreign lands. As such, an investigation of the uprising and exiled context of 
the expatriate Syrian businessmen from Syria to their host countries may facilitate the 
understanding of why a particular group of people in a particular location might 
partake in certain types of decisions. This would not only explain the transformation 
of the former state-businessmen relationships in Syria during the revolution, but it 
would also demonstrate the ways in which the economic elites who held strong 
                                                          
20 Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black and Khalid Koser, “The Limits to ‘Transnationalism’: Bosnian and 
Eritrean Refugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24, 
no. 4 (2001): 593; Hazel Smith, “Diasporas in International Conflict,” in Diasporas in conflict: 
Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? ed. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press, 2007) 9. 
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economic and social capital would go on to form new business communities in the 
host countries.  
 
On the one hand, the reactions from the Syrian business community towards the 
revolution demonstrate that although the majority of the Syrian businessmen remained 
non-reactive during the revolution, there were some Syrian businessmen who actively 
supported this unprecedented civil uprising in the country. Yet, due to the worsening 
of the conditions of security, economy, and politics following the escalations of 
conflict, many Syrian businessmen decided to flee. Although personal networks were 
argued as an important factor affecting the emigration and settlement process of the 
migrants, the routes of emigration of the Syrian businessmen also demonstrated how 
the importance of political relations between host and home governments affected the 
ways in which people decided where to relocate, as did distance, economic structures 
in the host countries, and personal networks.21 More importantly, the significance of 
economic consideration surpassed other previously suggested factors, including 
personal networks.  
 
On the other hand, originally migrants needed to deal with different challenges after 
they settled into the host countries. The beginning of the settlement also demonstrates 
various legal, political, and social constraints created by the structural conditions 
within host countries against the settlement of Syrian businessmen. Furthermore, 
                                                          
21 Monica Boyd, “Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments 
and New Agendas,” The International Migration Review, 23, no.3 (1989): 645; Michael P. Smith, 
Bernadette Tarallo, and George Kagiwada, “Colouring California: New Asian Immigrant Households, 
Social Networks and the Local State,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 15, no.2 
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although migrants initially had the expectation of a quick return to their home 
countries, their expectations during the settlement process gradually transformed to 
long-term residence due to the dim economy, lack of security and the irreparable 
conditions of their estates in Syria.22 
 
Third, diaspora as a social form includes different characteristics: social relationships, 
political orientations, and economic strategies.23 The settlement of Syrian business 
communities in host countries after the 2011 revolution conforms to this feature, 
which they conduct in various fields of activities including businesses, charities, and 
politics. This suggests that the expatriate Syrian businessmen were in an early phase 
of transnational community formation. Thus, the concept of diaspora as a social form 
can facilitate the analysis of the multiple dimensions of expatriate Syrian businessmen, 
who were not only practicing these different activities in the diaspora, but were also 
mentally and physically bound to those of their homeland. The participation of 
expatriate Syrian businessmen in different activities indicates another transformation: 
a change from primarily business activites to having various types of activities, which 
included political and philanthropic activities.  
 
From the examination of the economic investments of the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen, it will be argued that Syrian businessmen have not only migrated 
physically to their host countries, but also that, to a certain extent, the specific ways of 
thinking and acting have migrated with the businessmen to the host countries and 
have continued to affect their behaviours in the host lands. Syrian businessmen 
                                                          
22 Kristian Berg Harpviken, Social Networks and Migration in Wartime Afghanistan (Houndmills: 
Palgrave macmillan, 2009) 76 
23 Steven Vertovec, “Three Meanings of “Diaspora,” Exemplified among South Asian Religions,” 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 6, no. 3 (1997): 277-81. 
23 
 
continued to maintain fragmented trust in their networks and used other pre-2011 
mechanisms which they had applied to their business lives before their exile. 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of capital in the host countries with expectations of 
business improvement, many Syrian businessmen attempted to overcome that lack of 
trust in the business community, and ended up building new networks and 
associations with other Syrian businessmen. Political, economic, and social 
considerations were the three main criteria for improving trust among expatriate 
Syrian businessmen regarding their business networking. The expatriate Syrian 
businessmen not only seek help from previous acquaintances, but, more specifically, 
they prefer to seek help from people who were from the same cities as they were. 
Finally, due to the host countries’ environments, businessmen have needed to adjust 
some of their practices to get accustomed to different legal and business institutions in 
host countries as other migrants have done. 24  However, the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen still preserve specific ways of thinking or acting in the host countries by 
assessing the conditions in the host countries to see how their previous thought 
patterns or actions could secure them a better position.    
 
Regarding the philanthropic and political participations of the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen, it will be argued that the continuation of philanthropic activities and 
political emancipation of the decades-long, low-politicised Syrian business 
community were formed under the context of revolution and expatriation. But 
different from other diasporans or migrants who engage in charities, those expatriate 
Syrian businessmen not only provided help to their fellow countrymen in their home 
country, but they also did not neglect the needs of their fellow countrymen who fled 
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to the host countries. Regarding diaspora political participation, those who devoted 
themselves in homeland politics are mostly those who left their homeland decades 
ago. 25  Nevertheless, for the expatriate Syrian businessmen who participated in 
anti-Assad political activities, it was not only the long-term exiled businessmen who 
took part, but the businessmen who left after 2011 did so too. The experience of 
participating in politics before leaving Syria in 2011 helped this group to participate 
after they relocated to the host countries. Furthermore, these activities have moved 
from a local level in Syria to a cross-border level between Syria and the countries to 
which Syrian businessmen relocated, or even to a transnational level where Syrian 
businessmen from different countries can devote themselves to the same activities. 
This may include dynamic input from the former exiled Syrian businessmen who had 
departed Syria prior to the 2011 revolution. Finally, even though most expatriate 
Syrian businessmen have devoted themselves to philanthropic works and some of 
them have actively taken part in anti-Assad political activities, fragmented networking 
among Syrian businessmen and a low willingness to engage with political issues are, 
to a certain extent, still significant. 
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1.2 Literature on Syrian business community and business diaspora and the 
triadic analysis  
 
The timeframe of this research starts with the Syrian business community in the 
pre-2011 revolution and continues with the community’s later relocation from Syria 
to neighbouring countries. Since Wahlbeck argues that the concept of diaspora is 
helpful for analysing the livelihood of refugees in host countries, this section will not 
only review the relevant literature on the Syrian business community, but also the 
literature on business diaspora.26  
 
On the one hand, reviewing literature on the Syrian business community will 
demonstrate that the role of the Assad regime has always been one of the most 
important elements in studying the Syrian business community. It will also indicate a 
gap in previous studies on Syrian businessmen, that is, they over-emphasised 
prominent businessmen and ignored the bigger picture of the Syrian business 
community. There were many other economically strong, but low-profile, 
businessmen who were not included in previous studies. On the other hand, the 
review of literature on the business diaspora will show that the business diaspora used 
to play important economic or political roles with their home and host countries. 
However, it will also show that the previous literature on business diaspora lacks 
analysis of war-induced business diasporas, and hardly discusses how the relations 
between host-home countries influence the formation of diasporas. Finally, the 
conceptual framework of this research – the triadic analysis which includes the 
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interrelationships between the host country-home country-diaspora – will be 
developed based on the reflection of the literature. 
 
a. Studies on Syrian businessmen before 2011 
 
Previous literature on Syrian businessmen is scarce, and there are no academic studies 
on Syrian businessmen after their emigrations since 2011. Most studies related to 
Syrian businessmen focus on Syrian economic reform, rather than the Syrian business 
community itself. The structure of this section is made up of two parts based on the 
main approach of the former studies, which are, the state-centric approach and the 
network approach. The former is a macro-perspective approach for analysing the 
Syrian economy, and the latter on the other hand examines the activities of 
businessmen, including richer field research which reflects a clearer picture and has 





The literature that adopts a state-centric approach does not discuss Syrian 
businessmen directly, but focuses on the causality and problems of Syria’s economic 
liberalisation and transition or evaluation of reforms. To some extent, this approach 
illustrates how the role of the Syrian regime affected the development of the business 
class before 2011, and the main considerations of the regime in terms of the reforming 




Most scholars agree that the inadequate social and economic bases created by the 
Assad’s ruling clan since the 1970s led to the first infitah in the early 1970s, since the 
regime clearly acknowledged the demands for economic productivity from the private 
sector; however, the main consideration of the regime regarding the reform was not 
economic growth, but rather the maintenance of its political power as Perthes and 
Hinnebusch have suggested. 27  Hinnebusch and Haddad demonstrated that this 
process of economic liberalisation was conducted in a selective way. Perthes argues 
that the state’s selective economic liberalisation affected only a particular group of 
businessmen and fragmented the private sector.28 Haddad, Polling, and Sadowski 
demonstrated that only the people who have close ties to the Syrian regime could have 
access to mixed sectors.29  
 
Despite the fact that Syrian businessmen accumulated more wealth in the 1980s’ 
period of economic liberalisation than in that of the 1970s, Perthes argued that most 
industries were still maintained in the hand of the public sector.30 He interpreted the 
1980s infitah as an alliance between the regime’s elites and a specific bourgeoisie.31 
He also argues that economic reform was directed toward a corporatist model, yet for 
example, the board members of the Chamber and the General Federation of Trade 
Union were decided upon by the government. Under this restricted opening, not only 
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was a ‘new class’ formed in which the constituencies were supported by the regime 
and which obeyed the instructions of the ruling elites, but the political elites were 
embourgeoisied either by transferring from the political to the economic sector or by 
intervening in the activities of private businesses.32  
 
Even though Hopfinger and Boeckler seemed optimistic towards economic 
liberalisation and contend that Syria was moving from a state-planned economy to a 
free market, this appears to have been premature.33 Since even until 2005, the 
different economic reforms under the reign of Bashar al-Assad continued to apply 
similar strategies as his father, Hafiz, where the state still intervened and disallowed a 
prosperous private sector that might threaten its stability, as Marshall has shown.34 
Hinnebusch further argued that even though the regime claimed to apply the theory of 
the social market economy in Syria in 2005, they did not provide any clear plans 
regarding the transition, which has been called as a ‘failed transition’.35 
 
The state-centric approach of the studies has a strong top-down emphasis where the 
literature mostly focuses on the nature of the reforms and how the regime had an 
impact on the development of Syrian businessmen in the pre-2011 era, as Perthes and 
Hinnebusch have demonstrated.36 This suggests that to analyse the transformation of 
Syrian businessmen, the role of the Syrian regime should be taken into consideration, 
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since almost no businessmen could avoid the regime in their business activities. 
Nevertheless, the state-centric level approach oversimplifies the businessmen as a 




The literature on the network approach not only has more extensive empirical 
research than the state-centric approach for analysing the situation of the businessmen, 
but it also to a certain extent, looks inside the business community itself and further 
categorises the businessmen into different groups. The rich empirical evidence and 
interpretation of the relationship between the business community and the regime 
provide a more detailed observation which is necessary for the study of the current 
businessmen than the state-centric approach.   
 
As Haddad and Selvik have demonstrated, the fact that the structure of private 
businesses was usually small or family-run was a consequence of the lack of trust 
between the state and the private sector.37 Moreover, Boissière and Anderson have 
showed that at the end of the 1990s, Syrian businessmen generally depended on their 
families’ trust or professional networking to create great amounts of money.38 A 
more recent study from Haddad analyses the relationship between the regime and 
business sector between 1986 and 2005. He argues that the low-trust system between 
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the two sides constrained the private sector’s development which led to selective 
development and the high dependency of the private sector on the government. 
Although he contends that the year of 2005 was an important year for Syria because 
Bashar consolidated his power, his work does not deal with what happened after 
Bashar’s consolidation of power.39 
 
In addition, the network approach presented a similar argument to the state-centric 
approach with the unwillingness of the regime to allow a strong private sector in Syria. 
This is because a strong private sector could exceed the control of the regime. 
Therefore, as Bahout has argued, it was another constraint for the businessmen.40 
Nevertheless, Ismail argues that the alliance between the regime and businessmen was 
deteriorating and could have eventually dissolved, while the alliance between the 
religious people and merchants could have been revived.41 The businessmen not only 
needed the support of the regime, but they also needed the prestige and trust from 
religious groups.42 This dependency suggests that the study of the network of Syrian 
businessmen should not only observe the relationship between the regime and private 
sectors, but should also take the influence of religious factors into consideration. 
 
Furthermore, the limited political participation of Syrian businessmen has been 
studied. As Perthes demonstrated from the 1990 parliamentary election, three groups 
of people from the elected independent candidates can be distinguished: the upper 
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middle class includes lawyers and academics, the traditional leaders include religious 
and tribal figures, and the merchants and bourgeoisie. Perthes argues that this was due 
to the important role of the private sector which the regime had realised then gave 
them a limited say in policy making.43 However, as Selvik indicated, most business 
people have little interest in politics, or even if they were elected as parliamentarians 
they gave weak performances in the parliament.44 In 2012, one year after the eruption 
of the 2011 revolution, Haddad contended that there were no significant defections 
from the big businessmen in Damascus or Aleppo due to the decade-long 
regime-business alliance.45 Nevertheless, this argument contradicts the fact that at 
least 11 top businessmen did leave Syria, as I have already shown in the beginning of 
this chapter.  
 
Another trend in the network approach of the literature of Syrian businessmen is that 
it has categorised or used categorisation to analyse the structure of the Syrian business 
community. These previous categorisations provided general concepts about Syrian 
businessmen. Researchers used the criteria of emerging timing, economic sectors, and 
political proximity with the Syrian regime to categorise the Syrian businessmen into 
four groups, which are, the old bourgeoisie – the ones whose roots can be traced back 
to the landowning bureaucratic class of the late Ottoman Empire and whose wealth 
was strengthened during the French Mandate period (the division between the ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ is roughly divided by the year of 1963); 46 the new middle class (the new 
industrialists/ upper middle class merchants) – different scholars have used different 
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words to describe this group of businessmen but generally they were indicating the 
same group. This group benefitted from the economic opening in the 1970s under 
Hafiz’s leadership, and their wealth and influence surpassed the old bourgeoisie as a 
direct result of the infitah policy;47 the new commercial class – this group emerged 
only after 1973. It benefited from the infitahs in 1973 and in the late 1980s. Their rise 
was attributed to personal ties with people in the regime; 48  and the state 
bourgeoisie –the members of this group were from the Syrian regime or had key 
positions in the regime’s bureaucratic apparatus or military. They not only had 
significant political and economic power, but also had extreme wealth which may 
have even surpassed that of the old bourgeoisie.49  
 
Although the previous categorisation did provide an analytical explanation of the 
Syrian business community prior to 2011, to a certain extent, it overly focuses on the 
prominent businessmen which are the so-called state bourgeoisie and the crony 
businessmen, and the businessmen who become extremely rich through exploiting 
their privileged networks with the regime. Even though Haddad categorises one group 
of businessmen as the independent businessmen, his work mostly remained on the 
discussion of the prominent businesspeople.50 Since many Syrian businessmen were 
forced to work under the radar and to cover their wealth due to the tense 
socio-political environment, the categorisation does not sufficiently touch on the 
majority but low-profile business people. Even though the top businessmen owned 
much more economic capital, this does not mean that the rest of the majority 
socially-politically modest businessmen’s political strength and socio-economic 
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importance were negligible. For instance, many businessmen invested in different 
sectors with a smaller amount of capital in order to distribute their capital into 
different sectors.51 This indicates that many businessmen who invested under radar 
were also economically wealthy, even though they may not have been as rich as the 
top businesspeople who had gained extreme wealth through nepotistic ties or illegal 
activities, or who held big shares in a specific field.  
 
Furthermore, the former categorisations rely on the features of the businessmen who 
become extremely wealthy during the infitah during the 1970s and 1980s. They were 
categorised into the so-called new class businessmen or state bourgeoisie. Yet these 
categorisations by timeframe overlook the fact that the infitah inside Syria not only 
benefited the state and crony businessmen, but also the ‘merchant upper middle class’ 
who played an important economic role in Syria but were relatively modest in 
political and economic stance. This segment of the business class has been largely 
ignored in the literature, with the exception of Droz-Vincent work.52 Thus, a revision 
of the former studies of the structure of Syrian business community to include this 
majority modest merchant upper middle class is important for understanding the 
pre-revolution Syrian business community’s nature, and it would facilitate the 
explanation of their developments after the eruption of 2011 revolution.  
 
In addition, the categorisation of businessmen by economic sector, which Perthes 
suggests as new industrialists and commercialists, cannot reflect the fact that there 
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were many businessmen who invested in more than one business sector. Either 
industrialist or commercialist, businessmen were not deemed to have the same 
attributes as Perthes suggests. For example, Perthes states, “…the old bourgeoisie 
emphasized heavy industry – electrical generation, water, sugar refining and 
processing, textile weaving and manufacturing – the new industrialists are almost 
entirely restricted to light and finishing industries.”53 Nevertheless, the example of 
businessmen Muḥammad Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī, Khālid al-ʿUlabī, and Ghassān Karyam, 
are working in the heavy industrial field, as textile and refrigerators, and they are not 
from the old bourgeoisie class. Thus, a categorisation based on the economic sectors 
may oversimplify the dynamic of Syrian businessmen’s investment. 
 
Finally and more importantly, the eruption of the revolution in 2011 sent thousands of 
businessmen into exile, along with their economic capital. Nevertheless, the former 
categorisation does not illustrate any clear picture regarding these expatriate 
businessmen since most of the businessmen who are included in the categorizations 
are cronies or entrepreneurs who overly depended on the regime and did not leave 
Syria. 
 
The literature on Syrian businessmen indicates that whether by the state-centric or 
network approach, the role of the Assad regime in the development of the Syrian 
business community is crucial. Nevertheless, the previous literature overly focuses on 
the prominent business elites, which neglected the majority modest, but economically 
important, business people. Even though the network approach conducted by Haddad 
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looks further into the relationships between the regime and its business community 
and points out the lack of trust on both sides, the networking among the Syrian 
businessmen have been even less touched on. 54  Thus, this research on the 
transformation of the Syrian business community not only needs to take the regime’s 
role into consideration, but also requires further research into the former majority, but 
low-profile, businessmen and their networks to fill the gaps. 
 
b. Studies on business diaspora 
 
The study of diaspora can be found in subjects as diverse as politics, economics, 
sociology, literature, and religion. Since the late 1980s, research on diaspora has 
become more prevalent. 55  The term diaspora originates from the Greek word 
diaspeiro, literally meaning to disperse or to scatter.56 Even though the semantic 
meaning of the term seems to be simple, the definition of the term ‘diaspora’ and its 
concepts vary from scholar to scholar, as Tölölyan demonstrates the shifting discourse 
on diaspora and further argues that the diaspora is “in danger of becoming a 
promiscuously capacious category.”57 The debate over the definition of ‘diaspora’ 
has moved from a restricted to a broad concept. Safran limits the meaning of diaspora 
to six characteristics: people or their ancestors who were dispersed from a specific 
centre to two or more peripheries; people who possess a collective memory of their 
original homeland; people who think they cannot, or actually cannot, be fully 
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accepted inside a host country; people who consider the home country to be their ideal 
home and who would return if they could; people who need to commit to the 
maintenance of their homeland; and people who continuously relate themselves with 
their homeland while they are physically away from it. In terms of this definition, the 
only ‘ideal type’ which conforms to this strict frame is the Jewish Diaspora.58  
 
However, many scholars believe that the concept of diaspora should be more 
inclusive yet not wantonly developed without limits.59 Tölölyan suggests that “we 
use ‘diaspora’ provisionally to indicate our belief that the term that once described 
Jewish, Greek, and Armenian dispersions now shares meanings with a larger semantic 
domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest worker, exile 
community, overseas community, and ethnic community.”60 Clifford even argues that 
“we should be wary of constructing our working definition of a term like diaspora by 
recourse to an ‘ideal type.’”61 Gorman and Kasbarian suggest the working definition 
of diaspora should be “one that respects its historical and etymological roots but is 
open to new creative uses, within the broad triadic (homeland–diaspora–host state) 
parameters.”62 
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Brubaker identifies three criteria for the concept of diaspora: dispersion, homeland 
orientation, and boundary-maintenance.63 These three criteria can be found in all 
scholarly discussions regarding the concepts of diaspora, either directly or indirectly. 
Dispersion is a self-evident phenomenon that indicates a group of people moving 
from their homeland (voluntarily or forcedly) to other countries.64 However, this kind 
of exile should be developed in a multi-generational way with a durability that can be 
considered to be diaspora.65 In addition, the homeland orientation indicates the 
political, economic, and social ties between the diaspora community and their home 
country.66 This makes diaspora distinct from migration.67 Furthermore, Brubaker 
argues that “boundary-maintenance is an indispensable criterion of diaspora.” 68 It is 
the identity of the diaspora community that makes them conspicuous in the host 
society. Thus, many diaspora studies are based on a national unit of analysis to 
elaborate on further discussion. For instance, Sheffer’s research on ethno-national 
diaspora is a typical case.69 In addition to the three criteria definition of diaspora, 
Cohen classifies diasporas into five groups: victim, labour, imperial, trade, and 
de-territorialised.70 However, Safran argues that this typology “permits one to label 
virtually all expatriate groups as diasporas.”71          
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In this thesis, these three criteria delineated by Brubaker will be applied in order to 
examine the expatriate Syrian business community since not only do these three 
criteria comprise important variables of a diaspora, but they also have been defined by 
other scholars. The expatriate Syrian businessmen have been dispersed to Syria’s 
various neighbouring countries. As such, in addition to the dispersion, the homeland 
orientation and boundary-maintenance must be further examined to determine how 
the Syrian business community has been transformed into a war-induced business 
diaspora after the 2011 revolution.  
 
1) Impacts of diaspora  
 
Most studies on diaspora focus on the diasporas’ abilities and the impact that a 
diaspora has on the home or host countries. On the one hand, a diaspora is considered 
to be an agent of development, wherein previous scholars argue that such 
communities can play an important role in the development of their original country 
and that their influences may even reach an international level.72 On the other hand, it 
has been argued that these transnational communities are peace destroyers which 
deteriorate their country’s domestic stability and even prolong civil wars under certain 
circumstances.73 This may be due to their historical context and to the diaspora’s 
conditions of settlement, since these are important elements that influence their 
further development.74 Since the spatiotemporal background of the formation of 
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diaspora communities is essential for research into the development of those 
communities, in order to delineate the pre-emigration context of the Syrian 
businessmen chapter 2 will analyse the pre-2011 Syrian business community and 
chapter 3 will analyse the decision-making processes of their emigration after 2011.   
 
Diasporas demonstrate their effects on their homelands and their destinations in three 
dimensions: political, economic, and social. Politically, when the diaspora’s homeland 
is facing a certain kind of political dilemma or instability, the diaspora community in 
the host country may attempt to influence their domestic political issues through 
lobbying or even protesting in the host country. For instance, the Sir Lankan Tamil 
diaspora demonstrated their political support for the opposition group (Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam) through a protest in Toronto while their homeland was in a 
state of civil war.75 Economically, the diaspora communities show their ability in at 
least four ways: remittance, trade, investment, and skills transfer. It was estimated that 
the annual amount of the money transferred by the Afghan diaspora from Pakistan to 
Afghanistan between 1994 and 1995 was $50 million through the Hawala system.76 
The Hawala system is an informal fund transfer system, it refers to money transfers 
outside of formal banking sector channels.77 Many governments also understand the 
importance of diaspora to their countries. By ensuring they have a stable investment 
environment and providing them with specific favourable regulations, such 
governments expect diasporas to return investments or do business with their home 
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countries. For example, the Ethiopian government has attempted to attract their 
overseas diaspora to participate in their homeland development since there are many 
Ethiopian diasporas who have succeeded as business entrepreneurs in North 
America.78 After 2000, the Assad regime also applied a similar policy to attract the 
expatriate bourgeoisie to return to Syria. 79  Socially, diaspora communities can 
produce cultural exchanges between local societies and their homelands. This can be 
found in institutions that are established by diaspora communities to promote mutual 
understanding between the immigrants and local people.80 Based on the previous 
understanding on economic, social, and political effects of the diaspora to their home 
and host countries, the thesis will examine how they engaged in these three specific 
fields to analyse how the Syrian business community has been transformed after 
relocating to the host countries.  
 
2) Business diaspora 
 
Businessmen travelling beyond national borders for business activities are not a new 
phenomenon. However, not until the later stages of the twentieth century did 
intellectuals start to investigate the topic of trade diaspora, in this case, in West Africa. 
As Curtin demonstrates “the term ‘trading diaspora’ originated with the 
anthropologist Abner Cohen, who defined it as ‘a nation of socially interdependent, 
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but spatially dispersed communities.’”81  Curtin further elaborates that the trade 
diaspora is the commercial professionals who move to a town are important in the 
host countries (in cities but not fringe towns) and settle down for business activities.82 
Cohen describes the business diaspora as “puzzling and inconvenient,” as 
businessmen can either become successful or pariahs to their host countries.83 He 
concludes that without regard to these perplexities, the facts show that business 
activities can bring positive economic results to the diaspora homeland, to host 
societies, and to the diaspora itself. Furthermore, the study of business diaspora 
argues that expatriates donate, transfer, or invest in their home countries because of a 
psychological sentiment or philanthropy towards their motherland and their people.84  
 
In addition, they have the advantage of knowing their country’s networks and 
environments compared to other foreign investors – another reason which drives them 
to become involved in their homeland’s economic activities, since they are more 
competitive than others.85 
 
Finally, some diaspora groups even sponsor specific political groups in their original 
countries by transferring remittances. This transferral of remittances indicates how 
diasporas demonstrate their political identity through a transnational network, and is 
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considered to be protracting their homeland’s instability.86 The literature of business 
diaspora demonstrates that business diasporas not only have a strong economic stance, 
but in some cases, they also can play a role in their homeland’s political affairs. 
 
Nevertheless, the study of business diaspora mainly focuses on voluntary diaspora: 
when people move out of their home country to seek a better life. This interest-driven 
business diaspora has been broadly studied as with the cases of the Chinese or 
Lebanese diasporas.87 Conflict-driven diasporas usually involve refugees or exiles 
who have less economic and social capital and so typically preclude being defined as 
business diaspora.88 The cases of Afghani, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Iranian, Somali, 
Somalilander, and Sri Lankan diasporas are all war-generated diasporas in which their 
home country’s domestic instability left them no choice but to leave their homeland.89 
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Even though this kind of diaspora is conflict-generated, they also have, to some extent, 
the characteristics of business diaspora such as economic abilities or 
entrepreneurships. The case of expatriate Syrian businessmen in this thesis is a case of 
war-induced migrants who were forced to leave their homeland due to conflict, but 
previously had been economically strong.  
 
The literature on diaspora demonstrates the concepts and the impacts of a diaspora in 
the context of the original countries, and the literature on business diasporas shows 
the economic and political impacts of transnational communities on their original and 
home countries. In addition, the social background of expatriate groups plays a 
significant role in the future development of the diaspora. Voluntary business 
diasporas usually develop in a better economic situation than war-induced business 
diaspora. This is because the former groups are composed of business professionals 
who have knowledge and skills before they emigrate.  
 
Reviewing the existing literature on business diaspora indicates that two issues need 
to be addressed. First, most literature merely emphasises the relationships between the 
diasporas and their home countries or the relationships between the diaspora and the 
host countries. However, the settlement and relocation process of emigration of 
Syrian businessmen to the host countries after 2011 will demonstrate that the 
relationships between the home and host governments also played an important role 
and needed to be considered as another factor which affects the process of the 
formation of a war-induced business diaspora. Second, even though massive 
population emigrations due to domestic conflicts have repeatedly happened in human 
history, there has been only one article written by Kenneth Omeje and John Mwangi 
44 
 
on the war-induced business diaspora: when Somali businessmen emigrated from 
war-torn Somalia to neighbouring Kenya. This study demonstrates not only the legal, 
political, and social impediments the Somalia business diaspora has encountered in 
Kenya, but it also demonstrates that the family/social networks of the Somali business 
diaspora have facilitated business success in Kenya.90 As such, this research will 
distinguish the Syrian business class out from their compatriots who also fled the 
country because of war, and will focus exclusively on the businessmen to demonstrate 
how the economic elites migrated and settled through the disaster of their country and 
started their new lives in the alien lands. This strategy of research expects to pave a 
novel approach in the study of diasporas and provide a different way of thinking 
regarding the business diaspora, which is how a reconsideration of the importance of 
war-induced business diaspora can contribute to the on-going war.   
 
c. Triadic conceptual framework 
 
Based on the review of literature on Syrian business community and business diaspora, 
this study attempts to answer the question of how the Syrian business community has 
been transformed by looking into the development of the Syrian business community 
from a triadic conceptual framework. The triadic conceptual framework in this thesis 
refers to is the mutual interactions between three entities: the home country (Syria), 
the host countries (Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan), and the diaspora groups (the 
expatriate Syrian businessmen).  
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Previous studies of diaspora have a strong emphasis on the homeland dimension since 
the connections between the diaspora groups and their home countries, physically or 
sentimentally, were one of the main components which defined groups as a 
‘diaspora.’91 In the case of the Syrian businessmen, not only did their relationships 
with the Syrian regime crucially decide the development of their economic activities 
in pre-revolution Syria as the previous literature has shown, but also after they 
resettled into the host countries, their activities were also homeland-orientated 
regardless of field, be it economic investment, philanthropic works, or political 
activities.  
 
Furthermore, the host countries have a direct or indirect impact on the diasporans who 
resettled in their countries. This includes local regulations and the attitudes of the 
local societies towards the diasporans. Even though the former literature on diaspora 
did not pay much attention on how the relations between the host and home countries 
affect the formation of diaspora, under this framework, in addition to the analysis of 
the relations between the diaspora (Syrian businessmen) and their home country 
(Syria), and the relations between the diaspora (Syrian businessmen) and their host 
countries (Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan), the framework I propose in this research pays 
attention to the relationships between the home country (Syria) and the host countries 
(Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan), especially regarding the analysis of the relocation and 
resettlement process. Keeping this triadic conceptual framework in mind, I will look 
into the relationships between the Syrian businessmen and the Syrian regime from the 
1970s to the present, the interactions between the expatriate Syrian businessmen and 
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the host countries after 2011, and the relations between the Syrian government and the 
host countries in which the Syrian businessmen have settled. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 
Previous studies of the Syrian business community have shown the lack of sufficient 
fieldwork data on the Syrian businessmen, even during the more liberated Bashar 
al-Assad era, which was the main impediment in examining the complexities and 
subtleties of the Syrian business community as Haddad suggested.92 Address the lack 
of first-hand data, this research is based primarily on ethnographic work with 
expatriate Syrian businessmen in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. The reason for choosing 
Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan were because of the enormous number of the Syrian 
businessmen and the wealth that they brought with them into these three countries 
after the 2011 revolution. This means that the Syrian business communities which 
emerged in these three countries after 2011, to a certain extent, represent the 
meaningful dynamic of the Syrian business community in exile.    
 
a. Definition of a businessman  
 
The criteria of a businessman in this thesis is any Syrian who used to have investment 
activities in Syria and who was registered in the Syrian Chambers prior to the 2011 
revolution, or any Syrian who relocated to host countries after 2011 and then 
embarked on economic investment and registered with the local Chambers, 
conformed to the selection criteria of ‘businessman.’ Among the 191 Syrian 
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businessmen interviewed, only 7 were not in business prior to 2011 but later on 
established companies and registered in the host countries.  
 
The reason for using the criteria is that many of the informants maintained a 
low-profile investment in their host countries, and it was difficult to judge the amount 
of capital of a company and the economic importance of the interviewees from its 
outward appearance. For instance, from interviewing a dessert shop Aleppan owner in 
Gaziantep, Turkey, I discovered that he used to deal in the gold trading. The amount 
of capital he used to deal in and own by himself, as well as his knowledge of the 
former Syrian business community and Syrian political economic environment was 
not negligible. 
 
b. Methods: interviews, direct observations, and press surveys 
 
The two ethnographic methods applied in this research were interviews and direct 
observations. The interviews took place face-to-face, were open-ended and 
semi-structured, and most interviews lasted between one to two hours, and some even 
lasted for three hours. Some informants were interviewed more than once. The 
language for the interview was standard Arabic since most businessmen were well 
educated and fluent in it, with the exception of three informants whose interviews 
were in English. Given that the development of the expatriate Syrian business 
community is a new phenomenon, the flexibility of the semi-structured interview 
attempts to uncover the ideas and knowledge that have thus far slipped under the radar. 
All the conversations during the interviews revolved around the issues of the 
pre-revolution social, economic, and political situations in Syria, as well as the 
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experiences of expatriation to resettlement in the host countries. There were four main 
focal points during the interviews: the former professional activities of the informants 
in Syria, including their experiences or opinions of the engagement in economic, 
charitable or political related activities within the country; the businessmen’s 
reactions towards the 2011 civil uprising in Syria and the rationales behind their 
expatriation and the places of resettlements; the ways in which the businessmen 
interact with fellow Syrian businessmen and the local residents; and the reasons for 
and means of the professional activities they conducted or engaged in within the host 
countries. These points are essential for understanding what the situation in Syria was 
like before the revolution as well as for understanding their expatriation and 
resettlement in the host countries.  
 
For a qualitative study, the sample size should be appropriate enough to be able to 
adequately answer the research question.93 It is crucial to have enough data which 
can show variation and correlation of distinct groups and variables. The data 
collection in this research is a purposive sample, “[where] participants are selected 
according to predetermined criteria relevant to a particular research objective.”94 As 
Guest et al. further argues, purposive samples should be larger if the aim of the study 
is to “assess variation between distinct groups or correlation among variables.”95 In 
order to answer the question of how the Syrian business community has been 
transformed since 2011, a large amount of data is needed because there are several 
variables at play. Syrian businessmen who were from different cities in Syria and 
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worked in different business sectors moved to different countries and cities for 
various reasons and embarked on different activities and worked in various economic 
sectors and scales. Understanding the transformation of this heterogeneous context 
not only requires a scrutinised plan for the number of interviews to represent the 
transformation, but also requires multi-site fieldwork interviewing Syrian 
businessmen in different cities. Thus, the researcher conducted interviews across 
Turkey (Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Mersin), Egypt (Al-Obour, 6th of October, Cairo, 
and al-Badr), and Jordan (Amman). In Gaziantep and Istanbul there were 64 and 45 
interviewees respectively since these two cities were the primary relocation choices. 
In Amman, Mersin, 6th of October and Cairo, there were 23, 20, 18, and 15 
informants respectively. In Al-Obour and Badr, there were only 5 and 1 informants 
due to a limitation of time for field research in Egypt. In total, the researcher 
interviewed 191 informants. Although this number seems high, this was due to the 
need of understanding the different context and nature of the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen who moved to different cities and countries and conducted various 
activities.   
 
In total, 191 Syrian businessmen were interviewed: 129 in Turkey, 39 in Egypt, and 
23 in Jordan. All of the interviewees were from Sunni backgrounds, which made up 
74% of the Syrian population prior to the 2011 revolution. Although there were 
extremely rich businessmen from the Alawite and Shiite sects, these groups are only 
13% of the population, and only few of them became important businessmen, as 
previous studies have suggested.96  This data cannot reflect the attitudes of the 
minority community in Syria, but since the majority of the businessmen are Sunni, it 
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can still make major contributions to the study of the Syrian business community. 
Additionally, three interviewees were Turkmen and two interviewees were Kurds, but 
the rest of the interviewees were all Arabs. The backgrounds of the interviewees do 
not opposite to the fact that more than 90% of the population in Syria is Arab.97 Only 
three interviewees were female. This was due to the social culture in Syria, where, as 
a male researcher, it is not easy or proper to have access to or contact with females. 
Even during my stay at my male Syrian teacher’s house in Istanbul for more than two 
months, I never saw or talked with his wife – except on one occasion when I was sick, 
but I still needed to close the door so she could leave the medicine without 
face-to-face conversation.   
 
During one interview, two Turkey-based Aleppan businessmen (one worked in the 
plastic industry and trading, and the other one invested in restaurants and food 
services) informed me of the opportunity to participate with them in trade fairs with 
other Syrian businessmen in Turkey. As such, direct observation was also applied in 
this study since I personally attended four trade fairs in Turkey with Syrian 
businessmen to directly observe how they conducted their business, and how they 
interacted with each other during these trade fairs. Two strengths of direct observation, 
as Patton argues, are firstly that it can let the inquirer have a better understanding of 
the context of the people whom she/he is observing, and secondly it can capture 
important information which may “routinely escape awareness among the people in 
the setting.”98 Based on its strengths, the direct observation method provides the 
researcher with the ability to observe and reveal how businessmen interact in groups 
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of more than a dozen businessmen. With the application of direct observation during 
interviews, the researcher realised the fear and unwillingness in the majority of 
businessmen to talk about political issues as an individual. The application of direct 
observation during trade fairs confirmed this fear and unwillingness. Moreover, its 
main contribution lies in understanding businessmen’s social interactions in a group – 
the expatriate Syrian businessmen were afraid even to raise their hands to express 
their opinions or to write down their contact details at a gathering.          
 
In addition to these two ethnographic methods, information was also collected from 
Arabic news websites. The reason for using up-to-date, first-hand news from official 
and semi-official Arabic websites is that it could supply neglected but significant facts 
which could not be gained from the academic literature or ethnographic work. It can 
also be used as a complementary source for ensuring the authenticity of the interview 
data.    
 




Pilot fieldwork was conducted for one month between mid-May and mid-June 2014 in 
the two Turkish cities of Istanbul and Gaziantep. Before departure, four informants 
had already promised to accept an interview. The first Damascene informant used to 
work in the furniture and plumbing trade in Syria but resettled in Istanbul after the 
revolution. The second Aleppan informant worked in the field of machine trading in 
Gaziantep. The third Aleppan informant established a newspaper company in 
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Gaziantep. The last Aleppan informant established a general trading company in 
Gaziantep.  
 
The first informant was contacted through an introduction by my PhD supervisor Dr 
Thomas Pierret, and the latter three informants’ names were found on different online 
news media while preparing for pilot fieldwork. By finding the Facebook accounts of 
these three businessmen and sending them private messages explaining the purpose of 
the research and the intentions interviewing them, it was possible to get in touch with 
these three businessmen after I went into the field (the fourth informant did not 
answer calls after I arrived in Turkey and thus his information is not included). By 
applying a snowballing approach, the three informants each introduced to me at least 
one or two other Syrian businessmen who were working in Turkey.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to prevent interview data from being limited to the same social 
networks – which could have led this research into a bias – I also walked along the 
main business streets of Istanbul and Gaziantep looking for shops or companies with 
Arabic signs and asked the owners whether they were from Syria or not and if I could 
conduct interviews with them or not. In Gaziantep, a Turkish friend of the owner of 
the madrasa (religious school) where I was staying at introduced me to a Homsi 
industrialist. As such, a total of 17 Syrian businessmen who were not introduced by 
the first three informants’ networks were successfully located and interviewed.  
 
In total, 31 Syrian businessmen were interviewed during the pilot fieldwork; one was 
from the 100 prominent businessmen list in Syria in 2009; three established factories 
in Turkey; two owned educational institutes; two worked in the newspaper business; 
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two had begun working in the politics; one had a textile workshop; the rest worked in 
various kinds of businesses including, restaurants, sweet shops, and clothes shops.99 
All these informants started their new careers in Turkey after 2011.   
 
Three fieldwork trips: Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan 
 
Upon returning from the pilot fieldwork, the collected data was organised and coded 
using Evernote software. The first five-month fieldwork trip to the Turkish cities of 
Istanbul, Gaziantep, and Mersin took place between the end of November 2014 and 
the end of April 2015. In total, 98 Syrian businessmen were interviewed. This was 
followed by another twenty-day fieldwork trip to the Amman, Jordan between the end 
of July and the end of August 2015, where 23 Syrian businessmen were interviewed. 
The final fieldwork trip took place in the Egyptian cities of Cairo, 6th of October, 
Al-Obour, and al-Badr for 2.5 months between mid-September and the end of 
November 2015 where 39 Syrian businessmen were interviewed.  
 
In order to find new Syrian businessmen informants, four primary methods were 
applied:  
 
1) browsing online news and finding important Syrian businessmen’s names or the 
names of organisations, then sending them messages through Facebook or 
directly visiting their offices. For example in Egypt, one Aleppan textile tycoon 
who was also listed in the 100 prominent businessmen in Syria in 2009, was 
found through a Facebook group called “Rate AUC professors !!!!!!!!!!!!!” 
                                                          
99 “abraz 100 rajul aʿmāl Surī,” [100 prominent Syrian businessmen] Aliqtisadi, 2009, 2010. 
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Within this group, members were mostly students from the American University 
of Cairo.100  
2) walking and seeking on the streets for any Syrian companies or shops;  
3) asking for official data from local semi-official organisations: in Turkey, this 
included visiting the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Istanbul, Mersin, 
and Gaziantep, as well as the Silk Road Development Agency (İPEKYOLU 
KALKINMA AJANSI) in Gaziantep.101 In Jordan, this was done by visiting the 
Investment Commission in Amman.102 The managers and administrators of these 
organisations also introduced other Syrian businessmen who they knew;  
4) random encounters: One had been encountered during the pilot study fieldwork. 
He had been on the same flight from Istanbul to Gaziantep and an interview was 
arranged for the time period of the pilot fieldwork. .  
 
d. The use of Evernote  
 
During the interview, it was not possible to record what the informants said on any 
electronic device since most informants were nervous and cautious not to expose their 
identities. As such, during the interviews, all the conversations were written down (in 
the researcher’s native language, Chinese) in notebooks.103 After the interviews, the 
notes were transcribed onto a laptop computer using Evernote software. The use of 
                                                          
100  Rate AUC Professors, accessed March 12, 2017, 
https://www facebook.com/groups/rate.auc.prof/?fref=ts; “abraz 100 rajul aʿmāl Surī.” 
101 Silkroad Development Agency, 2013, accessed March 12, 2017, http://www.ika.org.tr/english.html. 
102 Jordan Investment Commission, accessed March 12, 2017, https://jic.gov.jo/portal. 
103 The reason I wrote in Chinese was because that this is my mother language, and also, the 
informants could not understand what I was writing since some of them were trying to peep on my 




Evernote facilitates the researcher in storing, categorising, and retrieving interview 
data and further helps the data analysis. 
 
The advantage of using the Evernote software for organising data was that it easily 
categorises the informants, this also help for the process of data analysis which will be 
explained later in following section. By using the tag function, it is possible to use 
more than one label in the informants’ files. Eight main tags were used for this 
database: their time of departure from Syria; the Syrian city where they came from; 
the cities and countries which they relocated to after their departure; the activities they 
engage in in the host countries (economic, philanthropic, political, etc. or no 
activities); the political affiliations of the businessmen; whether or not they had 
business partnerships and whether or not they had dual nationalities, non-Arab 
ethnicities, (such as Kurd or Turkmen); and the specific non-economic organisations 
they were working on, if any. 
 
In order to demonstrate the diverse nature of the informants, a brief description is 
relevant. This includes the time of emigration from Syria to the host country, the 
various economic scales of their economic investment, the different city origins in 
Syria, and political ideas towards the current Syrian conflict. This description will 
help to justify the strength of the data.  
 
First, among the 191 Syrian businessmen, 7 had left Syria before 2011. Out of these 7 
Syrian businessmen: 3 of them left after the Hama massacre, which was conducted by 
the Hafiz Assad regime in 1982, 1 started his investment in the United Arab Emirates 
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in 1988, and the other 3 left Syria to Turkey due to their business investments during 
the 2000s.  
 
Second, another important feature was the economic scale of the Syrian businessmen. 
Among the 191 informants, 8 businessmen were listed on the top 100 prominent 
Syrian businessmen in 2009 and 2010. 4 of them were from Aleppo, 3 were from 
Damascus, and one of them was from Daraa. Out of these 7 Syrian business tycoons, 
4 used to take the leading post in the Chamber of Industry in Damascus, the Chamber 
of Commerce in Aleppo, and the Chamber of Industry in Aleppo. One Aleppan plastic 
commercialist was believed to be on the top 10 Syrian commercialist list in his field 
by the other businessmen. The remain informants were on medium to small economic 
scales. This would include having a factory with more than 600 workers, commercial 
companies, and money transfer companies, to the smallest economic scale of owning 
of a restaurant with three workers.  
 
Third, regarding the city where the informants came in Syria, the bold numbers in the 
table 2.1 belows demonstrate that 113 were from Aleppo, 52 of them were from 
Damascus, 12 were from Homs, 3 were from Idlib, 3 were from Hama, 2 were from 
Lattakia, 2 were from Qamishli, 2 were from Daraa, 1 was from al-Hasaka, and 1 was 
from al-Raqqa. More than half of the informants were from Aleppo because much 
more fieldwork time was spent in Turkey and Aleppo is closer to the Turkish border 
so it was a nearby destination over the border. And although there was massive 
violence in Damascus, it did not affect Damascene central neighbourhoods the way it 




Fourth, regarding the informants’ political ideas towards the Assad regime, the italic 
numbers in the table 1.1 shows that 110 were anti-regime, 68 were self-proclaimed 
neutral, and 13 of them were pro-regime. The pro-regime businessmen are the ones 
who claimed to side with the Assad regime and were completely opposed to the 2011 
uprising. Contrary to the pro-regime businessmen, the anti-regime businessmen are 
the ones who claimed to support the revolution or praised the 2011 civil uprising, or 
sometimes had the three-star opposition flag in their companies’ offices. 104 
Nevertheless, their political ideas are not totally fixed, rather they might change due 
to the political environments in the host countries since the businessmen need to be 
aware of local political correctness. Additionally, they may maintain the fear of 
further retaliation from the Assad regime if they announce their oppositional stance. 
However, these two reasons, which may affect the assessment of the political ideas of 
Syrian businessmen in this research, may be less influential since the businessmen 
usually headed to host countries that had political positions which were similar to 
their own (this will be shown in chapter 4). Furthermore, many interviewees were 
introduced to the researcher by informants who had already been interviewed since 
they could vouch for the researcher’s trustworthy background. As such, they would be 
less afraid of potential political retaliation from the regime even if they expressed 
their different political opinions. Moreover, the researcher has followed the ethical 
regulations regarding conducting interviews whereby the interviewees were all 
anonymised. This further reduced the possibility of Syrian businessmen being afraid 
of revealing their various political opinions. Finally, the businessmen whose political 
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for freedom in 1930s. The three red starts represents the three districts under the rule of the Ottoman – 
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statements could not fit into either of the two above mentioned categorise were 
considered “self-claimed neutral”, because they were not willing to mention the 2011 
events, they believed both sides of the conflict were incorrect, or they said politics 
were not part of their responsibilities as a businessman.   
 
Host country Turkey Egypt Jordan  
Origin/ politics  Pr An Sn  Pr An Sn  Pr An Sn  
Damascus 20 1 13 6 17 2 10 5 15 1 9 5 52 
Aleppo 90 1 55 34 18 7 6 5 5  1 4 113 
Homs 8  6 2 2   2 2  2  12 
Idlib 2  1 1 1   1     3 
Hama 2  1 1 1  1      3 
Lattakia 2  2          2 
Qamishli 2 1  1         2 
Daraa 1  1      1  1  2 
al-Hasaka 1   1         1 
al-Raqqa 1  1          1 
 129 3 80 46 39 9 17 13 23 1 13 9  










e. Thematic analysis 
 
Thematic analysis is used for analysing interview data. It allows the researcher to “use 
a wide variety of types of information in a systematic manner that increases their 
accuracy or sensitivity in understanding and interpreting observations about people, 
events, situations, and organizations.”105 Thematic analysis is used for “identifying, 
analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within the data.”106 The theme is defined 
as “a pattern found in the information that at a minimum describes and organises the 
possible observations and at a maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon.”107  
 
Since the question in this research is how the Syrian business community has been 
transformed and the main data of the research is based on interviews, the analysis was 
mainly inductive and the themes were data-driven.108 The research also attempts to 
analyse the transformation with the triadic conceptual framework. To not neglect the 
theoretical perspectives, where themes can also develop from theoretical concepts, 
some themes were identified deductively based on the conceptual framework.109 The 
process of thematic analysis has been outlined by Braun and Clarke as usually passing 
through the process of familiarisation of data, generating codes, searching for themes, 
reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and writing up the report.110  
 
                                                          
105  Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development. (London: Sage, 1998) 5.   
106 Virginia Braun, and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative 
Research in Psychology, 3, no.2 (2006): 79. 
107 Boyatzis, 4.  
108 Braun and Clarke, 83-4. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 86-93. 
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After all the interview data were entered into Evernote, they were re-read three times 
and further coded through the tag function in Evernote, as mentioned above. Coding 
these data in different categories allowed the researcher to reflect on what the main 
themes were that related to the research question and fit into the triadic conceptual 
framework. Five themes have been developed both inductively and deductively. The 
inductive way of identifying themes produced three themes. The first was the political 
reactions of businessmen after the 2011 revolution. This information includes 
participation and non-participation during the 2011 revolution in Syria, the ways in 
which they participated, the wrath produced from witnessing killings of civilians by 
the regime, and the long-term wrath against the rule of Assad. The second was the 
rationales of emigration. The time of emigration, the reasons for leaving, and how the 
businessmen moved from Syria to the host countries were the codes for forming this 
theme. The third was the various activities in host countries. This theme derived from 
the different activities the businessmen were working on in the host countries, mainly 
in the fields of economics, philanthropy, and politics. The deductive way of the 
forming themes produced two other themes related to the triadic conceptual 
framework, emphasising the role of home and host countries. The first is the influence 
of affective ties to the homeland on expatriate Syrian businessmen, and the second is 
the influences of the host countries on expatriate Syrian businessmen. These five 
themes were discussed in chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6.   
 
f. Ethical issues 
 
Ethical issues are a significant factor for interviewing Syrian businessmen for several 
reasons. Since the Syrian conflict is still on-going and the Syrian businessmen may 
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have relatives or property in Syria, they do not want to get in trouble in the future 
after they return to Syria. If they were to say something which may not be in the 
favour of the Assad regime and if the regime were stay in power, their personal 
safeties may be into serious danger. They are not living in their own country, but 
rather were forced to resettle in the host countries. They were not used to interviews, 
and more importantly, they were afraid of whether the interviewer was sent from the 
Assad regime to monitor them. This was a serious issue during fieldwork which I 
encountered frequently. Many times Syrian businessmen considered me to be a 
‘Syrian mukhabarat.’ In some cases, even showing them my Taiwanese passport was 
not evidence enough. As such, confidentiality was of utmost importance. During the 
fieldwork, it was essential to always be honest and have no preservations regarding 
institutional affiliations and the research topic while during interviews with the 
informants. Each informant was asked to give oral consent to use their names – all but 
four of the 191 informants requested to remain anonymous. It was not possible to ask 
the interviewees to formally sign their names as that would risk exposing them, so no 
written consents were taken during interviews. As such, the informants’ names are 
being withheld here and only descriptions of where they are from, what kind of 
economic activities they were doing, the places of their relocation, and the date of 
interview are used, for instance, Aleppan restaurateur no1, personal interview, 
Gaziantep, May 22, 2014. Different interviewees from the same city will be given a 
sequence number followed by the order in which they appear in this research.  
 




This study has two limitations in terms of its materials. First, even though Lebanon 
and the UAE are the two other host countries which received many Syrian 
businessmen after 2011, due to time restraints of the PhD study and the difficulty of 
receiving visas for entering these two countries, the researcher could not conduct 
research with businessmen who relocated there. The absence of fieldwork in Lebanon 
and the UAE with the Syrian businessmen limited the possibility of reflecting on and 
analysing the pre-2011 and post-2011 situations and considerations of the Lebanon 
and UAE based Syrian businessmen. Furthermore, due to the lack of Turkish 
language ability of the researcher and the limited fieldwork time in Egypt and Jordan, 
this research did not cover the viewpoints of the people from the host countries 
towards the Syrian businessmen.   
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter which 
delineates the context of the study, the main questions and importance of this study, 
and its limitation. It also reviews the significant literature in the fields of the Syrian 
business community and the business diaspora, and proposes the conceptual 
framework developed from previous literature, and the discussion of the methods and 
empirical data used in this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 analyses the pre-2011 Syrian business community. It sketches the basis of 
how the Syrian business community used to be in the pre-2011 revolution era by 
investigating the pre-2011 political-economic environment in Syria and how this 




Chapter 3 explores the period between the eruption of revolution to the decisions of 
expatriation on the part of the businessmen. The chapter analyses the rationales 
behind the reactions of the Syrian business community towards the unprecedented 
civil uprising inside the country. It also discusses the reasons for expatriation of the 
Syrian businessmen from Syria.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates the relocation and settlement process of the Syrian 
businessmen in the host countries. The chapter first analyses the rationales for why 
Syrian businessmen selected places for relocation. The chapter then differentiates the 
challenges that the Syrian businessmen have encountered at the beginning of their 
settlement process. Finally, it demonstrates the shifting of the expectation of a quick 
return to Syria to a realisation that they would be staying long term in the host 
countries.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the activities conducted by the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen in the host countries after their settlements. Chapter 5 discusses the 
economic activities of the expatriate Syrian businessmen. Chapter 6 investigates the 
philanthropic works and political participations of the expatriate Syrian businessmen 
in the host countries.       
 
Chapter 7 concludes and summarises how the Syrian business community has been 
transformed into a war-induced business diaspora by the 2011 revolution, and how 
this transformation has made impact on expatriate Syrian business networks from a 
fragmented networks to a more cooperative and transnationalised networks. Based on 
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the analysis from the previous chapters, I will argue that those expatriate Syrian 
business communities are developing from temporarily forced migrants into a 
long-term war-induced business diaspora, and the pre-2011 Syrian business networks 
have been transformed from fragmented networks to more cooperate and 
transnationalised networks. This is due mainly to the prolongation of the conflict in 
Syria and a homeland-orientation of expatriate Syrian businessmen during life in exile, 
which can be observed from their economic, philanthropic, and political activities in 
the host countries.  
 
This analysis of the transformation of Syrian business community by the 2011 
revolution into a long-term business diaspora indicates five findings. The first two 
findings are related to studies on the Syrian business community and the other three 
findings address studies on migration and diaspora. First, the pre-2011 Syrian 
business networks were fragmented due to the previous political economic 
environment inside Syria. Second, the long-term, non-politicised Syrian business 
community divided into different political groups throughout the revolution, and some 
Syrian businessmen have actively supported and participated in the revolution, further 
wavering in the pre-revolution symbiotic state-business relationship. Third, although 
personal networks have been argued to be an important factor in migrants’ or 
diasporans’ settlement and relocation, for the business diaspora, the economic 
consideration is a more important factor. Fourth, the political relations between the 
host and home governments are important, in addition to their impact during the 
relocation and settlement process. Fifth, the activities of expatriate Syrian 
businessmen in the host countries indicate that their specific ways of thinking and 
acting pre-emigration migrated with them.  
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Chapter 2 The Pre-Revolution Syrian Business Community: Fragmented 
Business Networks 
 
The [Assad] government used to be very cruel to its own people and was corrupt. In 
every country there are mafias, and in Syria, the government is the mafia. 
- An Aleppan real estate investor no4111 
 
The above quote reflects, to a certain extent, the idea that many businessmen in Syria 
had of the regime before the revolution. But why did the businessmen have this idea? 
And how did this idea affect their previous behaviour inside Syria? Since the 
historical context of the diaspora has had an impact on their later development in the 
host countries, a delineation of context can facilitate the analysis of the 
transformation.112 In order to delineate this historical context, the aim of this chapter 
is to examine the Syrian business community in the pre-2011 revolution period, and 
will address three main issues: the structure of the Syrian business community in the 
pre-2011 revolution era; the impact that former features of Syrian political-economic 
environment had on the business community; and the former nature of Syrian 
business networks and the influences of the networks on the ways in which Syrian 
businessmen interact with each other and conduct economic, political and 
philanthropic activities. And the following chapter will analyse how they reacted 
towards the 2011 revolution and their decisions emigrate.    
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First, a categorisation of the Syrian business community will be provided based on 
political ties with the Syrian regime. This includes: ruling family businessmen, crony 
businessmen, strategic businessmen, and independent businessmen. Second, it will be 
argued that corruption combined with nepotism, the injustice accompanying state 
intervention in the businessmen’s activities, and the lack of efficiency and lack of 
transparency in judicial and banking systems with which the Syrian businessmen 
needed to interact were the three main factors that forced the businessmen to work 
cautiously and made them suspicious of others. Third, it will be demonstrated that the 
Syrian businessmen developed among themselves their own specific ways to 
compensate for the lack of trust in state institutions and that they actively engaged in 
business investment and philanthropic activities, as well as participating to a certain 
extent cautiously and suspiciously in domestic politics. The research findings in this 
chapter will demonstrate that Syrian business networks were fragmented prior to 2011 
due to the political-economic environment in Syria, and were characterised by a large 
number of small networks that did not trust each other, but inside which, had a 
number of small networks that benefited from a great level of trust. 
 
2.1 The structure of Syrian business community: pre-1963 to post-2000 
 
We lie to ourselves that he [Bashar] is good, that he is different from his father 
[Hafiz]. But, snake only delivers snake. 
- An Aleppan food industrialist no2113 
 
The Syrian business community was constituted of two main groups before the reign 
                                                          
113 Aleppan food industrialist no2, personal interview, Gaziantep, December 29, 2014. 
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of the Ba’th party in Syria in 1963: the extremely rich bourgeoisie and the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie. The extremely rich bourgeoisie businessmen’s roots can be traced 
back to the late Ottoman Empire and to the French Mandate period when those 
bourgeoisie who cooperated with the French had a better chance of enhancing their 
wealth under the private latifundia system; their economic position was later sustained 
after the Syrian independence in 1946.114 Examples of Syrian bourgeoisie families 
before 1965 include the al-Dibs, the al-Baʿlabakī, the Qallāʿ, the Haykal, the Shallāh, 
the Ḥaydarī, the ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Shabāriq, the al-Ḥājj al-Ṣāʾim al-Dahr, the Wahbī 
al-Ḥarīrī, and the al-Mudarris. 115  
 
During the 1961 United Arab Republic (UAR) political union between Syria and 
Egypt and under the nationalisation of president Gamal Abdu al-Nasser, these 
extremely rich bourgeoisie families experienced the first economic shock as a 
consequence of the government’s land reform. 116  One consequence was the 
devastation of the extremely rich bourgeoisies’ capital, which made these 
businessmen lose large parts of their fortunes. For example, al-Ḥājj al-Ṣāʾim al-Dahr 
had no more than $10,000 and 50,000 Syrian lira even though he used to employ 400 
workers in his factories and was the founding member and the first president of the 
Chamber of Industry in Aleppo in 1935.117 The bourgeoisie used to manipulate the 
Syrian economy and enjoy political privileges before 1961, however, some extremely 
rich bourgeoisie decided to leave Syria after the first wave of nationalisation in 1961.  
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When the Ba’th party came into power in 1963, they applied a series of 
nationalisation, which nationalised limited and joint-stock companies by the 
government and transformed or dissolved them into smaller establishments. 118 
During this period, a company whose owners held capital at a value of more than one 
million Syrian lira (equal to $250,000 at that time) would be subject to 
nationalization.119 Data suggests that another 120 industrial establishments were 
completely or partially nationalised in January 1965, and that after the February 1966 
coup, 95% of industrial investments in Syria were under the control of the state.120 
Furthermore, between 1963 and 1966, approximately 200,000 Syrians left Syria as a 
result of the nationalisations.121 Essentially, the group of extremely rich bourgeoisie 
businessmen in Syria withered due to the economic policies from the ruling powers 
and their exodus to other countries.  
 
In addition to the extremely rich bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie was the 
other important, but less discussed business group. The traditional petty bourgeoisie 
were the people who were neither from the working class nor from the capitalist 
primary bourgeoisie. They were self-employed artisans or shopkeepers.122 This group 
of businessmen frequently conducted strikes during the French Mandate period, but 
not to an extent which would threaten French authority.123 From the data provided by 
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Longuenesse, the number of people in this group in 1960 was estimated to be 110,900, 
which the bourgeoisie class was 59,390.124 Since their economic capital was modest, 
this group avoided the consequences of nationalisation and has sustained itself, with 
ups and downs, until today.  
 
When Hafiz al-Assad came into power in 1970, he acknowledged the lack of 
economic and social support from the Syrian society, which was a critical weakness 
that he needed to improve. By expanding ruling power from the military to other 
sectors, the Syrian regime went through what Hinnebusch calls the 
‘embourgeoisment.’ This is a process when a group of businessmen come onto the 
scene through personal and familial ties with the central power, and, as a result 
become rich and dominate the economic sector. Examples in Syria include 
Muḥammad Makhlūf, who was the brother-in-law of Hafiz al-Assad and the father of 
Rāmī Makhlūf, and Rifʿat al-Asad who was Hafiz al-Assad’s brother and the former 
vice-president of Syria.125 The ruling power of Syria allied with the Damascene 
businessmen and other middle and upper-middle class businessmen. Sadiq al-Azm 
even described the development of the new class as a “merchant-military complex,” 
mainly between the Alawites and Damascenes, as stated by Seal.126 Many nouveau 
riche started their new careers as ‘businessmen’ in Syria, through their personal close 
ties with the ruling power. Meanwhile, most traditional petty bourgeoisie continued to 
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grow their businesses, as long as they did not threaten the regime’s political power.    
 
During the 1980s, Syria experienced a foreign exchange crisis, which caused the 
regime to implement an economic infitah to counter this. The logic of the Syrian 
regime’s economic opening/ economic reform was considered ‘selective 
liberalization.’127 The economic opening was a calculation of political and economic 
interest to the regime.128 The businessmen who had familial ties with the Assad 
regime were still strong and were still dominating the economic sector when a law 
from the joint public-private sector was passed which attempted to attract economic 
input from the private sector into the Syrian market.129 Other businessmen who had 
personal ties with the Assad regime continued to benefit from the regime’s policies, 
while other family members of the regime’s crony figures became business tycoons, 
such as Firās Ṭallās – whose father was Muṣṭafā Ṭallās, a comrade of Hafiz’s and the 
Minister of Defence in Syria between 1972 and 2004.130 In 1990, capital investments 
of the private sectors overpassed the public sector for the first time since 1963.131 
This may be due to the weak performance of the public sector during fiscal crisis of 
the 1980s, but it also indicates that not only had the regime and their crony 
businessmen benefited from the 1980s’ infitah, but that many other Syrian 
businessmen’s economic investments had improved. The last prominent change in 
Hafiz’s economic policy was issuing Law No.10 in 1991. The Syrian economy 
experienced a general improvement, but after the issuance of this law, the economic 
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infitah in Syria slowed down.132  
 
When Bashar came to power in 2000, he attempted to encourage the development of 
private sectors in Syria through the establishment of representative associations and 
allowing private sector representatives join the decision making process regarding 
economic policies and reforms of previous economic laws and the establishment of 
banks inside the country, as Abboud suggested.133 However, regarding the business 
community in Syria, there were no obvious changes after 2000, but rather the 
structure of the business community remained almost the same as during the 1990s, 
with the exception of a handful regime and crony businessmen. Examples of 
additional crony businessmen include Rāmī Makhlūf, mentioned previously, 
Muḥammad Ḥamshū, who had been ‘poor’ in the late 1990s but became extremely 
rich and gained economic positions in Syria through his personal ties with the regime, 
and Nawār Sukkar, who owns the NASCO Group.  The NASCO Group invests in 
providing oilfield services to petroleum companies operating, and services and 
equipment to the medical sector in Syria, as well as agricultural services, irrigation 
systems and contracting, and oil exhibitions in the Middle East.134 Also, in the first 
five years of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, the state–businessmen relationships did not 
undergo many changes.135 In the Tenth Regional Conference of the Ba’th Party in 
2005, the decision was made to adopt a social market economy in Syria.136 One 
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element of a social market economy is the privatisation of the public sector.137 But 
this slogan of social market economy was no more than propaganda, as Donati 
suggests, that the social market economy “conveys the impression of openness but in 
reality penalizes reformist aspirations that are viewed as a threat by the ruling 
coalition.”138 Donati further argues, the Bashar regime attempted to cultivate a new 
circle of businessmen to counterweight former allies, especially the directors of the 
Chambers of Commerce.139   
 
Categorisation of the Syria Business Community 
 
I used to have a business partner from the regime, this was common in Syria. If 
someone tells you that he did not have a business partner from the government, 
then he must be a liar. 
- An Aleppan automobile parts and real estate investor no5140 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter on topic of the categorisation of Syrian 
businessmen, former categorisations of Syrian businessmen deserve a revision due to 
the lack of recognition of the majority upper middle class businessmen, the 
oversimplified categorisation criteria by business sectors, and the prolongation of the 
Syrian conflict.  
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Previous studies demonstrate that the top Syrian businessmen’s activities were 
strongly affected by the regime. As Haddad suggests, the fortunes of the “most 
powerful segment of the new economic elite” are derived from their political 
positionality.141 In addition to the new economic elite, it was not only this specific 
group which was affected by the regime, but that the remaining upper-middle, 
medium and small economic scale businessmen could not have achieved decent 
business without interacting with the regime.  
 
The situation of businessmen might not have been as extreme as the quote above 
suggests – that no one could work without a partner from the regime – however, no 
informants expressed the belief that any businessmen was immune from the regime’s 
influences or could work without the regime’s permission. Notwithstanding, 
businessmen had various forms of interactions with the regime and different degrees 
of dependency on the regime. These relationships would later decide the results of the 
businessmen’s activities and impact their behaviour. As such, the relationship 
between the regime and its business community was the most critical factor that 
determined a businessman’s later developments, regardless of his economic or social 
stance. Thus, I will categorise the Syrian businessmen in the pre-2011 era into four 
groups based on their relationships with the Assad regime: ruling family, crony 
businessmen, strategic businessmen, and independent businessmen. Essentially, a 
Syrian businessman’s destiny was non-separable from his relationship with the regime, 
regardless of other factors such as their economic scales or social status.  
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The ruling family businessmen 
 
The ruling family businessmen were considered the richest and wealthiest 
businessmen in pre-revolution Syria. Their economic position and wealth were 
absolutely attributed to their social origins, which, can be seen as an extension of the 
Syrian regime after the 1970 Ba’th rules. This group of businessmen were all directly 
related to the Assad clan and personally had familial ties with Assad family members. 
Furthermore, they tended to be either Alawite or Shia. This group of businessmen 
included Muḥammad Makhlūf;142 Rāmī Makhlūf;143 Muḥammad Ḥamshū;144 Ṭarīf 
al-Akhras (the cousin of Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asmāʾ al-Akhras and the second 
biggest Syrian  exporter);145 and Ghassān al-Mihna and Nizār Asʿad (al-Mihna is 
Rāmī Makhlūf’s maternal uncle and al-Mihna and Asʿad are maternal cousins, as well 
as Asʿad’s mother being friends with Hafiz al-Assad’s wife). Al-Mihna and Asʿad are 
also business partners in an oil company in Syria.146 
 
If there was ever a chance to make huge profits, the businessmen in this group would 
never hesitate to use their nepotistic ties or their authority to exploit other 
businessmen. For example, Rāmī Makhlūf exploited his personal ties with the 
intelligence service after forcing his Egyptian business partner to leave Syria and 
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surrender his share of the profitable SyriaTel cell phone company.147 Due to their 
illegal and nepotistic approaches of capital seeking, the majority of the businessmen 
in Syria despised the businessmen in this group. “They are not businessmen, they are 
thieves and robbers. They know nothing about running a business, rather they use 
their acquaintances from the regime to exploit others,” stated one Aleppan machines 
trading businessmen no6.148  
 
Since their wealth came exclusively as a consequence of the regime’s blessing, they 
held unwavering allegiance to the regime and actively took part in various 
organisations and business associations. Some important ruling family businessmen’s 
and crony businessmen’s personal relationships with the Assad regime are illustrated 
in Graph 2.1 below. The businessmen in this group were similar to what previous 
studies called the ‘state bourgeoisie.’ However, in addition to the ruling family 
businessmen, I further divide the former category of ‘state bourgeoisie’ into another 




The major distinction between the ruling family businessmen and the crony 
businessmen is that the crony businessmen did not have familial ties with regime 
figures and were not necessarily from an Alawite social origin. It was this difference 
that brought the crony businessmen close to the regime, but not quite into the regime. 
The reason that this group can be considered ‘cronies’ is because their characteristics 
conform to the definition of ‘crony capitalism.’ The people who are close to political 
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authorities can gain huge economic interest from favours provided by the political 
authorities. One common form is “to award a favored economic group with an official 
or quasi-official monopoly, thus allowing that group to earn monopoly rents.”149 
 
The main characteristic of this group is that, their ties with the regime provided them 
with a quasi-monopolistic or monopolistic stance in the market. Their wealth came 
primarily from direct personal relationships with members of the ruling family or “a 
tradition of informal business deals with military and intelligence officers,” to gain 
privileged access to certain sectors and economic fields in the form of a 
quasi-monopoly with less competition but high profits.150 Their origins are a result of 
four decades of the Assad family in political power.151 Since their emergence was 
mainly attributed to the regime’s consideration of political stability, the Assad family 
has provided different businessmen in various periods with ‘privileges’ once the 
regime needed allies in the economic sectors.  
 
The nature of the relationship between the crony businessmen and the regime can be 
illustrated as an alliance, personal patronage from the regime, indirect patronage from 
the regime, and the children of the comrades.152  The emergence of the crony 
businessmen through alliance with the regime can be traced back to Hafiz al-Assad’s 
seizing power in 1970, when the lack of a social and economic base made Hafiz apply 
the so-called “merchant-military complex”.153 For example, when Hafiz came to 
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power, he decided to ally himself with particularly reputable and wealthy, old 
Damascene families such as the Shallāh family, who was from the old Damascene 
bourgeois class which had remained after the series of nationalization changes in the 
1960s.154  
 
For the patronage groups of crony businessmen, their relationships with the regime 
first developed due to the economic situation of the 1970s and 1980s, when Hafiz 
selectively supported and cultivated a few medium-sized business families in an 
attempt to boost the Syrian economy. For instance, during the 1970 to the late 80s, 
Uthman al-‘Aidi, Sa’ib Nahhas, and ‘Abdul-Rahman al-‘Attar rose to the top, became 
extremely wealthy and were considered the ‘troika’ in Syria.155  This group of 
businessmen was not as economically strong as the old bourgeoisie before Hafiz 
provided them with economic privileges. In the 1990s, when the regime issued Law 
No. 10 aiming to increase its economic opening, most businessmen who benefited 
from the policy were in the same category as those who could access to the 
quasi-monopolistic market.156 Furthermore, other businessmen who had personal 
acquaintances with the Assad family also got promoted, such as Hāshim al-Aqqād 
who was a friend of Basel al-Assad and gained personal support from Māhir al-Asad 
in the 1990s.157  
 
Finally, once the children of the cronies grew up, some of them also participated in 
the business sector. With the blessing of their fathers’ political networks, they started 
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their businesses in a stronger position of political, social, and economic capital. The 
best-known figure from this group is Firās Ṭallās, whose father was the Minister of 
Defence in Syria, Muṣṭafā Ṭallās. As a child of comrades, Firās became the second 
richest businessman in Syria after Rāmī Makhlūf and was known as the ‘sugar 
king’.158 Since the wealth of crony businessmen originated with the regime, their 
political attitudes were also linked to the regime. 
 
Even though the nature of their alliance was strong, it was not as strong as that 
between the ruling family businessmen and the regime. Although Bashar al-Assad 
claimed to fight corruption in the 2000s, he did not take on the crony capitalists. If it 
ever came to a critical point, the crony businessmen could choose to give up their 
alliance with the regime, or vice versa.159 For example, Firās Ṭallās left Syria during 
the revolution, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-ʿAṭṭār and Ṣāʾib Naḥās both faced the 
confiscation of their capital and were prohibited from leaving the country during the 
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1. Ruling family businessmen: (1) Assad’s 
clan; (2) Comrades                                                  
2. Crony businessmen: (1) Personal 
patronage; (2) Indirect patronage; (3) 






The strategic businessmen were primarily from the Sunni backgrounds. Some of them 
their families can be traced back to the pre-Ba’th era since some had started family 
businesses in the 1970s and 1980s from a modest social stratum. As mentioned 
previously, the economic infitah in Syria not only benefitted the ruling family 
businessmen and crony businessmen, but also the merchant upper middle class and 
most strategic businessmen.161  The reason this group of businessmen is called 
‘strategic’ is because of the nature of their interactions with the regime, the way they 
conducted their business activities, and their attitudes regarding social or political 
participation. Their interactions with the regime were exclusively interest-driven, and 
they cooperated with the regime for the sake of gaining access to better business 
facilities. However, if they were not happy with the regime, they did not let it show. 
Although they still required interaction with the Assad regime, they did not have a 
share in the quasi-monopolistic markets. “Syrian businessmen in general do not like 
the regime, but they are forced to show their obedience to the regime. You know what 
will happen if you disobey or criticise the regime,” stated an Aleppan real estate 
investor’s wife no7 upon overhearing a retired Syrian who used to work in the 
Turkish consulate of Aleppo saying “the businessmen used to love the regime.”162  
 
Strategic businessmen usually possessed a higher number of business partnerships, 
formally or informally.163 And some of their business investments were in more than 
one sector and they had more business partners to work with than other businessmen. 
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Furthermore, some strategic businessmen were actively participating in the local 
Chambers, the People’s Assembly, or the Cham Holding. One of the biggest founders 
and shareholders of the Cham Holding was a Syrian tycoon1 who used to be the 
leading figure in one of the Syrian Chambers. He explained the reason why he joined 
the Cham Holding, saying, “because Rāmī Makhlūf asked me to join, the regime tried 
to create a neutral and clean picture of this holding company. And without the Sunni 
businessmen, they could not achieve this.”164  
 
There are many examples from this group. The Daʿbūl family founded the Madar 
company for manufacturing detergent and chemical raw materials in the early 1980s 
which was the strongest enterprise in the field of cleansing in Syria. The al-Shāʿir 
family founded their company in 1969 which was the first to work in the field of 
detergent in Syria. They were listed on the top 100 prominent Syrian businessmen list. 
The Sayf family was an old family from Damascus who established their clothes 
industry in 1959. In 2010, they had more than 800 workers. The Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī 
family started a textile factory in 1978 and by 2010 had more than 2000 workers. 
They were the second biggest shareholders of the Sham Holding. The Karyam family 
first established their refrigerator and household company in 1958 which later 
developed into a family business by investing in galvanizing iron, machines, and 
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establishing the texture company (OulabiTex) in 1953 in Aleppo. By 2009 they had 




The independent businessmen are defined by having distanced themselves from 
interacting with the regime, building up business partnerships with others, and 
participating in public affairs, as well as being mostly from a Sunni background. Due 
to their independent approach, they usually invested in single sectors rather than 
multiple sectors. Even though their economic, social and political behaviour was less 
obvious than the other businessmen, this did not limit their economic scale or leave 
them less well known among other businessmen. The independent businessmen 
would not have any personal ties with the regime. Nevertheless, they might have 
known somebody through their personal networks who would solve the compulsory 
‘bureaucratic routines’ with the regime’s henchmen. In fact, they might even play on 
the weakness of the regime’s complicated infighting. For instance, Āṣif Shawkat 
supported Rāmī Makhlūf, and Māhir al-Asad supported Muḥammad Ḥamshū. There 
was once a conflict between both groups where Rāmī Makhlūf won over Muḥammad 
Ḥamshū. This is just one known case of the infighting between the Syrian regime’s 
members.166  
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Since the ruling family businessmen’s internal fighting was not unknown, the 
independent businessmen who chose not to ally themselves or become involved with 
the regime could pretend to be an ally of one side of the infighting businessmen. By 
doing so, they could distance themselves from unnecessary interventions and 
annoyances from the regime. A Damascene chemical industrialist explained how he 
personally played with this internal fight:  
 
Because even among the regime’s bureaucrats, they have sensitive rift among 
different groups; whenever an official from group A comes to me and tries to 
force me to form a business partnership with him or ask me to pay a bribe, I 
always pretend that I already have another business partner from the official’s 
from group B and vice versa. Which I never did.167 
 
Table 2.1 Categorisation of Syrian businessmen prior to the 2011 revolution 
 
                                                          




































































Since they did not have any strong ties with the political centre and focused 
exclusively on their business investment, they preferred to remain silent on any 
political-related affairs, even when they actually had any opinions about it. And most 
of the businessmen in Syria were located in this and the former group. 
 
2.2 The pre-revolution Syrian political-economic environment  
 
Syrian businessmen could not avoid having their economic investments and activities 
in the pre-2011 era interact with the Syrian regime and were strongly affected by the 
regime. In order to break down the state-dominated Syrian market’s impacts on the 
Syrian businessmen prior to 2011, this section will examine the legislations and 
reforms; the laws and judicial system; the banking system; the representation of 
businessmen in the pre-revolution Syria; and the intelligence bureaucracy inside Syria 
prior to 2011. These five dimensions not only developed under the Syrian regime’s 
command but also directly influenced Syrian businessmen’s daily activities. 
Examining these five dimensions will contextualise pre-revolution Syrian politico 
economics and facilitate the understanding of how this environment affected 
businessmen before 2011, and will further delineate the main features of the pre-2011 
Syrian political economy.     
 
a. Rule of law or rule by law?  
 
In Syria, if you have enough money, you can buy a law. 
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- An Aleppan plastic businessman no8168 
 
Dozens of economic regulations, laws, and economic policies were issued from the 
1970s to the end of the pre-revolution period in Syria. The most frequently discussed 
are the two economic infitah (economic opening) during Hafiz al-Assad’s reign in the 
1980s and 1990s (which includes the issuance of Investment Law No. 10 in 1991), 
and the economic reform policy after the accession of Bashar al-Assad in 2000.169 It 
is not the objective of this section to analyse whether these regulations, laws, or 
economic policies were successful or not from an economic perspective, but rather, to 
focus on the implementation of these regulations, laws, and economic policies as 
studies consistently indicate the absolute nature of these laws and reforms.  
 
First, the regime had political and economic interests that were un-negotiably outside 
the reach of reform, and laws could not touch them. Perthes demonstrates that “the 
specific development of Syria’s private sector has, to a large extent, been determined 
by political decisions, i.e., by decisions of those running state affairs.” 170  The 
regime’s interests can also be observed in other issuances of laws and economic 
liberalisation, which existed even after the accession of Bashar in 2000.171 Research 
indicates that a certain number of old entrepreneurs benefited from these regulations 
and reforms, and that a new class of entrepreneurs emerged under these regulation and 
policy changes.172 Wealth was mostly distributed into the hands of the businessmen 
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who were close to the centre of the Syrian regime. As Ghadbian illustrates, “These 
liberties were the President’s reward for absolute loyalty, which meant carrying out 
the dirty work that was often necessary to preserve the security and stability of the 
regime.” The President includes the small entrepreneurial class and their protectors in 
the security, and the military elite as the liberties.173  
 
As Hinnebusch states, the 1970s trade liberalization extended corruption in the 
country.174 This corruption continued after Hafiz’s death in 2000 when Bashar came 
into power; large-scale economic opportunities were still controlled and dominated by 
the regime’s business networks.175 Under the pretext of laws and reforms, it merits a 
discussion of the nature of these processes of economic opening and economic reform 
policy. The nature of the Syrian style of ‘rule of law’ status in pre-2011 Syria, to a 
great extent, determined the Syrian businessmen’s behaviour in the pre-2011 era.  
 
Law No. 10 in 1991 received some positive evaluation from the academic field. As 
Polling suggests, the Law “goes far beyond these earlier measures and introduces 
qualitatively new features.”176 However, before Law No. 10 was issued, a group of 
crony businessmen had already learned about the new law and what sectors would be 
profitable for them to invest in. 177  Moreover, the regime supported the crony 
businessmen by manipulating regulations. An Aleppan plastic industrialist no9 stated 
that, 
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What the regime will do is, they will issue a law and validate the law immediately 
after it is passed. For instance, in mid-2000, after letting a crony businessman’s 
imported goods pass through customs and transport into the country, then the 
government issued a law to raise the custom tax all of a sudden. By doing so, other 
businessmen’s goods [which were still in the customs] were sold higher than his. So 
the crony businessman can easily win out from the market since he can sell his 
goods at a much lower price.178  
 
Second, even though there were thousands of regulations and laws inside Syria 
regarding business and investment, the regime and its civil servants usually exploited 
the laws to extract money from the businessmen, even without a legal basis. An 
Aleppan foods tycoon whose brother was the former vice president of the Aleppan 
Chamber of Industry and whose family was listed in the 100 prominent businessmen 
list in 2009 and 2010 stated that, 
 
The auditor fined me 3 million Syrian pounds (around $67,000) in the late 2000s; 
they came to me and just told me: we know you’re playing the game with us, even 
though we could not find out where you breached the law. So you deserve the 
fine.179  
 
Another Damascene businessman who owned a series of bookshops and printing 
factories explained a similar case:  
 
No matter how we obey the law, they [the regime and the civil servants] can 
always find an excuse to fine you. Once, I put the price of the book in Latin 
numbers, and then the auditor fined me because of this, because I did not use the 
Arabic number [the law said that you need to have a price on each book in the 
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shop, but did not mention whether it should be in Arabic or Latin numerals]. 
These auditors came to us as they were representing the law, but what they were 
doing was coming here for a bribe.180  
 
Interviews with the expatriate Syrian businessmen revealed dozens of stories similar 
to these, too numerous to be listed here. Additional stories included the repressions by 
the president’s cousin, Rāmī Makhlūf, and his corrupt business circle on other 
businessmen. Various cases of the use of laws and economic reforms or policies 
between the 1970s to 2011 in Syria suggest that the nature and logic of the Syrian 
regime’s ‘issuance of laws’ or ‘reform processes’ never changed – it was always 
corruption, injustice, and lack of transparency.  
 
b. The laws and judicial system 
 
Usually we know that the results of adjudication in Syria depend on how much you 
pay the judge and who you know in the government. 
- A Damascene car rental businessman no5181 
 
Article 4 of the emergency law released in 1963 restricted the freedom of assembly of 
people inside Syria.182 No matter what the case may be, if the regime suspects 
someone, they can easily arrest him according to this Article. The Damascene 
household items industrialist no6 explained how this law affected his social meetings:  
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If you have more than ten people who want to gather together, then you need to 
apply for permission from the government, no matter what kind of reason for 
gathering, otherwise it is illegal.183 
 
The existence of this emergency law deterred social gatherings of Syrian businessmen 
in pre-revolution Syria who were too afraid to gather with uncertain consequences.  
 
Even worse, some laws were out-dated and unrevised. For example, economic 
criminal law in Syria was first to be issued by Legislative Decree No. 37 in 1966, and 
it was not until 2013 that the People’s Assembly in Syria issued a new draft to amend 
this 47-year-old law.184 
 
During the four-decade rule of the Assad family over Syria, the country has 
experienced different degrees of economic liberalisation and transition. Since the 
seizure of power by Hafiz al-Assad in 1970, the state’s economic strategy has moved 
from hard-line socialist Ba’th to more pragmatic and economic.185 In addition to 
changing the main economic guiding principle, the pressures from social and 
economic realities inside Syria pressured Hafiz to apply two waves of infitah 
(economic opening) issuing different laws at the beginning of the 1970s and in the 
late 1980s.186  
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Nevertheless, the implementation of other laws involving Syrian businessmen did not 
work consistently or transparently. A fiscal crisis in the second half of the 1980s 
drove the regime to apply another broader wave of infitah in the country, but the state 
did not change its intervention in or domination of the private sector.187 A more open 
economic regulation – Law No. 10 – was issued in 1991.188 This Law No. 10 
“constituted the cornerstone of all liberalization steps before 2001.”189 Nevertheless, 
Perthes argues that not until nearly a decade after the issuance of Law No. 10 did the 
government embark on another trend of economic reform.190  
 
In 2006, the former vice president of the Chamber of Industry in Aleppo was charged 
with ‘tax evasion.’ 191  However, no other adjudications were released publicly 
afterwards. During an interview with his brother, his brother explained what was 
happening regarding the incident: “Someone proposed an incorrect report to the 
ministry and accused my brother of breaching the law of tax evasion, which was not 
true. At the end, my brother was fined $800,000 to finish the adjudication.”192 This 
was just one case out of the numerous other groundless business adjudications. 
Sometimes the regime would punish businessmen who were no longer in their favour 
through official investigations. Living under this uncertain context before the law, the 
Syrian businessmen did not know when they might be out of favour and become 
overnight ‘criminals’.   
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In addition to dealing with unstable and unclear applications of law, the Syrian 
business community did not trust the judicial system since it lacked justice. Prior to 
the 2011 revolution, religious scholars were favoured in informal arbitrations among 
Syrian merchants whenever a business dispute occurred, as Ismail suggests.193 The 
court itself “denies or limits the defendant’s right to appeal, limits access to legal 
counsel, tries most cases behind closed doors, and admits as evidence confessions 
obtained through torture.”194 A Damascene car rental businessman no5 stated that, 
“we do not trust the court in Syria. You need to pay a bribe to win a lawsuit. If there is 
a problem between two businessmen, they prefer to solve it themselves.”195  
 
To avoid contacting or interacting with the Syrian courts, the Syrian businessmen 
preferred to solve their business disputes by themselves. “What we do is, both 
disputers will respectively get another reputable business person from their side and 
will seek a religious scholar who has knowledge of business operations, and the 
religious scholar would decide,” explained an Aleppan real estate investor no20.196 
One Aleppan automobile industrialist no21, who was also the son of a famous 
Aleppan Muslim scholar, was often asked by other businessmen to be the arbiter for 
this kind of informal arbitration. He explained how this informal arbitration works, 
 
The informal arbitration is based on the Sharia principle [Islamic law]. The two 
disputers would both agree on an arbitrator who is pious and experienced, and each 
of them would both find another person from their side to participate in this 
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arbitration. The disputer who raised the arbitration is called ‘oppressed’ (maẓlūm), 
and he would need to prepare the evidence of receipts, or contracts, or other 
witnesses regarding the business dispute. The other disputer who was charged by 
the first ‘oppressed,’ is the ‘denier’ (munkar) of the charges. If he denied all the 
charges, he would put his right hand on the Quran and claim that he rejected the 
charges (ḥilf al-yamīn). The arbiter needed to let these two disputers sign a blank 
paper to show that they would accept this arbitration. The results of arbitrations 
were accepted by our courts in Syria if the informal arbitrations were conducted 
with two other witnesses. Before, in Aleppo, this kind of informal arbitrations was 
prevalent, not only for businesses, but also for marriage or other disputes. Usually 
the arbiters would be ‘knowledgeable ones’ (with knowledge of Islamic laws) or 
from religious families.197 
 
The application of the informal arbitration among the Syrian businessmen in Syria 
was a civil mechanism which developed due to the lack of trust from the businessmen 
towards the Syrian courts.  
 
c. Banking system  
 
Syrian businessmen either deposit their money in Western or Lebanese banks, or 
they only deal in cash, since we do not trust the banking system inside Syria. 
- An Aleppan dessert industrialist no10198 
 
The Syrian banking system in pre-2011 Syria was considered to be “poor 
intermediaries with the domestic private sectors,” as Abboud has shown.199 The 
report from the World Bank in 2005 also indicates that few private firms in Syria 
benefited from their financial sector, where “fully 88% of firms received no working 
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capital from banks and 88% received no investment finance from banks.”200 Private 
banks started to operate in Syria in 2004, three years after the issuance of the private 
bank law, and six private banks opened since then. However, the operation of the 
private banks indicates that the Syrian banking system was more or less under the 
influence of the regime and the regime’s henchmen, and the Syrian businessmen did 
not trust the banking system.  
 
First, the Ministry of Finance did not provide the new private banks with enough 
freedoms for setting up their own budgets or developing their own business 
strategies.201 In addition, some of the banks are even under-funded and only have a 
limited amount of money for long-term loans. The possibility for the banks to provide 
loans to companies was also constrained since many companies could not present a 
reliable balance sheet and there was a lack of transparency in the companies’ 
accounting.” 202  These issues indicate that the government did not provide the 
required assistance which was necessary for private banks to operate, which made it 
difficult for the banks to prosper. 
 
Second, most prominent Syrian shareholders of these banks were cronies of the 
regime, such as, Rāmī Makhlūf. These powerful ‘private’ investors still controlled the 
main decision-making processes of the banks.203 Thus, the emergence of the private 
banks after 2004 did not achieve the original goal of attracting other investors into the 
Syrian financial sector. An example of the unbalanced provision of loans was that 
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new entrepreneurs did not have the same opportunity as other business tycoons to 
apply for loans.204  
 
Third, the lack of reform of the state banks was another problem that influenced the 
development of private banks. Since the Central Bank of Syria still played an 
important role in creating banking regulations – even though the regime claimed to 
have reformed the banking sector – the restructuring of the state banks contradicted 
the official announcement.205 An International Monetary Fund report describes the 
Syrian state banks as “inappropriate [in] accounting, loan classification and 
provisioning rules, collateral appraisal, and the continuous rescheduling of 
non-performing loans.”206  
 
Thus, it was not common for Syrian businessmen to use the banking system in Syria 
due to the lack of trust between the business community toward the banking system 
inside the country. Anderson also demonstrates that almost all yarn transactions were 
conducted through cash rather than bank in Syria.207 As stated the Aleppan food 
industrialist no2, “When we all left Syria and started to invest overseas, the Syrian 
regime was shocked: how was there so much money inside Syria which we were not 
aware of?”208 
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Since the banking system was generally not trusted by the Syrian businessmen, using 
non-interest loans (al-dayn) was a common way of doing business in the Syrian 
business community in the pre-revolution era for managing the capital which banks 
could not provide them. There were two types of non-interest loans: one was in goods, 
and the other was in cash. Syrian businessmen used to give goods to other 
businessmen whom they considered trustworthy prior to paying for the goods. The 
Aleppan plastic industrialist no9 explained how they conducted this method of mutual 
support,  
 
If a Syrian businessman went bankrupt, he might announce the bankruptcy to his 
fellow businessmen. They would gather together and the others would help him to 
recovery 60-70% of his former business by giving him raw materials, machines, 
and allowing him to return these goods after one year’s time. But the precondition 
was they needed to know this person well enough and have trust in them.209 
 
Using non-interest loans is an informal economic activity which is not contract-based 
or legally binding. This means that businessmen who choose to give a non-interest 
loan may lose their money if the other does not return the full amount that he received. 
Thus, most non-interest loans were usually given to those who had a reputable name 
in the market or to those whom the lender had known for a long time and trusted. “We 
might not know them, but we know their fathers, their uncles, and their brothers. So 
we know this person is from a good and honest family and we will not overthink the 
case, rather we’ll give them the loan directly,” stated a Damascene clothes 
businessman no11.210 
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d. The representation of businessmen  
 
The Chambers have no functions, only a handful of people benefited from it, 
especially the ones who are close to the regime. 
- A Homsi electronic goods businessman no1211 
 
Hinnebush stated that during the economic liberalisation of Syria, the chambers not 
only could “press the implementation of liberalisation”, but could also “expand its 
parameters” if they pledged to the regime’s economic strategy, whereas, on the other 
hand, Haddad argues that, “an important characteristic of the Syrian private sector is 
that it has no genuine representation.”212 The representation of Syrian businessmen in 
the economic and political sectors can be observed in the operations of the Chambers 
and People’s Assembly inside Syria. However, even though businessmen did 
participate in these institutions, their participation did not mean that they had real 
rights as representatives.  
 
The operation of chambers, however, was supposed to be independent and protect the 
interests of the private sectors from the people who were in charge in the offices in the 
Syrian Chambers. It was not difficult to see that the regime was still the one who 
really had the control of these ‘independent’ business associations.213 Furthermore, 
the regime also intervened in the presidential election of the chambers. In 2009, a 
local Syrian news report released a story stating that Muḥammad Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī 
and Ghassān Karyam were suddenly withdrawing from the election of the Aleppan 
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Chamber of Industry.214 The news further quoted Mr Sharabātī as saying he wanted 
to have some rest [so he withdrew]. However, the truth was not as simple as the news 
had stated. “My brother and Mr Sharabātī were elected as the vice president and 
president of the Chamber of Industry in Aleppo, but then the regime asked them to 
resign and replaced them with Fāris al-Shihābi,” said the Aleppan food industrialist 
no2.215 An Aleppan textile industrialist no11 explained the follow-up story to Mr 
Sharabātī’s resignation,  
 
After Mr Sharabātī stepped down, he went to the head of the mukhabarat and 
asked them how he could explain to other businessmen about his resignation? 
The mukhabarat replied to him: just tell them that the mukhabarat do not prefer 
you in the seat.216 
 
This did not only happen in Aleppo, the presidential election of the Chamber of 
Commerce in Damascus also experienced a similar situation. “In the beginning, 
Muḥammad al-Shāʿir was elected as the president of the Chamber of Industry in 
Damascus. But then the regime asked him to step down,” stated a Damascene clothes 
businessman no7.217 The uncovered stories behind the presidential elections in the 
Syrian Chambers demonstrate the corruption and intervention of the regime to the 
supposedly independent business organisations.  
 
In addition to the chambers, some businessmen also participated in the People’s 
Assembly election and became members of the Assembly. During the 1990 election 
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of the People’s Assembly, the regime increased seats from 195 to 250, and 
approximately one-third of the deputies were reserved for the independent candidates, 
which included a group of businessmen. However, the bottom line was clear for these 
individual deputies who could never criticise the regime or its cronies. As Haddad 
argues, “The People’s Council was largely ceremonial and ineffective at the time, 
deliberating on local and politically nonsensitive matters.”218 This ‘ceremonial’ sense 
of operation of the Council can be perceived by the fact that businessmen who were 
elected as parliamentarians during the Bashar al-Assad era may possess strong 
personal ties with the regime, such as Muḥammad Ḥamshū and Hāshim al-Aqqād, the 
former being from the ruling business family group and the latter belonging to the 
crony businessmen group, as previously stated.219   
 
When Bashar came into power, the aftermath of the short lived Damascus spring was 
the imprisonment of Riyāḍ Sayf and Maʾmūn al-Ḥumṣi in 2001 due to their civil 
activities and outspoken criticism of the regime and, more specifically, for Sayf’s 
criticism of the mobile operating contract of the president’s cousin Rāmī Makhlūf.220 
The imprisonment of Riyāḍ Sayf not only demonstrated the regime’s strong will 
against any potential political opposition but also sent a signal to its business 
community: no businesses can develop across the political red line. Thus, both the 
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operations of the Syrian chambers and the participations of businessmen in the 
People’s Assembly in Syria prior to 2011 demonstrate that Syrian businessmen 
merely had limited autonomy and influence in these institutions, since the Syrian 
regime remained the final decision-making body in the end.  
 
e. The walls have ears: the Syrian mukhabarat (intelligence service) 
 
Once when I was traveling in Malaysia in 2006, I met an Egyptian and we were 
discussing Hafiz al-Assad. When he mentioned the name of Hafiz al-Assad, he 
lowered his volume and said: may Allah bring mercy to him. I told him Allah would 
never bring mercy to that guy [Hafiz]. You see how scary the Syrian mukhabarat is 
in our minds? Even an Egyptian in Malaysia would be afraid of it. 
- A Damascene furniture businessman no8221 
 
The Syrian government was notorious for monitoring its people through the 
intelligence service. Not only would people who had dissenting political ideas end up 
in prison or disappear without reason, but businessmen who owned companies or 
factories would be targeted by the mukhabarat for money. Syrian businessmen who 
possessed millions of dollars or extensive property in particular were worried about 
the disturbances of the mukhabarat.  
 
The regime would be patron to particular businessmen who obeyed the words of the 
regime.222 This led businessmen to compete with each other for the special favours. 
                                                          
221 Damascene furniture businessman no8, personal interview, Istanbul, May 14, 2014. 
222 Perthes, The Political Economy, 262; Haddad, Business Networks in Syria, 3. 
100 
 
Businessmen might not only report disloyal or rebellious activity of other 
businessmen in order to uproot their competition to the mukhabarat, but they might 
also defame their business competitors. Moreover, the mukhabarat system distorted 
the businessmen’s attitudes toward their fellow business countrymen. “Can you 
imagine a son writes a report to accuse his father, or a brother writes a report to 
accuse his brother just for money? The regime made people monitor each other,” 
stated a Damascene real estate investor no9.223 As a result of this social atmosphere, 
people did not trust each other very easily. Rather, they were cautious about 
developing social relationships with others. “When I was a kid, my mother always 
told me that ‘the walls have ears.’ So we learned to be cautious with other people 
since we were young,” stated an Aleppan technical company businessman no12.224 
 
The Syrian mukhabarat were not just passively waiting for businessmen to breach the 
law in order to find an excuse to ‘share’ their wealth, but rather they were also 
actively engaging in some of the profitable investments of the businessmen as 
‘business partners’. Once a businessman’s investment became conspicuous or famous 
in Syria, it was then time to wait for a visit from the mukhabarat. The mukhabarat 
would ask the businessmen to become business partners, sometimes even without 
giving any capital to the businessmen. This meant that businessmen had two choices: 
either accept the offers from the mukhabarat or stop their businesses. The Aleppan 
plastic industrialist no9 stated that he knew another Aleppan businessman who had 
been working in the food industry. Once the businessman’s investment had become 
popular, the mukhabarat came to him and asked to become business partners with him. 
The businessman refused in the beginning, but them the mukhabarat told him that: “if 
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you refuse, we will buy the lands next to you, and build up the same products as yours 
but with a bigger factory than yours [then you will close your factory by yourself].” In 
the end the businessman had no choice but to accept this demand of partnering with 
the mukhabarat.225  
 
The mukhabarat also took part in the presidential elections of the Chambers in Syria, 
as showen in the previous section. This kind of social atmosphere made people 
extremely cautious about their social gatherings and businesses. The Damascene real 
estate investor no9 stated that,  
 
If you have a good business idea which is highly profitable, but you do not work 
with the regime or do not let them be your partner, then the result may be either 
you will not receive the working permit or your business will bump into many 
‘technical problems.’226 
 
Most Syrian businessmen experienced or heard about what the regime would do to 
them if they did not cooperate with the regime or if they disobeyed the regime’s 
orders. 
 
During the fieldwork interviews, almost all the informants criticised the mukhabarat 
system inside their country, but before they started to denounce the mukhabarat’s 
abominable behaviours, they would look around to make sure that no one else was 
listening to the conversation. People in Syria constantly lived in a state of fear for 
forty years since they did not know when the mukhabarat would come to them or 
when they would be prosecuted for imaginary illegal charges. “They imprisoned me 
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for one day, just because I drove a fancy car on the street. I paid $2000 for release,” 
said an Aleppan clothes industrialist no13 who claimed that he was a millionaire 
before the revolution.227 Another Damascene restaurateur no10 who owned a series 
of restaurants in Istanbul stated that he was imprisoned for 23 days in 2003 only 
because he asked his friend to learn business skills from Turkish people, and his 
friend was shamed into anger and reported him to the authorities.228 “You do not 
know if the person you are talking to is from the regime or not. The regime uses the 
mukhabarat to create fears in the country, and make people not to trust each other,” 
stated the Damascene real estate investor no9.229 
 
The existence of excessive, vicious interventions of the mukhabarat system on the 
Syrian business community in Syria seriously affected how Syrian businessmen 
interacted with each other. The lack of trust among the Syrian business community 
worsened in this context since no one wanted to become a target of the mukhabarat or 
get unwittingly interrogated or imprisoned.  
  
Examining the five dimensions of the former political economic environment in 
pre-2011 Syria suggests that the main factors which affected the business community 
in the pre-revolution Syria were never about the regulations and reform, or the laws 
and judicial system, or the banking system, or the business representation, or the 
monitor of intelligence service. Rather, the main factors were the nature of these 
practices and institutions: corruption with nepotism, legal insecurity with state 
intervention, and the lack of transparency in the public sector.  
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This nature weakened the businessmen’s confidence in the state systems and 
institutions. More importantly, businessmen became cautious while dealing with other 
fellow countrymen since the external environment was full of suspicion and distrust. 
In this environment, businessmen chose either to ally with the regime, uncertain of the 
consequences, or to depend on their own business acquaintances. Regardless of how 
many laws or ‘reforms’ were issued, the red line did not change, that is, the protection 
of interests and power of the regime. Economically, the businessmen might confront 
unexpected legal charges by the regime. As an Aleppan textile industrialist no14 
stated,  
 
Sometimes they tell you this is legal, or they may turn a blind eye to your illegal 
way of doing businesses by accepting your bribes. However, all of a sudden, the 
government may charge you with the name of the breach of law. If you are lucky 
enough, you just pay more bribe to solve the issue; but if you are not that lucky, 
then you may be bankrupted.230 
 
And the judicial and banking systems did not provide enough of justice or efficiency 
to the businessmen. Syrian businessmen were not willing to engage in or use these 
opaque or low-efficiency institutions rather seek help from the civil mechanisms they 
developed.  
 
Politically, businessmen were not allowed to disobey the regime’s ‘political 
correctness’ since they would be killed or put in prison, such as in the early 1980s 
when ʿĀdil Bādinjki, who was a wood industrialist and participated in the uprising 
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against the Syrian regime, was later arrested by the regime and died in their hands. 231 
Additionally, there were the cases of Riyāḍ Sayf and Maʾmūn al-Ḥumṣi, mentioned 
previously, where in supposedly ‘autonomous’ institutions, like the chambers, 
decisions were not made and personnel were not elected, but rather were influenced 
by the regime. 
 
Even if businessmen wanted to donate their money to needy people, this could draw 
the concerns from the local officials. The Damascene detergent and chemical 
industrialist no2 who was from the 100 prominent businessmen list stated that,  
 
My father was donating money and food for the poor widows in Damascus, then 
100 people came to the distribution place to collect the goods. During the 
distribution, the intelligence services came to us, asking what we were doing, and 
they tried to make problems for us. But after paying them the bribe, they just 
left.232  
 
Since the economic, political, and social environments were not determinate as the 
businessmen could expect, they were afraid of or cautious about building up social 
relationships and conducting business or other activities with other fellow business 
countrymen. As such, due the previous political economic environment and the social 
atmosphere in Syria, the networking among the Syrian business community was 
discreet and full of suspicion.   
 
2.3 Business, political, and philanthropic activities  
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As has been demonstrated, interaction among the Syrian businessmen was cautious 
and full of suspicion since the former political economic environment limited the 
possibility of trust among the businessmen. It is important to continue examining the 
situation, now focusing on the business, political, and philanthropic activities of the 
Syrian businessmen in order to understand how Syrian businessmen conducted their 
activities under the Assad regime prior to 2011. This will demonstrate that even 
though the former political economic environment made the businessmen cautious 
and distrustful of each other, they still actively engaged in economic and 
philanthropic work, and, limitedly, participated in political activities. 
 
a. Struggling between a rock and a hard place – the business  
 
If you have a partner, you have a muʾallim. 
- Syrian proverb among the Syrian businessmen233   
 
As previously shown, Haddad has demonstrated that the numbers of the business 
partnership inside Syrian companies were limited, signifying that businessmen were 
used to individual or family businesses. Again, he argues that this is attributed to the 
lack of trust between the state and the businessmen.234 In addition to Haddad’s 
argument, I will argue that the specific style of doing business was another factor 
contributing to the lack of business partnerships.  
 
Limited business partnerships: a Syrian style 
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“If you have a partner, you have a muʾallim,” is a widely recognised proverb among 
the Syrian business community. “Muʾallim” here is not the literal meaning of ‘teacher’ 
in Arabic, but rather, it indicates a “boss.” Syrian businessmen generally believe in 
this proverb, since one does not want a partner to be a boss, they prefer to work in a 
family business or start their business. This was another aspect of the Syrian business 
community which existed for a long time.  
 
“When we were kids, we saw how our grandfathers or fathers work. Very few of the 
businessmen from my father’s generation had a business partner,” stated an Aleppan 
cleaning tools industrialist no16 in his early 40s. 235  He continued that, “My 
grandfather used to have a business partnership with his brother. In the beginning 
everything was going well, however, when the children of my grandfather and the 
children of his brother grew up, the problems started to show.” He explained that after 
his father and his cousins grew up, the fathers tried to put their sons into different 
leading positions in the companies, such as CEO, or manager, etc. The problem was 
that not all his uncles had the same ability and passion for business, but they did not 
believe another’s ability was better than his. Since the fathers were both the owners of 
the company and business partners, they expected their sons to maintain good 
positions in the businesses. This was how the family business dispute started to grow. 
“At the end, my grandfather and his brother split the businesses into two because they 
had issues as to which son should work in which position in the company, and in our 
generation we all know this family issue.”  
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Furthermore, Syrian businessmen have unspoken rules called the ‘Ḥājji system’ 
(Niẓām al-Ḥājjī) which had been prevalent in almost all Syrian companies for a long 
time. In the Ḥājji system, a company is not usually well organised, but rather a 
businessman would prefer to take charge of all the business details by himself, from 
the small bills to the goods exportation. In the Ḥājji system, it is normal to give orders 
to other people rather than consult their opinions. “Why should I have a business 
partner? If I have a business partner, we may even get into a fight regarding where to 
put this table in the office,” stated an Aleppan children clothes industrialist no17.236  
 
For businessmen who work for themselves, some consider a businessman who has a 
business partner to be ‘the weak businessman.’ “I have enough of capital, why do I 
need to have a business partner? Having a business partner means that you do not 
have enough capital, so you need to have another person to start a business with,” said 
an Aleppan shoes industrialist no18.237  
 
Factors for increasing and decreasing trust: family name and city origin 
 
Syrian businessmen were extremely careful while doing businesses with others since 
the ineffective and corrupted state institutions restricted the possibility to trust. 
However, the family name and the city origin were the two factors that might increase 
or decrease the trust among the networking of Syrian businessmen.  
 
Family name in the Syrian business community was critical since most people respect 
a person’s family name even without knowing the individual personally. The family 
                                                          
236 Aleppan children clothes industrialist no17, personal interview, Cairo, November 03, 2015. 
237 Aleppan shoes industrialist no18, personal interview, Gaziantep, February 22, 2015. 
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name is a symbol that can represent a person’s work ethic and businesses before 
meeting the real person, whether in a good or bad way. For example, Daʿbūl, al-Shāʿir 
and Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī (mentioned previously) and al-Nan have positive reputations 
that precede them. Al-Nan was a business family who established the Durra company 
in 1979 and was considered to be the biggest conserves producer and exporters in 
Syria. Family names not only positively represent a person’s reputation, but also 
people who have these family names are instantly recognised as working in the fields 
of chemicals, textiles, detergents, and foods in Syria.238  
 
Makhlūf, Sukkar, and Ḥamshū (mentioned previously) and al-Shihābi are the 
examples of family names that have a negative reputation. The al-Shihābi family 
established the Alpha medicines industry in 1990 and its products had the highest 
market share out of any other Syrian medicine company in Syria.239 These family 
names are well known for their alliances with the current Syrian regime. “Some of the 
people, when we heard their family name, we knew that they were totally the regime’s 
cronies before the war. And we know that they listened to what the regime asked them 
to do. For these kinds of people, we automatically stay away from them and will 
never have any relations with them,” said the Aleppan food industrialist no3.240 
 
Syrian businessmen can understand another businessman’s family history when it 
comes to family names; some can even be traced back to a businessman’s 
grandfather’s reputation and business. Not all businessmen personally know each 
other, however, they may consider taking further steps to having businesses with him 
                                                          
238 For Daʿbūl, al-Shāʿir, and Ṣabbāgh Sharabātī, please see page 16. Al-Nan, Durra, accessed March 
12, 2017, http://www.aldurra.com/about-us-extended/, and “abraz 100 rajul aʿmāl Surī.”. 
239 For Makhlūf, Sukkar, Ḥamshū, please see page 71; al-Shihaābi, “abraz 100 rajul aʿmāl Surī.” 
240 Aleppan food industrialist no3, personal interview, Gaziantep, February 10, 2015. 
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or building up social connections. The Aleppan food industrialist no3 in his early 60s 
and was from the old bourgeoisie stated,  
 
In Syria, when we hear another businessman’s family name, it is not hard for us to 
guess or know about his family history, like in which field their family used to 
work. If the businessman’s family history in doing business is honourable and they 
do not cheat, we respect these people. And if there was a chance to build up 
business partnerships or do business with them, we would have more confidence in 
doing so.241 
 
Even during fieldwork interviews, the importance of family names sometimes 
determined how smoothly the interview would be. For example, if I was introduced to 
a businessman with a reputable family name, the interviewees would usually treat me 
in a more polite way with a smile and might offer dessert.    
 
In addition to family name, a businessman’s city of origin might also be a factor 
regarding trust among Syrian businessmen. First, it is important to understand 
divisions based on region in Syria, an idea known as ‘regional fragmentation.’ 
Regional fragmentation among Syrians from different cities is not an unknown 
phenomenon. Pierret mentions this fragmentation regarding the Syrian ulama between 
Damascus and Aleppo in Syria.242 However, this mentality not only exists in the 
minds of Syrian religious scholars, but also in the minds of Syrian businessmen. This 
is especially true when it comes to Damascene and Aleppan businessmen since both 
sides generally have negative stereotypes of one another. The Damascene detergent 
and chemical industrialist no1 complained that “the Aleppan businessmen are 
                                                          
241 Aleppan food industrialist no3, eersonal interview, Gaziantep, February 10, 2015. 
242 Pierret, Religion and State in Syria, 13. 
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materialists and are not honest, they just think about money.”243 An Aleppan shoes 
industrialist no19 stated that “the Damascene businessmen are with the regime, and 
they use their nepotism to make money.”244 These stereotypes are widely known 
between the two parties.  
 
The consequences of the mentality of fragmentation can, to a certain extent, be found 
in how Syrian businessmen interact with each other, especially in choosing a business 
partner. For instance, it was rare to find a Damascene businessman who had a 
business partner from Aleppo, and vice versa. Syrian businessmen from the same city 
were more comfortable making contact with the other businessmen from their own 
city since it was easier to trace the background of another businessman from the same 
city and would lower the chances of doing business with the wrong person. As a result, 
the interactions of the businessmen from the same city became closer and more 
intense. Choosing the right person to do business with could lower the possibility of 
future interactions with the official system, and this was something to avoid since they 
clearly understood how ineffective and unjust the judicial operations in the country 
were. 
 
b. Philanthropic and political activities 
 
Businessmen as pious, honest, audacious, and affectionate 
 
                                                          
243 Damascene detergent and chemical industrialist no1, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 28, 
2015. 
244 Aleppan shoes industrialist no19, personal interview, Gaziantep, June 02, 2014. 
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Syrian businessmen also contributed a large amount of social welfare to their fellow 
countrymen in the pre-revolution era, especially since the 1990s.245 In Arabic, the 
word for merchant is Tājir, which is composed of four Arabic alphabets – ta, ʾalif, jim, 
and ra. These four letters are associated with four other words meaning pious (taqwā), 
honest (amīn), audacious (jarīʾ), and affectionate (raqīq) as explained by Damascene 
real estate investor no9.246 This association of the word ‘merchant’ (or businessman) 
is commonly known among the business community in Syria. For example, the 
Damascene real estate investor no9 whose family has a long history of working in 
trading activities mentioned that the traditional meaning of a real businessman was 
not to do with how successful his business activities were or how much money he 
earned, but rather, with the personality of how pious, honest, audacious and 
affectionate the businessman was.247 
 
Forms of philanthropic activities could be demonstrated in different ways. Generally 
in Syria, there were organised groups such as charities for collecting donations and 
giving to the poor, or businessmen who individually donated money to people in need. 
The roots of these charitable activities can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire, 
though the charities started to become integrated into society under the French 
mandate. However, after the Ba’th party came into power in 1963, the charities were 
no longer welcome and were constrained by the state under the context of emergency 
                                                          
245 The number and scale of the Syrian charities have grown due to the weak economic and social 
situations. Soukaina Boukhaima, “Le Mouvement associative en Syrie,” in Pouvoirs et associations 
dans le monde Arabe, ed. Sarah Ben Nefissa (Paris, 2002), referenced by Thomas Pierret, “Sunni 
Clergy Politics in the Cities of Ba’thi Syria,” in Demystifying Syria, ed. Fred Haley Lawson (London: 
Saqi, 2009) 77. 
246 Damascene real estate investor no9, personal interview, Istanbul, December 15, 2014. See also the 
quote of Badr al-Din Shallah, the former president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, in Perthes, 




law.248 In the 1990s, the regime began to loosen its control of the operations of 
charitable associations in the country, which limitedly contributed to the growth of 
charities.249 Then between 2000 and 2009, the number of charities nearly tripled from 
513 to 1485. Ruiz de Elvira Carrascal indicates the prosperity of charities during this 
period was probably due to motivations of the regime to gain funds and the support of 
powerful religious leaders.250  
 
It is for other research to discuss the motivations of the regime for loosening the 
restrictions of charities; here it is important to emphasise the financial pillar of these 
charities: the Syrian businessmen. The Syrian businessmen during the pre-revolution 
era used to actively participate in philanthropic activities. Though they were not the 
only financial sponsors of these charities, some took administrative positions in these 
organisations. Some businessmen might also use these charitable activities as a mean 
to build up a positive image in the country.    
 
In 2002, under the leadership of Shaykh Sariya al-Rifa’i, the Hifz al-Ni’ma 
(Preservation of Grace) was launched in Damascus.251 According to a Damascene 
auto parts businessman no12, and whose uncle was still a member of this organisation, 
the origin of this charity was as follows:  
 
A group of Syrian businessmen used to gather once a month, and one time they 
invited the Shaykh al-Rifa’i to join their gathering in a restaurant. But after the 
dinner, the Shaykh complained that the way they consumed the food was wasteful, 
                                                          
248 Laura Ruiz de Elvira, “State/Charities Relation in Syria. Between Reinforcement, Control and 
Coercion,”in Civil Society and the State in Syria. The Outsourcing of Social Responsibility, Laura Ruiz 
de Elvira Carrascal and Tina Zintl, (Portland: Lynne Rienner, 2012). 
249 Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, “Limits of “Authoritarian Upgrading”,” 596, 598-601 
250 Ruiz de Elvira, “State/Charities Relation in Syria,” 15. 
251 Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, “Limits of “Authoritarian Upgrading”,” 603. 
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and they shouldn’t waste food. So they started to collect the left overs, asked the 
chef to recook it, and distributed it to the poor people. However, later on Rāmī 
Makhlūf became the largest donor to the charity, and he used this as a way to 
control the operation of the charity.252  
 
In 2009, Pierret explained that “Zayd-linked businesspeople were allowed to take 
control of the Union of Charitable Associations in Damascus, which co-ordinates and 
represents the city’s charities.” 253  Furthermore, the case of Hifz al-Ni’ma 
demonstrates that Syrian businessmen used to play important roles in these 
philanthropic activities, from providing funds and to administration. Meanwhile, some 
businessmen would use this philanthropic cover to enhance their social publicity 
within Syrian society. In addition to those Syrian businessmen who conducted 
charitable activities as a group or cooperated in charities, there were also many other 
Syrian businessmen who preferred to donate their money individually without a 
formal organisation. A Damascene packaging industrialist no13 said that, “we [Syrian 
businessmen] would attend a class in the mosque in the morning, and we would 
donate some money to a person, and then the person would go to other people (such 
as foreigners or poor people) and give the money to the one who was in need.”254 
 
Striking a stone with an egg –Political Participation 
 
In addition to economic and philanthropic activities, some Syrian businessmen have 
limitedly participated in political affairs prior to the 2011 revolution. During the 
French mandate period, the traditional petty bourgeoisie conducted strikes against 
                                                          
252 Damascene auto parts businessman no12, personal interview, Cairo, November 10, 2015. 
253 Pierret, “Sunni Clergy Politics,” 77. 
254 Damascene packaging industrialist no13, personal interview, Amman, July 30, 2015. 
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French rule.255 After the Ba’th party came into power in 1963, the bourgeoisie 
conducted an investment strike in 1964.256 During the uprisings in the early 1980s, 
merchants in Aleppo also conducted a strike which quickly spread to other cities in 
Hama and Idlib.257 Nevertheless, in the early 1990s Perthes suggested that “...as a 
whole, the private sector in Syria is still politically weak.”258 And in 2012, Haddad 
also argued that the mistrust between the Syrian regime and the businessmen reminds 
the latter that “the state will not allow them to acquire political positions (especially 
for urban-Sunni businessmen), act jointly outside the networks, or convert their 
economic wealth to political power.”259 In addition, as mentioned previously, when 
Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000, two businessmen who were members of the 
People Assembly (Riyāḍ Sayf and Maʾmūn al-Ḥumṣi) were imprisoned due to their 
outspoken criticism of the regime’s politics.260 The strike and limited participation of 
Syrian businessmen in the People’s Assembly indicate that the businessmen played a 
minor role in Syrian political history, where the political strengths of the businessmen 
are not considered influential to domestic politics. Even though the political 
environment under the rule of the Assad family was unwelcoming to businessmen’s 
political activities, certain incidents that happened during the 20th and early 21st 
century show that Syrian businessmen were not absent from political participation at 
the political crossroads in Syria. 
 
                                                          
255 Khoury, “Syrian Urban Politics,” 512,517,519, 525. 
256 Perthes, The Political Economy, 38 
257 Alasdair Drysdale, “The Asad Regime and Its Troubles,” MERIP Reports, 110 (1982): 8. 
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259 Haddad, Business Networks in Syria, 105. 
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The examples of political activities demonstrate how businessmen participated in 
political affairs in pre-revolution Syria, and their political participation can be 
categorised into two forms: conducting an economic strike; and being outspoken MPs. 
If their political behaviour and demands contradict the ruling power or threaten the 
regime’s legitimacy, these political activities usually do not lead them to a good end 
since Syria was highly politically coercive. Even though Hafiz and Bashar both 
applied for and claimed economic openings and liberalisation, the limits were clear: 
the regime’s authority could never be challenged, no matter what form or under which 
name. Thus, Syrian businessmen were taught to maintain a low-profile and keep their 





In this chapter, I first delineated the structure of the Syrian business community in the 
20th century, and further categorised Syrian businessmen into four groups according 
to their relationship to the regime, which included, the ruling family, the crony, the 
strategic, and the independent businessmen. Second, I argued that Syrian businessmen 
used to conduct their activities cautiously and suspicious among each other due to 
corruption combined with nepotism, the legal insecurity that accompanies state 
interventions, and the lack of efficiency and opaqueness of the public sectors inside 
Syria. This behaviour further constrained the businessmen’s activities in Syria, 
regardless of their economic investments, philanthropic activities, or political 
participation. Nevertheless, in order to improve trust among the business networks 
and facilitate businesses, businessmen developed specific informal mechanisms 
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regarding financial or judicial issues, such as the non-interest loans and the informal 
arbitrations. Also, the importance of social roots was the critical factor for 
strengthening trust among the Syrian businessmen, especially family names and cities 
of origin.  
 
The Syrian businessmen not only actively worked in the field of economic activities 
prior to the year of 2011 inside Syria, but they also provided important contributions 
to the charities and limitedly participated in the political affairs. Nevertheless, the 
development of the business investments of the Syrian business community used to be 
strongly affected by the Assad regime prior to the 2011 revolution. Not only the 
economic investments of the Syrian businessmen were affected by the Assad regime, 
but also, their charitable or political activities were both under the influence of the 
Assad regime. Due to this former political economic environment inside Syria, which 
possessed the feature of corruption, legal insecurity, and lack of efficiency of the 
public sectors, I argue that the Syrian business networks used to be a fragmentation 
comprised of larger networks that did not trust each other and smaller networks with 
high levels of trust. That is to say, the former political economic environment made 
the Syrian businessmen to be cautious and suspicious while interacting with each 
other in general, because they were lack of trust with the regime and the institutions 
inside the country. Nevertheless, Syrian businessmen who they already have enough 
trust with each other because of long periods of friendships or could made sure the 
other Syrian businessmen were trustworthy, in this case, the trust among them may be 




After examining the Syrian business community in the pre-revolution era, it is 
important to analyse the period between the eruption of the 2011 revolution and the 
time when businessmen decided to leave Syria, to determine how the transformation 




Chapter 3 From Revolution to Expatriation: the Reactions and Exodus of Syrian 
Businessmen  
 
The Syrian economy started to be affected by the incidents in other Arab countries 
at the end of 2010 because people thought that the revolution would reach Syria 
soon. Then poverty started to spread inside the country. In the middle of 2011, 
many car companies closed, as well as real estate companies. The rich people 
started to become conservative with their businesses and not spend too much money. 
In October 2011, my company started to not sell anything, and then we started to 
feel the pressure because no one was making money. 
- A Damascene technological company businessman no14261 
 
The Syrian business networks used to be fragmented due to the political economic 
environment inside Syria and from the study of the relationships between the Assad 
regime and its business community helps to categorise the pre-revolution Syrian 
businessmen into four different groups as shown in the last chapter. I now aim to 
examine the Syrian business community between the eruption of the 2011 revolution 
and the decisions of the businessmen to emigration from Syria to neighbouring 
countries.  
 
First, the reactions of Syrian businessmen towards the 2011 revolution and the impact 
of the reactions on the unprecedented civil uprising will be analysed. Although the 
Syrian business community was generally considered not very political and held 
mutual ties with the Syrian regime, certain businessmen based in Syria who were less 
                                                          




dependent on the regime prior to 2011, broke their silence and played important roles 
in the revolution. The reasons that the less dependent Syrian businessmen supported 
the revolution were their long-term resentment and experiences of suppression by the 
regime, the habit of personalised philanthropic practices, moral shock from witnessing 
how the regime brutally repressed the civilian movement, and the political 
calculations of whether the Bashar regime would stay in power or not. Second, after 
the escalations of conflict in Syria, due to the lack of security, the worsening of the 
economic condition, and the political suppression, the businessmen had no choice but 
to flee Syria. Moreover, the waves of emigration are chronicled into three main 
periods: the beginning of 2011, between the mid-2012 and mid-2013, and the 30th 
June 2013.  
 
The analysis of the Syrian business community between the period of the 2011 
revolution and the moment they decided to leave will demonstrate that the harsher the 
regime suppressed its people during the revolution, the more the Syrian businessmen 
reacted and supported the people. Nevertheless, once the conflict reached a higher 
level of damage inside Syria, the lack of security, the worsening economic conditions 
and political suppressions, many Syrian businessmen had no choice but to leave Syria. 
This context of emigration of Syrian businessmen is different from previous business 
diaspora studies because Syrian businessmen were forced to leave their homeland 
while in other studies of business diasporas, the emigrants were driven by economic 
interest.262  
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The political participation of Syrian businessmen who had left Syria before the 2011 
revolution but participated in and supported the uprising - such as Ayman Asfari, and 
Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh - will be examined later in chapter 6.  
 
3.1 The eruption of the revolution 
 
Although many studies have been done on the 2011 Syrian revolution, the role of the 
Syrian business community during this unprecedented event has rarely been 
discussed.263 It is common to assume that most Syrian businessmen preferred to 
maintain low-profiles during the beginning of the 2011 revolution in Syria due to the 
economic profits associated with a stable political environment.264 On the surface, the 
Syrian business community seemed to maintain calm and not react during the 
uprising.265 And even though the majority of the Syrian businessmen did not react to 
the civil uprising, I will demonstrate that some Syrian businessmen secretly and 
actively did participate starting at the beginning of 2011. And with the escalation of 
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conflict, more and more businessmen decided to partake in the revolutionary 
campaign against the regime. 
 
Based on the categorisation of the Syrian businessmen provided in the previous 
chapter (ruling family, crony, strategic, and independent), I will first illustrate how 
these four groups reacted differently towards the revolution. Looking into the 
businessmen’s reactions in a chronological timeline will demonstrate how some 
businessmen reacted towards the revolution primarily from a politically conservative 
position, but still being somewhat personally against the revolution while providing 
material support. Furthermore, since at the beginning of the revolution all civilian’s 
actions were mostly self-motivated and they did not have any substantial funds or aid 
from abroad, the participation of some businessmen from various business scales and 
different cities – including some business tycoons – had without a doubt a positive 
effect on the continuation of the revolution, despite the ruling family businessmen and 
crony businessmen remaining on the side of the regime and the other businessmen 
staying silent as before.  
 
a. General reactions of the Syrian businessmen  
 
If we [the businessmen] hadn’t supported the people during the revolution, then the 
revolution could not have continued. No one helped us in the beginning. It was us 
[the Syrians] who were helping ourselves. Most businessmen did provide help to 
the revolution, whether financially or humanitarianly. In each area, there’s a food 
distribution centre or field hospital (mushfā al-maydānī) organization which is 
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funded by the local businessmen. Even some expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
Europe donate money to us to support the revolution. 
- Lattakia automobile parts businessman no1266 
 
The Syrian business community’s reaction to the revolution can generally be divided 
into two groups: the businessmen who were not supporting the revolution and the 
businessmen who were supporting the revolution. The categorisation of Syrian 
businessmen provided in the previous chapter categorise the Syrian businessmen into 
four groups was based on the nature of the relationships between the regime and the 
businessmen. These groups of businessmen also reacted towards the civil uprising 
differently. 
 
On the one hand, businessmen who did not support the revolution were mainly the 
ruling family businessmen and the crony businessmen since the members of the 
former group had their familial ties or business fortunes originating or extending from 
the regime itself, and the latter group had their economic wealth patronised mainly by 
the regime. They were supporters of the regime who rarely took any action against the 
regime and stood with the regime, with the exception Firās Ṭallās who left Syria in 
2012. For the most part, they remained in Syria within the areas controlled by the 
regime. Some pro-regime business figures inside Syria spoke out in accordance with 
the regime’s political stance and condemned the ‘terrorist attack’ inside the country, 
such as Fāris al-Shihābi, the president of the Federation of Syrian Chambers of 
Industry. He attributed the damages in the industrial area of Aleppo to a terrorist 
armed attack and theft with assistance from the Turkish government, “we have 
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conclusive evidence to prove the involvement of the Turkish government of stealing 
the assembly lines and machines [and] hundreds of factories from Aleppo.”267  
 
Furthermore, many pro-regime business figures, such as Mazen al-Tabba, Tarif 
Akhras, Ra’if Al-Quwatly, Mohamed Hamcho, Rami Makhlouf, Samir Hassan, and 
Khalid Qaddur were listed on Western sanction lists which was an attempt to prevent 
them from continually supporting the regime during the civil uprising. 268  The 
sanctions from the Western countries deterred Syrian businessmen, to a certain extent, 
from allying with the Bashar regime or publicly showing their loyalties.269 This is 
why there were not many news reports showing the support of businessmen for the 
regime, except those who were already known for their support and were listed on the 
sanction lists. Nonetheless, the number of ruling family businessmen or crony 
businessmen was significantly less than the other two groups. At best, the 
businessmen who supported the regime would only leave Syria with the acceleration 
of conflict, such as one prominent businessman from an old Aleppan family who was 
a close friend of Fāris al-Shihābi and preferred not to reveal his name.270 
 
In addition, there were also other strategic and independent businessmen who did not 
take part in the anti-regime campaign. However, the businessmen in these two groups 
who did not partake in the revolution also did not support the regime like the ruling 
family businessmen or crony businessmen did. Rather, they remained self-proclaimed 
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neutral. Since their relationships with the regime were based on the calculation of 
their business interests, they chose to remain ‘as usual’ as before the revolution. 
 
On the other hand, the businessmen who did support the revolution were primarily 
from the other two groups, the strategic and independent businessmen. Since their 
relationships with the regime were not totally reliant on the regime’s patronage, and 
many were furious with or had been personally affected by the regime’s reactions to 
civilians, some businessmen in these two groups decided to take part and support the 
revolution. They supported the revolution with financial support, humanitarian aid, 
and information exchange. They did this voluntarily since they did not agree with 
what the regime was doing to the people, and their reactions during the revolution 
were agitated by the cruel repressions from the regime on its people.  
 
Since it is already clear why pro-regime Syrian businessmen to support the regime or 
remain silence during the civil uprising, it is important to examine how the 
anti-regime businessmen took action and developed under the rule of the 
authortitative regime.  
 
b. Growth of anger  
 
Some businessmen supported the regime, and they were big, rich businessmen. 
Others were afraid that they would lose their country. And some felt that they 
needed a regime change, since the regime was killing its own people mercilessly. 
But they were afraid. 
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- A Damascene detergent and chemical industrialist no2271 
 
The Syrian business community has never been absent from participating in the 
revolution since it began in 2011. The dynamics of the Syrian business community 
can be seen in al-Ḥarīqa protest that happened a month prior to the Daraa protest.272 
Before the revolution, the al-Ḥarīqa market in Damascus had already experienced 
some tension between local merchants and officials. On 17 February 2011, local 
police arrested the son of a merchant, ʿImād Nasab, from the al-Ḥarīqa market and 
beat him.273 The outcome of this arrest was that thousands of local people from the 
area gathered to express their grievances about how the police treated citizens and 
chanted the slogan, “the Syrian people will not be humiliated.”274 The Minister of 
Interior later came to the crowd and promised to punish the police.275 This event was 
the first reaction on the part of the Syrian business community regarding the regime’s 
unjust treatment of its people. On 18 March 2011, the people of Daraa walked on the 
streets in response to the regime’s security force detaining and torturing fifteen 
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schoolchildren. 276  However, as the International Crisis Group’s report stated, 
“security services brutal and often erratic performance has created more problems 
than it has solved, as violence almost certainly has been the primary reason behind the 
protest movement’s growth and radicalization.” 277  The regime’s merciless 
suppression of the protestors outraged the people.  
 
With the escalation of casualties, the participation of the Syrian businessmen in the 
revolution became more active and obvious. A chronological analysis will indicate the 
ups and downs of the participation of Syrian businessmen during this period in three 
major phases: at the beginning, Syrian businessmen mostly stayed calm and 
considered whether it was the right time to get involved or not. Involvement during 
this period was still low. Then, after witnessing a series of massacres by the regime on 
its people and predicting that the regime would soon end, between mid-2011 and 
mid-2012 the support of the business community to the opposition rose. Various 
degrees of conflict within Syria also led businessmen in different cities to react 
differently, since it was not until mid-2012 that Aleppo witnessed large scale clashes 
between the regime and the rebels.278 Finally, after mid-2012, when it was no longer 
possible to continue residing in Syria, they decided to flee for their lives. 
 
First Phase: preserving (beginning of 2011) 
 
18th of March 2011 –Daraa protest 
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When people walked on the streets of Daraa calling for the regime to make reforms, 
what they received was not a rational conversation. Instead, local authorities arrested, 
tortured and shot protestors. The regime’s coercive repression on unarmed citizens 
angered the local community, which quickly spread to other major cities in the 
country. Different series of protests were common during this period. Nevertheless, 
the regime did not adjust its way of reacting to the people’s demands. Many reports 
state that most Syrian businessmen were more politically conservative towards this 
uprising, or staying on the side of the Syrian Bashar regime.279 Many were hesitant to 
choose sides or oppose the uprising at the beginning of the revolution since they 
believed that the regime might win as it had done previously and they might be 
rewarded for their support. “We saw what happened in Hama and in Aleppo during 
the 1980s uprising; it was a total disaster. The regime has no mercy for its people, and 
we know that they will not hesitate to do anything to preserve their political power as 
before,” stated the Aleppan automobile industrialist no21 in his sixties, who had 
witnessed the Hafiz al-Assad regime’s brutal ways of repressions against the 
dissidents in Aleppo in 1982.280 However, some businessmen reportedly played a 
double game during this period, as they also funded the opposition should the regime 
eventually lose.281 The Damascene technological company no14 businessman who 
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was in his early thirties from a Damascene printing industrial family explained how 
he personally took part in the protest in Dārayya in the beginning of 2011, 
 
I decided to walk on the street, and I participated in the demonstration in Dārayya 
in the beginning of 2011. More than 100 people were arrested at check points, and 
some people were even tortured to death. The government did not allow their 
family members to ask where their missing relatives were, or the government would 
imprison them, too. There are also other youths who were from a business family 
like me. What we want is a clean country, a reformed regime without corruption.282 
 
In addition, another six interviewees also stated that they participated in the protests in 
the city where they resided. Among them, four were from Aleppo, one from Lattakia, 




Even though the regime responded to the protestors with cold-blooded repression, the 
Syrian people did not surrender. Some businessmen also set up non-governmental 
organisations of their own accord attempting to help the protestors whose personal 
safeties were severely affected by the regime’s assaults. For example, in April 2011 in 
Aleppo, the second largest city in Syria, some businessmen gathered with other local 
intellectuals and established the organisation ‘Appeal from Aleppo for the country’ 
(nidāʾ min Ḥalab li-ajal al-waṭan), which not only issued a petition to president 
Bashar al-Assad demonstrating their pain and sorrow regarding the conflict in Daraa, 
Homs, and Bānyās and a desire for a non-division of Syria despite its different sects, 
                                                          





they also devoted themselves to saving or helping the protestors who were imprisoned 
by the Syrian regime and the patients who were injured during the protests.284 The 
Aleppan dessert industrialist no15 who was also a founding member of this 
organisation stated that,   
 
We established an organisation called ‘Appeal from Aleppo for the country’ in 
April 2011 in Aleppo. The aim of this organization is to provide humanitarian aid to 
the local people. We also try to free people from prison, we negotiate with the local 
authority, and protect the patients inside the hospital from the regime’s harassment. 
Because once a protestor is injured and sent to the public hospital, the regime may 
send people to assassinate or arrest him.285  
 
Second Phase: active participation (mid-2011 to mid-2012) 
 
Arm the rebels and supply the protestors 
 
Homs also experienced widespread anti-regime movements by the local people. 
Those in the ‘capital of the revolution’ – as Syrians described the city of Homs – 
started to arm themselves and fight for their freedom after the regime sent tanks to the 
city in mid-2011.286 “I even bought weapons for the people, I supported them,” stated 
a Homsi food industrialist no2, who was from an old and well-known family in Homs, 
and had a positive reputation among other Homsi interviewees. He further explained 
that,  
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There are many unjust things in Syria; the regime is corrupt, as everyone knows. 
But it is not only corrupt, it also against our religion. In 2010, the government sent 
people to my factory and investigated me. They asked me, why do you have a 
mosque in your factory? Isn’t this ridiculous? We are Muslims, and the government 
tries to prohibit us from practicing our religion.287 
 
The rebels purchased weapons with the funds they received from the inner and 
expatriate Syrian businessmen, as reported by journalist Nir Rosen when he stated 
that “Much of the financing comes from Syrian businessmen inside or outside the 
country.”288 
 
In addition, almost all the 191 businessmen interviewed stated that they provided 
money or food to the people who were in need during the first few months of the 
revolution. The Homsi electronic goods businessman no1 stated that before the 
revolution his capital had reached $2 million. When the revolution erupted in the 
country, he personally donated $400,000 to buy food for the protestors and the needy 
people, “because when the people are going to streets to protest, they do not have time 
for work and have no salaries, and many people lost their family members who used 
to be the breadwinners in the families. We need to support them.”289 News reports 
also state that Syrian businessmen were “opting to donate money, food and medical 
supplies covertly or grant time off to protesters.”290  
 
29th of July 2011 - The Emergence of the Free Syria Army 
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On 29 July 2011, seven defected Syrian military officers released video footage on 
YouTube and announced the formation of the Free Syria Army (FSA), whose goal 
was to topple the Syrian regime and protect the revolution.291 Numerous defectors 
from the Syrian Army to the FSA emerged in the following month.292 Some rich 
Syrian businessmen also donated their money to support the FSA.293 Because of their 
long-term dread of the regime’s rule, they thought the FSA could topple the 40-year 
rule of the house of al-Assad. “Syria is under unjust leadership and without human 
rights since Hafiz al-Assad; if we do not stand up against them, we are part of them,” 
stated a Damascene clothes industrialist no15 in his fifties and used to have a shop in 
al-Ḥamiydiyya market.294 Before the revolution, the Syrian businessmen needed to 
personally know a few official figures from the government to facilitate their 
businesses administrative work. However, after the revolution erupted, these 
connections could be used by the anti-regime businessmen to transfer strategic 
information from the mukhabarat or military generals to the protestors. The same 
Damascene businessman further explained how he used this connection for helping 
the FSA,  
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I used to know some people from the mukhabarat. In the middle of 2011, while I 
was sitting with them, I knew what they were going to do to the protestors, where 
they were going to show up. Then I would pass this information to my son because 
he had connections with people from the FSA. After the mukhabarat learned what I 
was doing, I became wanted and I fled Syria.295  
 
With the exception of the regime and crony businessmen, most Syrian businessmen 
had this long-term dread of the regime, and some expected that the emergence of the 
revolution and the armed rebels change the country. As such, they secretly provided 
materials to help the people. The young Damascene technological company 
businessman no14 who participated in the Dārayya protest explained how they 
gathered money and bought light weapons for the rebels,  
 
In every area, Syrian businessmen would gather together to donate and collect 
money. Of course, this needed to be in secret. They used this money to buy food, 
basic needs, and banners to distribute to the protesters. They contacted each other 
by phone, and they used some secret code to make sure the road was safe for 
transporting the goods. Some businessmen were imprisoned or tortured to death 
after the regime caught them participating in these protests. When the Free Syria 
Army (FSA) emerged, many Syrian businessmen also bought weapons for the 
rebels. We bought weapons for the rebels, but they were light weapons, like $2000 
for a gun. We bought it either from the black market at the Syrian-Lebanese borders, 
or from the State Security. The people from the State Security would sell us bullets, 
and even high-ranking officers inside the government would sell weapons to us. 
They do not care about who stays in power, rather, they merely cared about their 
pockets. Then we transported these bullets to Homs.296 
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Also, another Damascene household cleansing industrialist no31 from the rural 
Damascus set up a restaurant in the mid-end of 2011 for providing meals for the 
rebels. “My father opened a big restaurant in our hometown. That time, everyday 
around 5000 rebel fighters would come to the restaurant and have food then go fight 
the regime,” stated the son of this industrialist.297  
 
This anti-regime financial support from the Syrian business community was found in 
other major cities in Syria, as confirmed by interviewed businessmen who were from 
Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Daraa, Lattakia, and Tartus during the revolution period. 
Nevertheless, it was not until mid-2012 that the second biggest city in Syria – 
Aleppo – experienced escalated protests and conflicts as other major cities. Thus, 
before mid-2012 there were not as many as Aleppan businessmen participating in the 
revolution as the other major Syrian cities. 
 
11th of December 2011-Dignity Strike 
 
On 11 December 2011, Syrian activists attempted to initiate a nation-wide ‘dignity 
strike,’ which called upon all workers, students, and businessmen in Syria to join. 
Many shops owners also responded to this strike, like one who said “in Homs, 
al-Zabadāni, and Aleppo, the shops are closed and the streets are empty.”298 Areas 
inside the cities of al-Qābūn, Jawbar, Barza, Kafarsūsa experienced different degrees 
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of market shut down, as did the rural side of Damascus of Zamlaka, Kafarbaṭna, 
Dārayya.299 The day after the dignity strike, the Syrian national news refuted that the 
people were behind it, but that the terrorists were the ones who organised the 
strike.”300 The strike also angered the regime and the security forces from the 
government ordered these merchants who had already closed their shops to reopen 
them. The security forces also reacted violently by smashing the shops’ doors of the 
merchants who refused to obey their demands.301  
 
Early to mid-2012 – Escalation of Repression 
 
The situation in Syria was getting worse day by day. As stated by the International 
Crisis Group’s report in April 2012, the attacks and repression by the regime were 
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dramatically escalating at this time.302 The regime mercilessly bombed Homs and 
other places with heavy artillery not only causing high numbers of causalities and 
thousands of internally displaced people, but it also enraged other Syrians who had 
witnessed the brutal killings. To help care for injured people, some Syrian 
businessmen donated money and established field hospitals inside residential houses 
or inconspicuous buildings. They bought medicine from corrupt officials in public 
sectors and sent it to these field hospitals. These field hospitals were found in all 
major cities in Syria after the conflict had been aggravated. In addition, some 
businessmen provided places to stay for whose who were forced to leave their 
hometowns, even if accepting these people would get them in trouble with the regime. 
The regime considered those who were fleeing as ‘terrorists’ due to the strong 
revolutionary tendencies of their hometowns (especially people from Homs). A 
Damascene clothes industrialist no16 said,  
 
At the end of 2011, I rented a complete two-star hotel in Damascus to let people 
who fled from Homs for Damascus to stay in. But the government was not happy 
with what I did. The government said that these people were all terrorists. Then the 
government sent intelligence to me and asked me why I did this. The official asked: 
how can you be sure that they are not terrorists?303 
 
Humanitarian aid from the business community was found throughout Syria during 
the revolution. However, it is not possible to estimate the amount of these donations 
since all had to be done in secret. 
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The participation of the businessmen in the civil uprising also received attention from 
the regime during this period. One businessman stated what he had heard from 
another businessman who had apparently participated in a meeting with Bashar 
al-Assad:  
 
On 8 May, Bashar met with over 20 leading Sunni businessmen from the capital. 
He said that he had heard that some of them were supporting the revolution. He said 
that, if it was true, he was willing to do to [the historical commercial hubs of] 
Hamidiya and Madhat Pasha what he had done to Baba Amro. He wanted them to 
know that this would pose him no problem whatsoever.304  
 
This quote indicates that the scale of the businessmen’s participation in the revolution 
in Damascus had reached such an extent that the regime was attempting to impede the 
further growth of the businessmen’s donations to the revolution and that it was 
threatening the businessmen to not take part in the revolution. 
 
25th of May 2012 - al-Ḥūla Massacre 
 
On 25 May 2012, 108 civilians were killed in al-Ḥūla, Homs, including 49 children 
and 34 women.305 This killing was described by the United Nations Security Council 
as an “outrageous use of force against the civilian population.”306 The Syrians were 
furious by the images that they were seeing on social media; that is, the corpses of 
women and children.307 Two days after the massacre, the Damascene merchants went 
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on strike against the regime’s brutal killing of children in al-Ḥūla. According to 
eyewitnesses during this strike, 50 to 90% of the markets at al-Ḥamiydiyya, al-Ḥarīqa, 
al-Bazwariyya, Bāb Sariyja, Madḥat Bāshā, al-Ḥalabūnī, al-Khayyāṭīn, Ḥūsh Balās, 
and Bāb al-Jābiyya joined the strike.308 This was the first time since the 2011 
revolution that merchants from the two most important trading centres in Damascus 
–al-Ḥamiydiyya and al-Ḥarīqa – took part in the strike against the regime.309 The 
strikes by the business community put economic pressure on the regime. By doing so, 
the Syrian economy was weakened during the strike, especially once the shop owners 
in the main markets of Syria started to take part. The strike sent a message of 
dissatisfaction from the business community to the regime, and as a consequence, put 
both minor and major economic pressure on the rulers. Nevertheless, the business 
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strike resulted in the regime’s immediate suppression of the businessmen, as had the 
dignity strike in December 2011 as mentioned earlier, by using its security forces to 
force these shop owners to reopen their shops or destroy the ones who refused to obey 
the orders.310   
 
These activities demonstrate that the reactions of the Syrian businessmen who 
participated in anti-regime activities did contribute to the unprecedentedly large-scale 
uprising in Syria, and that their funding to a certain extent provided support to the 
protesters’ daily life by helping the people whose lives were affected by the uprising. 
Except for the regime and crony businessmen, the remaining businessmen suffered 
from the unjust rulings of the government. This deepened the long-term resentment of 
businessmen towards the Assad regime. Since the political environment did not even 
allow them to express their fury about the regime’s unfair governance, and since 
certain businessmen had been suppressed, the eruption of the massive uprising created 
an opportunity to react. In addition, none of the regime or crony Syrian businessmen 
participated in the revolution (expect Firās Ṭallās who left Syria during the 
revolution). This indicates that the stronger the dependency between the regime and 
the businessmen was, the fewer possibilities they to revolt, and vice versa.  
 
Furthermore, the Syrian businessmen would donate financial or material help to the 
needy people before the revolution, as previously discussed.311 In addition to the 
altruistic reason of Syrian businessmen for helping the needy people during the 
conflict, as soon as ordinary Syrians suffered from the conflict, the business class that 
used to help the poor, needed to show their sympathies to preserve their reputable 
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standing in the country. Within the context of businessmen’s long-term resentment of 
the regime, and the less dependency of Syrian businessmen on the regime, the habit of 
personalised philanthropic practices among the Syrian business community, 
witnessing the regime’s merciless killing of its people during the revolution also 
provoked businessmen to support the people and the revolution. Especially after the 
political calculations of the fall of the Bashar regime became higher, the Syrian 
business community’s support of the revolution became more prosperous.  
 
However, after the middle of 2012, due to the deteriorating conditions inside Syria, 
most Syrian businessmen were forced to leave Syria. Since then, the participation of 
the Syrian businessmen in the revolution inside Syria has become less tangible. But 
their expatriation from Syria did not mean that they stopped engaging in the 
revolution. Rather, for some of them, their revolution continues in the host countries 
which they relocated into. 
 
3.2 Timings and reasons of emigration 
 
The turning points which drove Syrian businessmen to emigrate from Syria and the 
reasons behind their decisions to emigrate require attention. An analysis of interview 
data and online press suggests that there were three main periods with higher numbers 
of Syrian businessmen leaving the country starting at the beginning of the 2011 
revolution. These three periods are:  
 
1) The beginning of the 2011 revolution  
2) Between mid-2012 and mid-2013 
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3) From the 30 June 2013  
 
The first two periods include the emigration of businessmen from Syria, while the 
third is the date when businessmen emigrated from the first host country to a second 
host country, namely from Egypt to Turkey. During the period of conflict, Syrians left 
because of the severe conditions in the country, the lack of security being the most 
common reason as with other cases of forced migration. However, the reasons Syrian 
businessmen left Syria were not limited to the lack of security, but rather the 
worsening economic situation and the suppression of the political environment were 
another two factors which forced them to leave. Furthermore, the regime applied 
proactive strategies which attempted to deter and prevent the businessmen from 
joining the uprising, and further intimidated the businessmen who might have stood 
with the other side.  
 
a. Chronological waves of business emigration  
 
In September 2011, many foreign human resource agencies stopped sending 
workers to Syria. At that time it was still peaceful in Damascus, but all the foreign 
companies I used to do business with stopped doing business with us. 
- A Damascene human resources businesswoman no17312 
 
As previously mentioned, the emigration of Syrian businessmen was massive, in 
terms of both large numbers of businessmen and the capital they took with them. To 
more easily understand the time frame of Syrian businessmen emigrations, the table 
                                                          




and Hama, which were receiving more suppression from the regime. However, this 
peace was merely a mirage since the first wave of emigration of Syrian businessmen 
had already started. According to one businesswoman quoted above, this emigration 
demonstrates that the human resources sector in Syria dealing with foreign companies 
had already been affected during the first few months of the Syrian uprising. Not only 
had the human resources sector been affected, but so had the sector of those who 
worked in international trade and tourism. A Damascene ceramic industrialist no18 
who was a member of the Ceramic Industry Committee in Damascus Chamber of 
Industry and Rural Areas stated that, 
 
When the incident started at the beginning of 2011, everything still seemed to be 
okay in Syria. Yet the foreign companies that we had businesses with began losing 
trust in our productive ability and the transportability of our goods. My foreign 
customers did not trust that I could continue exporting my goods so they stopped 
purchasing goods from us. Then I had to shut down my factory since there was no 
more business for me.314  
 
In addition, before the eruption of the revolution in Syria, some businessmen whose 
family members had been active in participating in political affairs (such as the 
Damascus Declaration) received mukhabarat visits because of their family’s activities. 
“At the beginning of the revolution, the government sent their people to my family in 
order to investigate us [because of my family’s history]. And we were all afraid to 
leave our house at that time. On 4 February 2011, I decided to go to Qatar first 
because I had family members there,” said an Aleppan textile industrialist no23.315 
After the Daraa protest in March 2011, the regime made efforts to guarantee the 
loyalty of the business community. For instance, the Syrian tycoon1 who used to be 
                                                          
314 Damascene ceramic industrialist no18, personal interview, Cairo, September 30, 2015.  
315 Aleppan textile industrialist no23, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 20, 2015.  
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the leading figure in one of the Syrian Chambers and was on the list of the top 100 
prominent businessmen stated,  
 
Rāmī Makhlūf phoned me after the Daraa protest in March asking me my opinions 
on the matter and what I suggested to do. I told him that I thought peaceful talk 
would be the best way to solve the issue, but he was not happy with that. What he 
preferred to do was to shoot anybody who was against the regime. A few days later 
I went to the Aleppo airport because I needed to see my factory in another country. 
But the airline representative at the airport told me that my name was on a 
‘prohibited to travel’ list [because of what I had said to Rāmī.] Then I fled to 
Turkey illegally.316  
 
Furthermore, the increase of checkpoints inside Syria and stricter security checks also 
made life difficult for businessmen. The regime started setting up checkpoints, and the 
State Security began issuing a new form of identity card called the ‘security card.’ 
The check points in Syria under the regime-controlled area usually had two lines, one 
for the people who had the security card, the other one for those who did not. People 
would need to pay $2000 to get this card.317 Security guards at the checkpoints 
usually would not interrogate people with cards very much. Moreover, some 
businessmen who passed through checkpoints at the beginning of 2011 were asked to 
sign a letter to declare that they would not participate in anti-regime activities. This 
annoyed businessmen who saw it as an insult and an example of distrust by the 
regime. 
 
Finally, the outskirts of major Syrian cities were the first places where unrest was 
most prevalent since the regime had targeted the cities. Businessmen whose factories 
                                                          
316 Syrian tycoon1 who used to be the leading figure in one of the Syrian Chambers, personal interview, 
Gaziantep, December 12, 2014. 
317 Damascene general trade businessman no19, personal interview, Istanbul, April 02, 2015. 
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were located in the outskirts were severely affected by the unstable situation. Not only 
were their factories at risk of being looted or destroyed by local gangs, but their 
personal safety was also at risk. The Aleppan textile industrialist no22 and was listed 
on the 2009 prominent businessmen list stated that,  
 
A few months after the outbreak of the incident, my friend called me and told me 
to be careful because someone wanted to kidnap my son - because they knew that 
I was rich and that I only have one son. In mid-2011 someone called to threaten 
me so then I sent my son to Lebanon.318  
 
Mid-2012 to Mid-2013 
 
In mid-2012, the battle between the Syrian regime’s army and the opposition groups 
became critical. Especially in the two main cities of Damascus and Aleppo, the 
opposition groups advancing upon the regime forces there that the rebels took half of 
Aleppo and most of the suburbs of Damascus.319 On 18 July 2012, the FSA bombed 
the capital city of Damascus, which killed the Defence Minister Dāwūd Rājiḥa, 
Deputy Defence Minister Āṣif Shawkat, and al-Assad’s security adviser and assistant 
vice president Ḥassan Turkumāni.320 This attack by the opposition groups against the 
regime was considered as the harshest blow to the regime forces since the beginning 
of the rebel movement. In Aleppo in August 2012, the FSA also took over the biggest 
industrial area of Syria, the Shaykh Najjar, which had included 1,250 factories before 
the conflict.321 However, the progress of the opposition movements in the battlefields 
                                                          
318 Aleppan textile industrialist no22, personal interview, Cairo. November 17, 2015. 
319  Syria: Mapping the Conflict, BBC, July 10, 2015, accessed March 17, 2017, 
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led to harsher reactions from the regime, conducted a series of indiscriminate 
bombings in the Shaykh Najjar area.322 The regime’s heavy attacks on the rebel 
occupied area caused great damage and many casualties. 323  Businessmen’s 
investments and properties were without a doubt heavily affected by these armed 
clashes. An Aleppan agency businessman no24 who was an agent for many 
international electronic companies recalled how his businesses were affected by the 
both the regime forces and the rebels, 
 
One of my companies was occupied by the regime’s forces because the officer told 
me that they needed my office to let the soldiers sleep in. And I heard that another 
one of my offices was turned into an Islamic court. That office had a 1500-meter 
square showroom and was occupied by the rebels. If the area was occupied by the 
regime then it should be comparatively safer than the one that was occupied by the 
rebels.324  
 
Not only were the properties of the businessmen in danger, but so was their personal 
safety and the safety of their families. The Damascene detergent and chemical 
industrialist no2 stated that,  
 
My father was in his eighties and he was kidnapped by an armed group in the 
middle of 2012. The kidnappers asked us to pay $60,000 for the ransom or they 
would kill him, and we paid it. We were living in the area which was controlled by 
the regime, but even the regime said that they did not know who was behind this 
ransom [because the regime themselves did not know whether the kidnapping was 
conducted by their people or not] since everything was in chaos.325  
                                                                                                                                                                      
Almalaf-sy, accessed January 5, 2016, 
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Furthermore, the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the 
northern part of Syria in May 2013 onwards also negatively affected business for 
Syrian businessmen. Especially after 14 May 2013 when the ISIS started to dominate 
the city of Raqqa, then the conflict started again between the FSA and ISIS in the 
northeast of Syria.326 These armed clashes not only directly affected the activities of 
the Syrian businessmen whose businesses were located in the northern part of Syria, 
but also blockaded the transportation routes of goods for the Syrian businessmen who 
used to export their goods to Iraq via Raqqa.  
 
30th of June 2013 
 
In addition to these two periods, a third period, which cannot be seen from this table 
because it indicates a move from the first host country to the second, is 30 June 2013. 
This was when Syrian businessmen who had already fled Syria for Egypt decided to 
leave Egypt for other countries, primarily Turkey. 18 out of the 191 interviewees 
stated that they moved from Egypt to Turkey after the military coup in Egypt on 30 
June 2013. Many other interviewees also reported that a number of their Syrian 
business colleagues left Egypt for Turkey after the incident in Egypt. On that date, 
protesters in Egypt demanded the resignation of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi. 
The country then entered a state of chaos and the Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi later arranged a military coup.327 “We, as Syrians, were believed to be the 
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supporters of president Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhoods by the local people, 
which led local Egyptians to start destroying our shops or robbing us on the streets. 
There was no safety for us in Egypt after the protest,” stated the Aleppan plastic 
industrialist no9 in Egypt who has a plastic factory in the 6th of October city with 
fifteen workers. 328  Most Syrian businessmen in Egypt experienced threats and 
uncertainty at that time. This anti-Syrianness in Egypt could be observed from two 
Egyptian media sources, both television presenters. Tawfīq ʿAkāsha and Yūsuf 
al-Ḥusayni labeled the Egypt-based Syrians as supporters of the Muslim Brotherhoods 
and Muhammad Morsi.329 ʿAkāsha even threatened “to kill the Syrian refugees and 
burn and destroy their houses” in the programme.330 For many Egypt-based Syrian 
businessmen, 30 June 2013 became a turning point to leave the country due to the 
lack of safety.   
 
b. Reasons for leaving  
 
I was sitting in the salon watching my neighbour’s kids playing on the balcony. 
Suddenly, I heard gunshots and I went to check on the kids. All I saw were the 
dead bodies of the kids covered in blood. They had been shot dead by the 
regime’s snipers. 
- A Damascene printing industrialist no20331 
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The reason that Syrian businessmen left Syria was not merely due to the lack of safety 
which exacerbated the conflict, but also to the deterioration of the economy and the 
political suppression by the Syrian regime. Furthermore, decisions to leave Syria were 
made suddenly, since in most cases, there was no time for them to reconsider 
departing from the conflict zone or not.   
 
During the conflict period, the businessmen were the conspicuous targets for all the 
armed groups, especially businessmen who had been big names in the Syrian market. 
These businessmen received direct threats from both the regime forces and the rebels, 
as well as other unknown opportunist armed gangs, with different incidents of 
assassinations, looting, and kidnappings happening to them once the conflict started. 
On 1 November 2011, Muḥammad al-Ways, a big Aleppan food industrialist who 
established his company in 1967 and had several industrial facilities in Idlib and 
Aleppo, was assassinated by an armed group because he refused to join the revolution 
  
north-western Syrian city of Sarāqib.332 The other well-known case of devastation 
towards the business community in the early phase of the uprising occurred on 7 
December 2011. Olabi Text was a company run by the Aleppan textile tycoon Khālid 
al-ʿUlabī, who was also a member of the People Assembly and an active member of 
the Aleppan Chamber of Industry and Federation of Syrian Chambers of Industry.333 
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His factory had more than 3,000 workers and hundreds of machines before the 
revolution. However, one of his factories that was worth 5 million Syrian pounds was 
burnt down and the amount of capital loss was estimated to be more than one billion 
Syrian pounds.334 This incident kept other Syrian businessmen in Syria in a state of 
fear. Moreover, the business community remained uncertain about who had 
orchestrated the attack against the factory. The Aleppan shoes industrialist no18 
claimed that his factory in Syria used to be located next to al-Olabi’s factory, and he 
stated that it was the vicious and greedy workers in al-Olabi’s factory who were the 
masterminds.335 However, most Aleppan businessmen interviewed believed it was 
because al-ʿUlabī refused to pay bribes to the shabiha, which angered them such that 
they burnt down the factory in retaliation.336  
 
The expansion of violence in Syria following the exacerbation of conflict in the 
summer of 2012 increased the incidents of kidnappings and lootings, especially in 
Aleppo.337 An Aleppan wood industrialist no25 claimed that he used to have a good 
relationship with government staffs, stated that, 
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One day, I received a phone call. On the other side, I heard my son crying. They 
asked me to pay a ransom for my son and for my neighbour’s son [$100,000]. Then 
I went to the head of the intelligence service [who used to be a good friend of mine]. 
After I entered the office, the kidnapper called me and said, ‘You want to seek help 
from the intelligence service?’ Then the officer suggested that I pay the kidnapper 
the ransom. Afterward, I realised that this was a self-directed kidnap performed by 
the intelligence service. How could the kidnapper know that I was in the office of 
the head of intelligence? It was them who hired the kidnapper .338  
 
The kidnapping was a threat to all businessmen, indiscriminately, no matter what 
political ideology they had or what they had done in the past or during the revolution. 
The violence against the Syrian businessmen seemed to become politically motivated 
inside the country, but it was not only anti-regime businessmen who received threats, 
but so did the pro-regime businessmen from rebel groups.339 The lives of pro-regime 
businessmen within free areas in Syria were at risk. “After the incident in Syria, I 
bought a gun and put it in my car because once I’m outside of my house, I might 
bump into armed groups who may want to kidnap me because they know that I’m 
with the regime,” stated an Aleppan textile industrialist no22 who is from the top 100 
prominent businessmen list in 2009.340 Fāris al-Shihābi, the president of the Aleppan 
Chamber of Industry who was a loyalist to the Bashar regime, also claimed that he 
was targeted by the rebels many times.341 The lack of security for the businessmen 
and their family members and the possibility of losing their property put extreme 
pressure on them. 
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2001 5,047,967 4,553,496 2009 9,693,797 15,442,770 
2002 6,536,363 4,487,753 2010 11,352,924 17,561,576 
2003 5,730,663 5,110,634 2011 8,014,012 17,194,150 
2004 5,382,567 7,048,837 2012 2,238,512 7,928,452 
2005 6,449,882 7,897,930 2013 1,495,454 6,357,829 
2006 10,919,371 11488279 2014 1,032,586 7,210,285 
2007 11,545,710 14,655,130 2015 466,595 4,469,615 
2008 14,380,038 18,104,749 
Table 3.2: Syrian trade value between 2001 and 2015, Unit: US Dollar thousand344 
 
Since April 2011, different international sanctions have been imposed on Syria by the 
United States, the European Union, and the Arab League, including various bans and 
freezing assets, travel, and trading. By issuing economic sanctions, these countries 
and organisations expected to persuade the Bashar regime to stop the brutality in 
dealing with dissidents.345 The international sanctions further damaged the already 
fragile Syrian economy, where “28.3% (about $6.8 billion) of the total GDP loss in 
2011 and 2012 was due to the impact of the sanctions.”346  
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Under the international sanctions, the Bashar regime has taken different measures in 
attempts to alleviate the economic difficulties caused by those sanctions. For instance, 
on 24 September 2011, “the government announced a ban on imports of all goods 
carrying a tariff over 5 per cent.”347 According to residences of Damascus, the result 
of this ban was that the “average prices rose by 30 per cent on nearly all imported 
consumer goods.”348 The sanctions and imports made many of the businessmen’s 
businesses face significant supply issues, and basic products rapidly increased in 
price.349 This investment environment, along with multiple international sanctions, 
frustrated the Syrian business community. Bāsil al-Kuwayfi – the former head of the 
Chamber of Commerce in Damascus and a member of the Syrian Transitional Council 
who was an aluminium investor based in Egypt – stated that investors could not make 
profits due to the discontinuation of internal trade in Syria.350 Furthermore, the 
aggravation of the conflict inside the country heavily devastated the consuming ability 
of Syrian customers, and inflation within the country also became a nightmare to not 
only normal Syrians but also to the business community.  
 
Furthermore, the intensification of conflict in Syria complicated the work of the 
businessmen. Syria became divided into different areas which were ruled by different 
authorities. Generally, there was the Syrian regime controlled areas, the free areas 
(which were dominated by the rebels), and the ISIS occupied areas. Transporting 
goods became much harder, as an Aleppan plastic industrialist stated no26,  
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When your goods are crossing the borders between different areas, if you are lucky 
enough, you just pay a bribe. But if the people at the border are greedy, they may 
confiscate your goods. We cannot make any profit like this. Sometimes we need to 
pay more than the cost of the products.351     
 
Finally, the political suppression caused by the businessmen’s political leanings was 
another factor that drove them to leave the country. As previously mentioned, the 
Syrian regime proactively made sure the business community would stay on the same 
side as the regime. Businessmen who did not act according to the regime’s will would 
immediately receive a verbal warning or political punishment, such as, being 
prohibited from travelling, imprisoned, detained, or had their property or money 
confiscated. Detention or imprisonment was common after the eruption of 2011 
revolution – 19 out of the 191 interviewees were arrested on account of their 
participation in the revolution, remaining in prison for between a few days and up to 
two years. Another dozen interviewees also claimed that their relatives or friends had 
been imprisoned or had disappeared during the revolution. Any businessmen whose 
family histories were against the regime or were related to the revolution received 
threats or warnings from the mukhabarat. “The al-Assad regime has punished those 
suspicious opposition supporters, confiscating their properties or bringing spurious 
legal charges in newly-established ‘counter-terrorism’ courts.” 352  For example, 
Ghassan Aboud was a businessman from Idlib and based in Dubai who was the 
founding member of Orient-NEWs, the owner of an olive-crushing factory in Idlib, 
and car dealerships in Damascus and possessed a clear anti-regime political position 
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since the beginning of the uprising. He recalled that the “Security forces burned my 
house, my land, and my family’s houses……And they turned my olive oil factory into 




Although the Syrian business community was considered less political and the ties of 
the economic elites with the regime were symbiotic prior to 2011, due to long-term 
resentment and personal experiences of suppressions from the regime, less 
dependency of their fortunes on the Syrian regime, habits of philanthropic help to 
needy people, witnessing how the Bashar regime brutally suppressed its own people, 
and the political calculations of the end of the Bashar regime, there was partial but 
meaningful participation of Syrian businessmen in the revolution against the Bashar 
regime. The businessmen who devoted themselves to the revolution supported the 
uprising mainly in terms of financial and humanitarian aids. Nevertheless, the lack of 
security, the deterioration of economic conditions, and political suppressions from the 
regime, forced them to flee the country. The timing of their emigration could be 
chronicled into three main periods according to the degree of conflicts and their later 
host country’s environment, being the beginning of 2011, mid-2012 to mid-2013, and 
30 June 2013.  
 
The massive emigration of Syrian businessmen and the partial but meaningful 
participation in the revolution indicate a wavering of the long-term mutual ties 
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between the Syrian regime and the business community, since the Syrian businessmen 
no longer remained silent about the Assad regime’s ruling and they later experienced 
massive emigration. Although numbers of actual participation of Syrian businessmen 
in the revolution could not be presented in a quantitative way, the fact that there was a 
certain amount of political participation on the part of the businessmen is meaningful, 
especially for a business community which was living under an authoritative regime 
for more than four decades and possessing symbiotic ties with the Assad regime.  
 
Even though the majority of the Syrian businessmen have left Syria, their activities 
have continuously affected the domestic and expatriate life of Syrians. It is therefore 
important to first examine the decision making process of the Syrian businessmen 
regarding where to relocate to, and how they sorted out their new lives in the host 
countries and managed with the challenges during their settlement process. Chapter 5 
and 6 will demonstrate that the specific background of conflict-driven businessmen 
emigration not only made the economic condition of the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen weaker than other interest-driven business diaspora, but also that the 





Chapter 4 Relocation and Settlement: Decision-Making, Challenges, and 
Expectations 
 
We Syrians [businessmen] are smart and hardworking, and we never give up in any 
situation. Even if we lost a great amount of our money during the war, but we still 
have our skills and networks. Even if you throw us into a desert, we can build up a 
castle successfully and quickly. 
- An Aleppan textiles industrialist no27354 
 
To a certain extent, after the breakout of the 2011 revolution, some Syrian 
businessmen actively engaged in the revolution, although the majority stayed silent as 
usual, and the former symbiotic ties between the Syrian regime and its business 
community deteriorated. Nevertheless, due to the conditions inside war-torn Syria, 
most Syrian businessmen had no choice but to leave the country. Following the 
analysis of the expatriate context of Syrian businessmen, this chapter will examine the 
decision-making process of whether to relocate to Turkey, Egypt, or Jordan, the 
challenges the businessmen encountered in these three host countries, and the changes 
in expectation of returning to Syria that they had. These three governments and 
societies demonstrated different attitudes regarding the ways in which they reacted to 
Syrian emigrants. In general, Turkey applied a more friendly policy towards the 
Syrians, the situation in Egypt became difficult for the Syrians after the coup in 
mid-2013, and the Jordanian government had unclear policies regarding the Syrian 
conflict. 
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First, the Syrian businessmen’s decision-making process in choosing the relocation 
countries and their routes of migration will be investigated by showing how political 
relations between the host and home governments had an effect, in addition to other 
considerations such as distance, the economic structure of host countries, and personal 
networks. Previous studies have shown how the relationships between the home/ host 
countries and the migrants/ diasporans play an important role in the settlement process 
of the migrants/ diasporans; nevertheless, how the relationships between the home and 
host governments affect the settlement of migrants/ diasporan have been 
understudied.355 The rules, regulations, and practices towards the migrants in the host 
countries have been argued to bring a direct impact on the ways in which migrants 
settle in and develop their livelihoods in host countries.356 As such, the chapter will 
first examine the impediments that Syrian businessmen encountered during their 
settlement process in the host countries, namely, the legal, political, and social 
dimensions.  
 
Also, previous studies on migration widely recognise that social networks such as 
kinships and friendships facilitate the further emigration of people to host countries.357 
Nevertheless, the case of Syrian businessmen relocations suggests that the main 
consideration regarding choice of relocation was not pre-existing ties in the host 
countries, but rather, the economic consideration for possible future economic 
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investment. In other words, possible future investment was more significant than 
pre-existing ties. Finally, as Harpviken argues, as war-induced migration starts, the 
migrants’ expectations of the duration of their exile is of a short-term stay, and this 
significantly affects the later decisions of the migrants’ activities in the host 
countries.358 As such, the expectations of the duration of exile and their impact on 
Syrian businessmen’s activities will be examined, in addition to how their 
expectations transformed with the extension of conflict in their home country. 
 
This chapter will argue that in addition to economic considerations, the relocation and 
settlement process of Syrian businessmen was strongly affected by the conditions in 
the host countries, whether economic, social, or political. Different from other 
migrants or diasporans whose personal networks were important factors in deciding 
their relocation, the case of expatriate Syrian businessmen demonstrates that 
relocations were affected more by economic considerations. Moreover, although 
political attitudes were similar towards the Syrian conflict between the host and home 
governments, host governments may be less willing to accept emigrants from Syria, 
and vice versa. More importantly, how the lack of understanding of how political 
relations between the home/ host government plays an important role in the relocation 
process regarding the migrants/ diasporans will be demonstrated. Finally, even though 
Syrian businessmen did not expect to stay in the host countries for long at the 
beginning of their settlement, similar to Harpviken’s argument, the prolongation of 
conflict and the damage to economic property in Syria changed their expectations.359 
This change influenced expatriate Syrian businessmen in the host countries to work 
                                                          




seriously on different economic investments and political activities related to the 
uprising. 
 
4.1 Choice of relocation 
 
It is easy for people from Aleppo to travel to Turkey since the border is controlled 
by the rebels, and it’s less than 100 km between Aleppo and Gaziantep. But as 
Damascenes, we can only travel by plane through Beirut to Istanbul since there is 
no flight from Damascus to Turkey, and travelling from Damascus to Aleppo is too 
dangerous. 
- A Damascene clothes industrialist no21360 
 
After Syrian businessmen decided to flee Syria to other countries, they chose different 
countries and routes for their journeys. There are four main reasons why Syrian 
businessmen would choose a specific place of relocation: the distance between Syria 
and the settling countries, and the regulations for entering the host countries; the 
economic structure in the host countries; the political relations between the host and 
home governments; and personal experience and pre-existing networks of 
businessmen.  
 
Distance between Syria and the host countries and the entrance regulations 
 
Syrian businessmen followed two main migratory routes, the choice of which 
depended on the location of their home cities in Syria: those from the north (Aleppo, 
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Raqqa) took routes to Turkey, and those from the south (Damascus, Der’a), the centre 
(Homs, Hama) and the coast (Lattakia, Tartus) took routes to Jordan and Lebanon. 
The groups are separate because the conflict in Syria made travelling between the 
northern and southern parts of the country nearly impossible and unsafe. The reason 
most businessmen in, for example, the centre of Syria and on the coast from Homs, 
Hama, Lattakia, and Tartus did not head for Turkey was due to lack of safe travel 
caused by the conflict. It essentially prevented them from travelling from their home 
cities to northern Syria where they could enter Turkey. As a consequence, 
businessmen from the south, centre and cost ended up taking the same routes to travel 
to host countries, and businessmen from the north took different routes, but the two 
groups rarely crossed over.  
 
On the one hand, northern groups of Syrian businessmen could reach Turkey by 
crossing the border between Syria and Turkey in their own vehicles. For this group to 
travel to geographically non-connected countries, Turkey has been considered the 
most important ‘transfer’ country to reach Egypt and Jordan. On the other hand, 
southern, central, and the coastal groups of Syrian businessmen could reach Jordan by 
crossing the Syrian-Jordanian border in their own vehicles. For this group, since 
Syrian businessmen could no longer fly from Syria to Turkey and Egypt, Lebanon and 
Jordan were the two most important ‘transfer’ countries. 
 
The close distance between Syria and certain host countries encouraged the Syrian 
businessmen. For example, Syrians in the south-central cities of Turkey are 
predominantly from Aleppo. Since many of their relatives and property were still in 
Aleppo, it would only take a few hours to travel between the two countries in their 
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own vehicles. During field research in Gaziantep, nearly all interviewees and Syrians 
on the street were from Aleppo.361 Moreover, there were at least three restaurants 
with names indicating that the owners were from Aleppo, such as, Original Halabi 
Restaurant which opened in Gaziantep after the 2011 revolution. For the same reason, 
Jordan mainly attracted Syrian businessmen from the southern part of Syria.362  
 
However, distance alone is not sufficient to explain why Syrian businessmen would 
choose a specific place over another. Regulations for entering the host countries and 
their impact also need to be taken into consideration. The host countries’ regulations 
affected migrants’ decisions about whether or not to settle in that country, especially 
regulations regarding Syrians. For instance, many countries in the Middle East, 
particularly Gulf countries, have put in place prohibitions or restrictions to prevent 
Syrians from entering their countries as a consequence of the conflict, even though 
these countries did not change their regulations regarding the entrance of Syrians into 
their lands.363  
 
The Jordanian government temporarily closed its borders with Syria more than one 
time between the beginning of the conflict in 2011 and March 2013.364 In June 2013, 
on 8 October 2014, 19 November 2014, and 1 April 2015, the Jordanian government 
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had either unofficially closed its borders with Syria or officially closed the borders 
due to the conflict between the Syrian rebels and regime forces.365 On 21 June 2016, 
the Jordanian government officially announced the closure of their borders with Syria 
for security reasons, whereby no Syrians could enter the country except those who 
already had Jordanian residential permits.366 This also happened in Egypt after the 
political coup on 30 June 2013. However, a few Syrian businessmen were still able to 
enter Egypt by paying bribes of $3000 to officials in the migration office.367 The 
considerations of security for the Jordanian government and the political change in 
Egypt have made it more difficult or impossible for Syrian businessmen to move to 
these two countries.  
 
As such, entrance regulations influenced whether or not Syrian businessmen could 
enter host countries, and how easy it was to cross the border crossing normally 
increase the attractions of a host country, in addition to the distance between home 
city and host country. 
 
Economic Structure  
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The economic structure of the host countries also affected Syrian businessmen’s 
choice of where to resettle. The meaning of economic structure here includes the cost 
of labour, local investment laws, and the markets. The cost of labour in the host 
countries was important to consider if businessmen were deciding to open a business 
after resettling, be it commercial or industrial. This was especially true for 
industrialists. Calculations of the local economic structure further influenced what 
type of businessmen was going to settle in which country, industrial or commercial. 
The minimum wages per month in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon in 2012 were 
$115, $226, $443, and $450 respectively.368 Low minimum wage indicates that Egypt 
provided cheaper labour forces compared to Jordan and Turkey. As a result, most 
Syrian industrialists working in textiles would choose to settle in Egypt since the 
textile industry requires a high number of labours, and the low cost of labours there 
attracted Syrian textiles industrialists to invest, and 90% of the industrialists who left 
Syria chose Egypt.369  
 
In addition, how difficult it would be to do business would affect a businessman’s 
choice of place of relocation. On the World Bank Group website, Turkey was ranked 
55th in the world for ease of doing business, followed by Jordan 113th, Lebanon 123th, 
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and Egypt 131th.370 Although the United Arab Emirates ranked 31st on the list, the 
high living cost in the UAE was not affordable for most Syrian businessmen.371 The 
world ranking for cost of living in the UAE, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt are 
36th, 106th, 131st, 163rd, and 230th respectively.372 As such, Turkey was considered the 
easiest country to establish investments in for Syrian businessmen because of its 
relatively open and transparent business environment, and cost of living in the host 
countries. 
 
Finally, another economic consideration was the markets that Syrian businessmen 
could access, especially for those who attempted to maintain former foreign 
customers after resettlement. Before the conflict, Syrian businessmen had customers 
in various countries, in addition to these three main host countries, such as in Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia. Iraq and Saudi Arabia were two out of the top five export partners of 
Syria between 2006 and 2010. Iraq was ranked 4th in 2006 and 2007, and 1st from 
2008 to 2010. Saudi Arabia was ranked 3rd in 2006 and 2007 and 5th from 2008 to 
2010. Most trading between these two countries was in the field of consumer goods, 
raw materials, and textiles and clothing.373 Nevertheless, due to the difficulties that 
Syrian businessmen encountered in moving to these countries as mentioned above, 
they would choose other host countries from where they could continue transporting 
their goods. For instance, an Aleppan plastic industrialist no29 who relocated to 
Istanbul and Gaziantep after the conflict used to export his products from Syria to Iraq 
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and now continues selling his products from Turkey to Iraq. “For us as industrialists, 
if you do not maintain your customers, they might find new providers.”374 Those 
businessmen who used to have customers in Gulf countries might prefer to move to 
Jordan or Egypt to maintain the routes of product transportation.375 Thus, evaluating 
the economic structure of host countries was another factor when choosing a 
relocation place.  
 
Studies suggest that personal networks of potential migrants in host countries prior to 
emigration can enhance the possibilities of attracting them to relocate into the specific 
countries where they already have acquaintances. 376  Nevertheless, economic 
consideration was a more significant factor than familial ties regarding the motives for 
emigration of Syrian businessmen. This was due to the nature and professions of the 
business migrants, whose economic calculation usually decided how they were going 
to move. Even within a business family, brothers might not flee to the same 
destination unless they were working in the same business field. Rather, businessmen 
who were working in the same field had a higher chance of fleeing to the same 
destination if they had been able to trust each other enough or if they had had stable 
business with each other in the pre-revolution period. For example, the former vice 
president of the Aleppan Chamber of Industry decided to move to Ghana with one of 
his brothers (as opposed to the other three) since they were working in the same field 
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of investment. Out of the other three brothers, two went to the U.S. and the other went 
to Turkey.377 
 
Political relation between the host and home governments 
 
After the eruption of the 2011 revolution, the Turkish, Egyptian, and Jordanian 
governments held different political views towards the Assad regime. Although it has 
been demonstrated that the relationships between the host/ home countries and 
migrants/ diasporans influence relocation of migrants and diasporans, the analysis in 
this section will fill the gaps of how relations between the host and home governments 
crucially affect the relocation process of the migrants.378 
 
Political relations between the home and host governments were a double-edged 
sword in influencing the decision-making process of Syrian businessmen. On the one 
hand, the trend of emigration of Syrian businessmen suggests that when the political 
orientation of the host government was contrary to that of the home government, the 
motivations for the businessmen to immigrate would be higher. On the other hand, 
Syrian businessmen would choose to move to a host country whose government’s 
political ideology was closer to their own political leanings. The most obvious cases 
for supporting this argument were Turkey and Egypt. The Turkish government’s 
political attitudes towards the Syrian regime were consistently anti-Assad. The 
Turkish government applied a more welcoming stance towards the arrivals of Syrians 
into its country and received high numbers of Syrian businessmen. In Egypt, between 
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mid-2012 and mid-2013, Muhammad Morsi’s government publicly condemned the 
Bashar regime in Syria, maintaining an outspoken and strong anti-Assad regime 
position, and policies regarding the entrance of Syrians the country were not difficult 
to comply with. Nevertheless, after Sisi came into power in mid-2013, the Egyptian 
policies towards the entrance of Syrians became stricter and many Egypt-based Syrian 
businessmen fled to Turkey.379  
 
First, Turkey and Egypt used to be the main destinations for Syrian businessmen to 
relocate after the 2011 revolution, and many Syrian businessmen, accompanied by 
their capital, left for Syria to these two countries as previously demonstrated. During 
the Morsi period in Egypt, Egypt witnessed a high number of Syrian businessmen 
moving into the country. However, after the coup on 30 June 2013, the new 
government switched its political standpoint from supporting the revolution to 
supporting the Bashar regime, which led to an outflow of the Egypt-based Syrian 
businessmen to Turkey. As confirmed by the president of the Syrian Businessmen 
Assembly in Egypt, Khaldūn al-Muwaqqʿ, the numbers of the Syrian businessmen in 
Egypt experienced a continuing loss after mid-2013.380 This was mainly due to the 
change of welcoming Syrians during the rule of Morsi to the unfriendly stance of the 
Sisi government against the Syrians and the unstable situation inside Egypt after the 
coup. As such, this demonstrates that an opposing political attitude between the host 
government and Syria would attract more businessmen to the host country.  
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Second, the Turkey-based Syrian businessmen were mostly anti-regime, which meant 
that their political ideas were similar to the Turkish government’s, which was also 
strongly anti-Assad, there were at least two formal anti-Assad regime’s business 
organisations – the Syrian Business Forum and the Syrian Economic Forum – 
established by expatriate Syrian businessmen active in Turkey.381 In the city of 
Gaziantep, the Syrian Interim Government, the Syrian National Coalition, and the 
Al-Waad Party – which is a Muslim Brotherhood political party – also had 
businessmen participating in anti-regime activities.382 I will discuss these business 
organisations and political coalitions and political parties in chapter 6. In Egypt, once 
the pro-Bashar’s Sisi regime came into power in mid-2013, most Egypt-based Syrian 
businessmen who did not flee the country either had closer political orientations to the 
Syrian regime, or were self-declared as politically neutral.383  For example, the 
president of the Syrian Businessmen Assembly in Egypt, Khaldūn al-Muwaqqʿ, took 
on an official business delegation for visiting the Minister of Internal Trade and 
Consumer Protection, Samīr Qāḍī Amīn. During the meeting, al-Muwaqqʿ stated that 
the Syrian Businessmen Assembly was “the economic partner of the country (Syria), 
and all the (Syrian) businessmen are happy to return back to the country for work.”384 
This kind of visit from the Egypt-based Syrian businessmen to the Bashar regime was 
never reported under the reign of Morsi. Thus, not only did the political atmosphere 
inside the host countries affect the numbers of Syrian businessmen moving in, but so 
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did their different political orientations. It is hard to find public sources to show the 
Egypt-based Syrian businessmen who self-identify as politically neutral, however, 
most Syrian businessmen interviewed during the fieldwork stated that they were 
neutral. Nevertheless, this did not mean that those Syrian businessmen actually held 
self-proclaimed neutral views on the Syrian conflict, rather, their political neutrality 
may be attributed to the political atmosphere in Egypt, which had switched from a 
Syrian-friendly and anti-Assad stance to an anti-Syrian and pro-Assad position after 
Sisi came into power in mid-2013. This shows that positive relations between the 
Syrian regime and host governments could limit the appeal of a host country, and at 
the same time, could attract businessmen whose political ideas were similar to the 
host government’s. 
 
Pre-existing Networks and Personal Experience 
 
Pre-existing networks in host countries would increase the motivations for other 
potential migrants to move. This was true, to a certain extent, for Syrian businessmen, 
who might decide to move to another host country where they had friends, relatives, 
or acquaintances while choosing a place of relocation. Nevertheless, entry regulations 
and economic conditions exceeded social ties regarding the Syrian businessmen’s 
emigration.  
 
As previously mentioned in chapter 1, the Syrian business community experienced 
different degrees of emigration due to the government’s nationalisation policy in the 
1960s, and many businessmen went to Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia at that 
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time.385 And at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the Syrian regime 
suppressed a domestic branch of the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency and later forced 
thousands of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members to leave Syria for Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan and Turkey.386 This indicates that Syrian diasporas had begun to 
spread to other countries long before the 2011 revolution. Nevertheless, once the 
Syrian businessmen decided to leave Syria, most did not head to Jordan or Saudi 
Arabia where there were already a great number of Syrians prior to their departures. 
This was mainly due to the local authorities’ regulations allowing Syrians entry and 
the economic conditions in these countries. Although those Syrian businessmen might 
have other familial or business networks in other countries, they might not move to 
these places due to the fact that they might not manage to enter or due to the possible 
economic profits they could make.       
 
Nevertheless, pre-existing networks still, to a certain extent, affected Syrian 
businessmen’s decision-making process. Before the revolution, Syrian businessmen 
had business activities, business partners, and relatives in other countries in the area. 
These economic and social networks were a pull factor in attracting Syrian 
businessmen to choose particular host countries. In terms of economics, for instance, 
Turkey played an important role in Syria’s international trade in the pre-revolution era 
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Turkey was also Syria’s seventh largest exporter and third largest importer in 2011.387 
 
This suggests that prior to 2011, the strong bilateral trade between Syria and Turkey 
used to be active, and that some Syrian businessmen who used to have business in 
Turkey might have had Turkish business partners or Turkish business acquaintances. 
For example, one Damascene box industrialist no22 moved to Turkey because his 
family business used to have a Turkish business partner. He eventually sought help 
from his father’s old business partner and later built up business partnerships with 
him.388  
 
In terms of social ties, Turkey’s citizenship regulations allow individuals of other 
nationalities who can trace roots back to the late Ottoman Empire to obtain Turkish 
citizenship.389 As such, some Syrian businessmen either held Turkish nationality or 
had a Turkish business partner inside Turkey before the war had started. Among the 
138 Turkey-based Syrian businessmen interviewed during fieldwork, 12 already had 
Turkish nationality (four had been based in Turkey before the 2011 revolution), and 
another four were applying for nationality.390  
 
Previous economic and personal ties in other countries can be considered as bridges 
taking Syrian businessmen out of Syria. These former social ties and economic 
activities explain why Syrian businessmen moved to Turkey, Egypt and Jordan.391 
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Nevertheless, there is no account of Syrian businessmen moving to Egypt or Jordan to 
obtain citizenship since the local regulations did not offer foreign investors local 
citizenship. 
 
Thus, the decision-making process for Syrian businessmen included the distance 
between the host countries and Syria as well as their entry regulations, the economic 
structure in the host countries and their political relations with the Syrian regime, and 
former social ties which the Syrian businessmen had prior to their departure. The 
decisions of the Syrian businessmen could not be explained simply by either one of 
the factors alone. Nevertheless, in choosing a place of relocation, the economic 
consideration was a crucial factor, even more important than familial ties.   
 
4.2 The challenges of the Syrian businessmen during their settlement process 
 
After the Syrian businessmen made their decision about which country they would go 
to, they encountered various legal, political, and social challenges from the host 
countries. Legally, Syrian businessmen needed to deal with local regulations issued 
by local authorities before and after their entry into the country. Politically, the 
relations between the host government and Syria, to a certain extent, determined the 
atmosphere in the host countries. Socially, the businessmen would need to engage in 
the host countries by interacting with the local communities. Since Turkey, Egypt and 
Jordan dealt with the businessmen differently in legal, political, and social aspects, the 
constraints the businessmen encountered during their settlement process will be 
demonstrated. Table 4.1 indicates the general context of the various degrees of 
difficulty that the businessmen had when settling in. The following paragraphs will 
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explain the different situations in these three host countries regarding the Syrian 
businessmen from the legal, political and social aspects.  
 
 Turkey Egypt Jordan 
Legal Easy –> Medium  Easy –> Hard Easy –> Hard 
Political Anti-Assad Anti-Assad>Pro-Bashar Unclear 
Social Different Medium Similar 
Table 4.1 Legal, Political and social environments of the host countries towards the Syrian 
businessmen  
 
a. Legal perspective: entering, residence and business regulations  
 
Saudi Arabia prohibits Syrians from travelling in and out unless you have a 
residence permit. Egypt is ousting our people out of their lands. Jordan [is] afraid 
our arrival may have an impact on their local economy. You can see how the other 
Arab countries hate the Syrians through this war. It is the Turks who are helping us 
now. Such a shame for the Arabs. 
- An Aleppan food industrialist no30392 
 
The above quote from an Aleppan industrialist who relocated to Gaziantep after the 
middle of 2012 reflects the general situation regarding the entry of Syrians into their 
neighbouring countries, indicating that it was a critical issue for resettlement. As such, 
in order to examine the challenges that Syrian businessmen faced from the legal 
perspective, the entry regulations of host countries towards Syrian businessmen will 
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first be taken into account, and then residential permits and business laws of the host 
countries which Syrians had to deal with after entry will be examined. These two 
issues were the most pressing concerns that Syrian businessmen needed to address at 
the beginning of their settlement. 
 
Entering the countries 
 
At the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan all 
applied fairly simple regulations on the entry of Syrians into their lands. The Turkish 
government had applied the ‘open door’ policy regarding the entry of Syrians into the 
country since the beginning of 2011.393 During that period, Syrians could easily enter 
Turkey without any restrictions, and even without bringing any of their personal 
official documents if they entered through the Turkish-Syrian borders. The situation 
in Egypt was similar to that of Turkey at the beginning of 2011. That is, Syrians could 
enter Egypt easily with their Syrian passports.394 Egyptian policy welcomed Syrians, 
especially under the rule of Mohammad Morsi between mid-2012 and mid-2013. 
Jordan had received great praise for their open-border policy towards the Syrians at 
the beginning of 2011, whereby Syrians could simply enter Jordan with their 
passports.395 Nevertheless, these three countries later made changes, from minor to 
major, in their regulations regarding the entry of Syrians into their countries.  
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In Turkey, regulations did not change massively until 6 January 2016 when the 
government issued new visa regulations on Syrians whereby Syrians who wanted to 
travel to Turkey were required to have a visa, except those travelling through the 
Turkish-Syrian borders in southern Turkey. 396  This was in reaction to the 
demographic pressure on Turkish society caused by 2 million Syrians who had 
relocated to Turkey by the end of 2014, which led to the rise of living cost such as 
house rents inside Turkey and made significant wage decrease in the areas which 
Syrians mostly relocated in.397 It forced the Turkish government to adjust the former 
‘open-door’ policy.  
 
The Egyptian and Jordanian governments either tightened their border control or even 
closed off their borders against the Syrians after the 2011 revolution. After the coup in 
Egypt in mid-2013 when Mohammad Morsi was forced to step down and was 
replaced by the pro-Assad regime Sisi, Egyptian policy on Syrians experienced a 
180-degree turn around. On 9 July 2013, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
announced that Syrians who attempted to enter Egypt would be required to have a 
visa.398 The Jordanian government officially announced the closing of the borders 
with Syria in June 2016 due to the escalation of conflict in Syria and the fear that the 
conflict would extend into Jordan. Since the entry requirements for the Syrian 
businessmen became more difficult in Egypt and Jordan as of mid-2013, some Syrian 
businessmen who had already relocated to Egypt and Jordan after the 2011 revolution 
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had to re-emigrate to Turkey. Regulations directly affected the possibility of Syrian 
businessmen entering other countries, since if the host countries did not open their 
borders to Syrians and had strict regulations against their entry, Syrian businessmen 
could not emigrate there. Thus, the regulations of the host countries towards Syrians 
entering were the main challenges in deciding whether or not Syrians could relocate 
to those countries.    
 
Residential permits and business regulations 
 
After entering the host countries, the next legal steps for Syrian businessmen were to 
solve the issue of residency. If the businessmen needed to stay in these host countries 
for a long period of time, they needed to have legal residency. The two main 
differences between Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan regarding the applications for 
residence of expatriate Syrian businessmen were the prices of application fees and the 
regulations for establishing a company. 
 
Most Syrians after relocating to the host countries would apply for residential permits 
as refugees, students, or tourists. However, the businessmen did not apply for the 
same types of residential permits as their fellow countrymen; rather, they applied 
mostly for investment residential permits. This was mainly due to the fact that, if they 
wanted to establish companies and register those companies in the host countries, 
having an investment residential permit was the condition to do so. Also, the Syrian 
businessmen who relocated to Turkey could not purchase real estate through as Syrian 




Turkey-based Syrian businessmen might even have the chance of gaining citizenships, 
which started to get discussed in the news at the end of 2014.399 Even during 
fieldwork in Turkey between mid-2014 and mid-2015, Turkey-based Syrian 
businessmen stated that if they had an investment residential permit and a company in 
Turkey, after five years they would have the chance of receiving Turkish 
nationality.400 In July 2016, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced 
that Syrians in Turkey might receive Turkish nationality in the future.401 Since many 
were forced to leave Syria due to the conflict and there was no sign of the end of the 
conflict, and since some had participated in anti-Assad activities and were wanted by 
the Assad regime, the possibility of receiving Turkish nationality also encouraged 
them to apply for an investment residential permit.  
 
The main differences in business regulations among the three host countries were the 
required amount of capital for establishing a company and regulations regarding the 
establishment of a commercial company. There was no minimum capital requirement 
in Egypt to start a limited liability company (LLC), while in Turkey it cost at least 
10,000 Turkish lira (around $3000), and in Jordan it cost 50,000 Jordanian dinars 
(around $70,430).402 This suggests that if Syrian businessmen wanted to establish 
new companies in one of these three countries, Egypt provided the lowest threshold 
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for opening a new investment project, followed by Turkey and Jordan. Moreover, the 
corporate income tax for foreign companies in Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt were 10%, 
20%, and 22.5% respectively in 2016.403 This shows that Jordan had the lowest 
requirements of tax payment for Syrian companies such that the tax to be paid in 
Jordan is only half of the tax in Turkey or Egypt.  
 
The regulations for foreign investors to establish a commercial company in Turkey 
were different from those in Egypt and Jordan. The regulation in Egypt allows foreign 
investors to have 100% ownership of the companies; nevertheless, both the types of 
LLC and joint stock company (JSC) do not allow their foreign investors to conduct 
importation from outside of Egypt.404 For Jordan, foreign investors can hold 100% of 
the share of their companies, but “Foreign entities may not however have ownership 
in excess of 50% of construction and certain other commercial ventures” according to 
the Jordanian investment law.405 Only the regulations in Turkey did not have any of 
the above mentioned limitations for foreign investors to establish companies in its 
country.406 The different minimum requirement also directly affected the Syrian 
businessmen’s types of investment in the host countries. A Damascene real estate 
investor no23 explained how this difference in regulations affected the Syrian 
businessmen’s investment types, 
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I do not think many Syrian businessmen would like to open a commercial 
company in Jordan or Egypt, since they cannot control the whole company by 
themselves because of the local regulations. Unless they know somebody there, 
they will not open a commercial company.407 
 
Even though having a registered company in the host country and holding an 
investment residential permit gave fully legal status, Syrian businessmen who had this 
status were not without legal or residential problems. For example, as mentioned 
earlier, in Turkey Syrian businessmen were not allowed to purchase real estate under 
their own names, but could only do so under the name of their companies. In Jordan, 
even though Syrian businessmen held investment residential permits, their parents or 
children might still have entry issues once they traveled outside of Jordan and 
expected to re-enter. For example, an Aleppan food industrialist no31 in Jordan 
stated, 
 
One Syrian businessman’s twelve-year-old daughter travelled to Europe for 
language school. However, on her way back, she was refused boarding on the flight, 
even though her father has an investment residential permit in Jordan. These kinds 
of travel incidents happen to our families quite frequently even though we have 
registered a company or factory in Jordan.408  
 
This kind of travel issue also happened with some relatives of the Egypt-based Syrian 
businessmen. “I registered a company in Egypt for producing clothes, but I cannot 
bring my elder parents to here,” stated the Aleppan clothes industrialist no28.409 It not 
only frustrated the Jordan and Egypt-based Syrian businessmen who had invested in 
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and had legal residencies for these countries, but it also made these Syrian 
businessmen feel insecure about their legal status.     
 
Investigating the entry regulations and residential permits and the business regulations 
of the three host countries demonstrates the different degrees of difficulty that Syrian 
businessmen had. Not only did these regulations require a certain amount of money, 
but in some cases, connections to solve issues. Furthermore, these regulations were 
not static, but rather dynamic and had been changed along with the host governments’ 
policies and incidents in the countries. Even after Syrian businessmen entered the host 
countries and completed all the required documents for residence and established their 
companies, their lives were not fully secured. 
 
b. Political perspective: political dynamics towards the Syrian businessmen  
 
In Turkey, the government welcomes the arrival of Syrians, but the situation is the 
opposite in Egypt. The attitudes of the host governments toward the Syrians directly 
decide what our [the Syrian businessmen] businesses will be like. 
- A Damascene household goods industrialist no24410 
 
In addition to local regulations, the political dynamics of the host countries also 
affected the settlement process of the Syrian businessmen in the host countries. The 
political dynamics regarding the settlement of the Syrian businessmen were primarily 
attributed to the political relations between the host governments and the Syrian 
regime, especially depending on how the host governments reacted towards the Syrian 
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revolution. The political relations also influenced the atmospheres within host 
countries for Syrian businessmen.  
 
Since the eruption of the revolution in Syria, the Turkish, the Egyptian, and the 
Jordanian governments have held different political stances on the Syrian uprising. 
The Turkish government did not cut off official ties with the Syrian regime at the 
beginning of the revolution, but rather they were attempting to be a mediator through 
official talks between the regime and the rebels. Nevertheless, the Turkish 
government changed its position and publically condemned the Bashar regime in 
mid-2011.411 This policy remains in place to the present day.  
 
Egypt was dealing with its own political transition from the then recent ousting of 
Hosni Mubarak after three decades of rule. Between the beginning of 2011 and 30 
June 2012, the Egyptian government was temporarily ruled by the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces. During this one-year period, the Egyptian policy towards the 
Syrian uprising was vague due to Egypt’s internal situation. When the newly elected 
president Muhammad Morsi came into office in mid-2012, Egyptian policy towards 
the Syrian regime shifted from being vague, yet still following the Arab League’s 
position on anti-al-Assad regime. However, the support of the Syrian revolution 
ended after the military coup on 3 July 2013 when the General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi 
became the new leader of Egypt. During Sisi’s reign in Egypt, the government started 
to treat the Egyptian-based Syrians harsher than before.412  
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Jordan’s policy on the Syrian revolution was seen as ambiguous since they were more 
centred on their own internal stability at the time. The Jordanian government was 
mostly cautious about the Syrian event, neither supporting the Syrian regime, nor 
standing with the opposition.413  
 
The Turkish and Egyptian governments both went through different phases and had 
varying degrees of policy changes. The Turkish government shifted their political 
stance regarding the Syrian regime from being a mediator to being anti-regime. The 
Egyptian government’s policies towards the Syrian regime changed from a vague 
position to an anti-regime position, then to a pro- regime position. Jordan’s policy was 
more consistent and politically ambiguous than Turkey and Egypt. These different 
political relations between the host governments and the Syrian regime further 
delineated the general political atmosphere inside the host countries towards Syrians. 
It also led to different political atmospheres for Syrian businessmen regarding their 
settlements in these places. In Turkey, the government was widely known for its 
support of the Syrian opponents, and the situation in Egypt was the opposite of 
Turkey. These two governments both had clear political positions regarding the 
Syrian revolution, and stated publicly which side they were supporting. The Jordanian 
government maintained a much lower political profile. The political atmosphere in 
Turkey was clearly advantageous to the Syrian opposition, while in Egypt it was the 
opposite. In Jordan, the situation for the Syrian businessmen was less politicised than 
in Turkey or Egypt.  
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Since the local governments’ attitudes towards the Syrian businessmen were not 
stable and could take a 180-degree change, Syrian businessmen often needed to adjust 
their behaviour and speech to accommodate the political correctness in the host 
countries. Syrian businessmen were also required to adjust their political leanings 
depending on any changes in the local government’s political position toward the 
Syrian conflict. In Egypt, Syrian businessmen either had to leave the country or 
remain silent about their differing political views, especially after the mid-2013 coup. 
Furthermore, the clear political stances of the Turkish and Egyptian governments 
towards the Syrian conflict made it easier for Syrian businessmen with clear 
anti-Syrian regime politics to settle in Turkey, and made it more difficult for 
businessmen who were anti-regime to settle in Egypt, and vice versa for the 
pro-regime businessmen.  
 
c. Social perspective: attitudes of the local communities towards the Syrian 
businessmen 
 
I drive my Syrian car on the street in Gaziantep. I need to be like an angel, and 
sometimes I even do not look at the other drivers. 
- An Aleppan interior design businessman no32414 
 
Along with the legal and the political aspects of settling in host countries, the Syrian 
businessmen also needed to interact with the local communities. The analysis of 
fieldwork data and the media press suggests that Syrian businessmen mainly needed 
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to deal with three major issues from the social perspective: the language barrier in 
Turkey, the public opinions of local communities regarding Syrian businessmen, and 




Out of the three host countries, Turkey posed major difficulties to Syrian businessmen 
due to the language issue. This not only became a problem for the businessmen while 
managing their businesses, but it also made their daily life harder. Both the Syrians 
and the Turkish community could not communicate with each other easily. “I tried to 
learn Turkish and speak with the local people. Once when I was using Turkish to 
communicate with a Turkish guy, I mistakenly used a word which has a negative 
meaning, and he was furious and just left the office,” stated an Aleppan32 
businessman who owned a design company. 415  Nevertheless, there were some 
businessmen who could speak intermediate to advanced Turkish because of their 
former business experiences in the country. For them, the language was less of an 
issue. The majority of Syrian businessmen, however, did not understand Turkish, but 
they sincerely understood the importance of having the language skills necessary for 
doing business with the local business people. As such, they would recruit translators. 
The Syrian businessmen would choose Turkmen Syrians who also left Syria for 
Turkey as translators, or other Syrians who could speak Turkish.416  
 
Public opinions regarding the Syrian businessmen 
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As Fussell suggests, the attitudes of locals in the host countries towards the migrants 
is an influential factor which will affect inter-group relations; if the locals hold 
prejudices towards the migrants, they will probably not be very welcoming.417 As 
such, local public opinions about the arrival of Syrians did indeed affect their 
settlement. However, on the one hand host governments may have their own political 
stances towards the Syrian revolution which affected the settlement process of Syrian 
businessmen; on the other hand, public opinions may or may not be in accordance 
with the policies of their governments. Thus, the expatriate Syrian businessmen may 
need to deal with contrary attitudes between the host governments and the locals in 
the host countries.      
 
The public opinions of the Turkish population towards the Syrians were, in some 
cases, not as friendly as those of the Turkish government’s. There have been many 
protests against having Syrians in the country.418 In turn, many Syrians have been 
aggravated and insulted by the local Turks.419 This anti-Syrian atmosphere was not 
restricted to Syrians from lower social strata, but rather rich Syrian businessmen who 
had established companies were not immune from local aggression. An Aleppan 
furniture industrialist no33 who opened a fast food restaurant in Gaziantep after his 
arrival in Turkey stated how his restaurant was destroyed by the local people,  
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One day, I saw a car accident outside of my restaurant. It was between a Syrian 
woman driver and a Turkish man. They were standing on the streets and shouting at 
each other. I saw the Turkish man almost hit the Syrian woman so I thought I 
should try to calm them down. I went to them and tried to stop them from 
physically fighting. Then the Turkish driver turned his anger on me – he thought 
that I knew the Syrian driver. Then he left. Ten minutes later he came back with 
around twenty other Turkish people with sticks in their hands. They just broke into 
my restaurant and destroyed everything they saw. The police were just standing 
outside the restaurant not doing anything.420  
 
Many other similar incidents happened to Syrian businessmen. “You see why I would 
rather drive an old car than a new one? It is quite possible that our [Syrian] cars will 
be attacked by the locals. One time, I went back home, and the next day I could not 
find one of the tires of my car,” stated the Aleppan food industrialist no2.421  
 
Furthermore, Syrian businessmen experienced additional discrimination, complaining 
that the Turkish people were not willing to rent houses to Syrians, even those who had 
the money. “We would pay two or three times normal the rent. However, many 
Turkish landlords just refused to rent their houses to us once they knew that we are 
from Syria,” stated an Aleppan packaging industrialist no34 in Istanbul.422  
 
During fieldwork interviews, several other Syrian businessmen who experienced 
similar scenarios explained that their companies or restaurants were attacked by the 
local people, or that the money in their offices was stolen.423 “In Turkey, it’s like half 
the population welcomes the Syrians, but the other half of the population does not like 
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us. The latter group of the people are supporters of the opposition parties in Turkey,” 
stated an Aleppan textile industrialist no35.424  
 
The main opposition party in Turkey – the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – 
opposed to the current Turkish policy regarding the Syrians in Turkey. During one of 
the campaigns of the general election on 23 April 2015 in Mersin, the Chairman of the 
CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, pledged that if they won the election, the CHP “[would] 
send our Syrian brothers back. We will say to them, ‘Sorry, but go back to your 
hometown.”425 This kind of statement from the CHP reflected not only a political 
idea of its party, but also indicated that this policy had gained support from the CHP 
advocates in the country.  
 
During the Morsi period in Egypt, Syrians enjoyed political freedoms in expressing 
their political identity. “You can even see some Syrian stores hanged the Syrian 
revolution flags outside their stores, or Syrians here walked on streets waving the 
[revolution] flags,” stated an Aleppan suits industrialist no36.426 Many Syrians would 
walk the streets, protesting the tyrannous regime in Syria and demand a political 
change.427 However, following the ousting of Morsi and the rise of Sisi in Egypt, the 
political atmosphere changed from anti-Assad to pro-Assad. Moreover, Syrians 
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became considered to be supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. Obviously, the life of 
the Syrians in Egypt became extremely difficult during this period. The Aleppan 
plastic industrialist no9 who has a factory in the city 6th of October stated, 
 
Many of my Syrian business friends’ cars were stolen after Sisi came into power, 
and many of them have even been robbed on streets or in shopping malls. Once, a 
business friend was driving in the city 6th of October. Three guys got off their 
tuktuk with a gun, and robbed him of all of his money and car. That was at the end 
of 2013.428 
 
Syrian businessmen were generally considered by the local Egyptians to be ‘rich 
people,’ even though many of them were not as wealthy as the local Egyptians had 
believed. During fieldwork in the Gisr El-Suez area of Cairo, where many textile 
workshops and stores are located, I was walking on the street looking for 
Syrian-owned shops. I went into an Egyptian clothes shop and asked the owner where 
the Syrian shops were. He responded, “Why do you want to do research on the 
Syrians? They are wealthy. They are richer than us.”429 This suggests that the local 
Egyptians might consider that the Syrians in their country are ‘normal’ people who 
are in good economic situations. Egyptians’ general impressions of Syrians negatively 
impacted the lives of the Syrian businessmen since they could be remnants of the 
Muslim Brotherhood or wealthy people who came to their country to compete with 
the local population.  
 
Syrian businessmen based in Jordan had less tense relationships with the local 
communities than those in Turkey or Egypt. Jordanians in general did not have 
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prejudices or discriminate as some Turks or Egyptians did. Since some famous Syrian 
dessert shops’ names were well known in Jordan prior to 2011, some Jordanian 
businessmen even used Syrian commercial brands to raise their own visibility in the 
market. For example, an ice cream shop and a kunafa store called ‘Bakdāsh’ and 
‘Nafīsa’ respectively were located on Makka Street in Amman.430 The signs outside 
the shop were very ‘Syrian,’ using pictures of the al-Umawi mosque or the Aleppo 
castle.431 The names of the shop and the images on the signs made customers believe 
that they were branches of the famous ‘Bakdāsh’ and ‘Nafīsa’ shops in Damascus, 
both being well known in Jordan. However, after speaking with the workers in the 
shops and other Syrian businessmen in the city, it turned out that these shops were run 
by Jordanian businessmen who were merely referencing the Syrian brand to promote 
their businesses. The Damascene bookshops owner and printing industrialist no4 
explained why he thought the relationship between the Jordanians and the Syrians 
were comparatively better,  
 
Jordanians used to consider Syria as heaven. Jordan imports almost everything from 
abroad, including from Syria. Before the war, Jordanians even depended on 
smuggled meat from Syria. So the Jordanians are not unfamiliar with our products. 
Furthermore, the Jordanians used to come to Damascus for weekends to go 
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Different business practices in local communities also affected the settlement process 
for the Syrian businessmen once they had established their businesses in the host 
countries. Since the local businessmen in some cases had specific ways of doing 
business, and since the Syrian businessmen also had their own ways of doing business, 
the Syrian businessmen needed to address this issue and adjust to the local practices. 
The two most frequent differences in business operations that Syrian businessmen met 
were the usage of cheques and the custom of a one-year duration of products returning 
in Egypt. 
 
The majority of expatriate Syrian businessmen struggled with using cheques for 
business transactions in the three host countries. Since Syrians did not trust the 
banking system in Syria during the pre-revolution era, using cheques was not 
common. Syrian businessmen were used to doing business with cash, and they were 
not accustomed to receiving bank cheques, not to mention being afraid of receiving a 
dishonoured cheque from a stranger in an alien land. “How can we be sure the 
cheques are transferable into cash? And even worse, we are not in our country now. 
Who will help us if we receive a dishonoured check?” stated an Aleppan plastic raw 
material businessman no37 in Istanbul.433  
 
Nevertheless, after the Syrian businessmen started doing business with the locals in 
Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, they were required to use cheques for doing businesses in 
these countries, “If we are doing businesses with other Syrian or Iraqi businessmen, 
we can use cash. But with the locals will not do business with you unless you accept 
their cheques,” stated a Damascene household cleaning industrialist no25 in 
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Mersin.434 However, the Syrian businessmen would take certain actions to protect 
themselves, such as confirming with the banks immediately after receiving a cheque 
to make sure it was legitimate.435 As a precondition for using cheques, Syrian 
businessmen needed to have a bank account in their host country. This encouraged 
them to become familiar with the local banking systems. Therefore, even though 
Syrian businessmen used to rarely conduct business transactions by cheque or use the 
banking system in Syria, they had no choice but to adapt to the local customs in the 
host countries. As far as is evident from the 191 interviewees, none had not opened a 
bank account in the countries where they had relocated to. 
 
In Egypt, local businessmen had their own ways of buying and selling goods. One 
Damascene clothes businessman no26 in Cairo stated that “if Egyptian businessmen 
order goods from you at the beginning of the year and if they do not finish selling 
them by the end of the year, they will return the goods to you and you need to give 
them back their money.” 436  This particular way of doing businesses was not 
uncommon in the Egyptian business community, as I confirmed with an Egyptian 
businessman.437 However, this was new and unfamiliar to Syrian businessmen. “Even 
though it is weird for us, or be asked to return the money we received from a buyer, 
we have no choice but accept this,” stated an Aleppan carpet industrialist no38 in 
Cairo.438  
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The investigation of the legal, political, and social perspectives of host countries 
towards Syrian businessmen demonstrates that the Syrian businessmen struggled with 
four major challenges while settling in, namely, assurance of entry and the legal status 
of residence, volatile policy changes towards Syrians, anti-Syrian political 
atmospheres, and different local cultures or the negative public opinion of Syrians. 
Nevertheless, the expatriate Syrian businessmen could still manage with these issues 
because of their capital and their knowledge of adapting to various local dynamics.  
 
4.3 So, what is the plan?  
 
After arriving in the host countries, Syrian businessmen embarked on different 
activities, such as establishing new businesses, participating in philanthropic or 
political events, or just waiting to return. Before moving on to discussing the activities 
that Syrian businessmen were doing and how they conducted the activities, the 
expectations of how long the exile would last and how their expectations affected 
them at the beginning of their settlement will be analysed. 
 
Since the expectation of exile duration can affect the migrants in the host countries, as 
previously mentioned, exploring their expectations will help to understand why the 
Syrian businessmen did what they did and how they did it. Expectations at the 
beginning of settlement can be divided into two main types: the expectation of a quick 
return to Syria, and the loss of hope of returning to Syria in the near future. Even 
though many Syrian businessmen from the first group expected to return to Syria soon, 
with the escalations of conflict in Syria, many of them eventually lost hope and their 




a. Expectations and activities   
 
My factory was worth $5 million, and my house was worth $2 million. Both are still 
in Syria. The reason I chose to open a restaurant is because it is easy to close it 
down and return back to Syria. Once the war is finished, the country will need 
people like us who have money to rebuild the country, and it means that we will be 
able to make more profit than now. 
- A Damascene ceramic industrialist no18439  
 
On the one hand, many Syrian businessmen desired a quick return to their home 
country at the beginning of their emigration. This was similar to what Harpviken 
demonstrated in his work on war-induced Afghani migrants. 440  Most Syrian 
businessmen were expecting a short-term leave for a few days or months as a ‘holiday’ 
away from the conflict zone. “Even after the protest had started in Daraa in March 
2011, I still imported two machines from Korea. I did not expect that the war would 
start or expand in the country. All of a sudden the bombing started in the rural parts of 
Aleppo, and we had to leave the country,” stated the Aleppan children clothes 
industrialist no17.441 Having decided to leave Syria with the expectation of a quick 
return, businessmen were mentally and materially unprepared to flee when they did. 
As the Aleppan interior design businessman no32 stated,  
 
                                                          
439 Damascene ceramic industrialist no18, personal interview, Cairo. September 30, 2015. 
440 Harpviken, Social Networks and Migration, 76. 
441 Aleppan children clothes industrialist no17, personal interview, Cairo, November 03, 2015. 
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I left Syria in the middle of 2012 because the situation in Aleppo had become very 
bad. It wasn’t safe there anymore – the security situation was terrible and it was 
urgent that we flee the country. I brought my wife and my son with me along with 
some summer clothes. Then I drove my car from Aleppo to Gaziantep.442 
 
The Syrian businessmen did not bring enough capital or possessions with them, or 
even all of their family members. Since the original intention was to leave for just a 
short stay, they did not consider starting new businesses in their ‘temporary’ settling 
countries. What they did bring with them were just the basics for short-term living. 
 
On the other hand, although many Syrian businessmen desired a quick return as 
previous studies have suggested, some had already lost hope of returning in the 
short-term after relocating. The Damascene restaurateur no10 stated, “Since my house 
was bombed by the regime and my factory was destroyed through the conflict, after I 
gave up everything in Syria and came here in the mid-2011 [Istanbul], I used all the 
money I have and started the business.”443   
 
The two groups of businessmen also developed their activities in the host countries 
differently. Those who believed in a quick return remained more politically and 
economically conservative, such as by merely waiting or opening up a simple, small 
scale investment. Those who lost hope of a quick return were more actively engaged 
in starting up new careers, regardless of the field of investment or political activities. 
As confirmed by field research, many Syrian businessmen claimed that in the 
beginning of their time in the host countries, they assumed that they would return to 
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443 Damascene restaurateur no10, personal interview, Istanbul, April 17, 2014. 
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Syria soon, while others claimed that they did not think it is possible for them to 
return to Syria in the near future.  
 
There were three main reasons for this division: the expectation of the duration of the 
conflict, economic property remaining in Syria, and political leanings. Even though 
the Syrian businessmen had different expectations of their return, they never gave up 
the desire to return. This conforms to one aspect of diaspora, that is, ties with its 
homeland during exile, as previously mentioned.  
 
To return soon or not to return soon? 
 
Syrian businessmen who expected a quick return believed that the uprising would be 
stomped by the regime, whether in few months or possibly in one or two years. As 
such, they did not seriously consider establishing new investments in the host 
countries. As the Aleppan textile industrialist no35 in Gaziantep stated,  
 
In the beginning when we arrived here in Turkey, we did not see any sign that the 
protestors or the rebels were winning the revolution or that the regime was 
considering giving up any of its power. Since most foreign countries are not 
supporting the people, and the regime is brutally killing the people with the support 
of Iran and Russia, we expected that the regime would just win the battle soon. And 
the 1980’s massacres conducted by Bashar’s father on the people in Aleppo, Hama, 
and Homs were still in our minds. We knew that the son would do the same as his 
father. However, we were wrong about this.444 
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Furthermore, when the Syrian businessmen left in a rush, they did not bring most of 
their capital with them, but rather left it in Syria. In any case, most of the capital was 
not portable as it was real estate, machines, and factories. The concern about the 
property that they had worked for or had held in their family for decades was another 
important factor to keep hope of returning to Syria as it was not easy to believe that 
they would lose everything they had worked for. One Aleppan real estate investor 
no39 said,  
 
I used to work in real estate in Aleppo. The estates I owned were valued in the 
millions of US dollars. However, I could not bring those estates with me to Turkey, 
and I did not want to sell them since the price would be extremely low. I just want 
to go back to Syria once the conflict is finished so I can get back my properties 
rather than starting a new investment here in Turkey.445   
 
On the other hand, some businessmen had already made their decision before their 
departures to not return to Syria soon. This was due to economic and political 
considerations. Economically speaking, either their business activities in Syria were in 
a critical, non-redeemable state, or they needed to immediately start up factories in the 
host countries in order to maintain their foreign customers. Even though the conflict 
in Syria at the beginning of the revolution did not see large-scale damage of domestic 
facilities, some businessmen’s facilities were indeed totally destroyed by the war and 
militias, especially facilities that were located in the rural areas of the country. “My 
factories were all gone! They were bombed by the regime’s missiles! What can I do in 
Syria? I have no expectation of returning to Syria in the near future,” stated a 
Damascene box industrialist no27.446  This kind of damage made many Syrian 
                                                          
445 Aleppan real estate investor no39, personal interview, Mersin, February 6, 2015. 
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businessmen gave up the idea of returning to Syria, since their unmovable estates such 
as houses, factories, or machines have been severely destroyed or occupied through 
the conflict. As for the Syrian businessmen who attempted to maintain their foreign 
customers, specifically the industrialists, they immediately established factories in the 
host countries. The Aleppan packaging industrialist no34 who used to have customers 
in other Middle Eastern countries after he relocated from Aleppo to Gaziantep in the 
end of 2012 immediately established his factory for continuing businesses with his 
foreign customers.447  
 
In addition to the economic considerations, the businessmen who did not hope to 
return quickly at the beginning of their settlement were also influenced by their 
political leanings about the revolution. Some Syrian businessmen left Syria due to the 
political suppressions from the regime because their pro-revolutionary activities or 
their overt anti-regime family history made them targets of the regime. As previously 
shown, some Syrian businessmen actively participated in the revolution and were 
either imprisoned or declared to be wanted by the regime. Those Syrian businessmen 
did not expect to return to Syria soon since they could not return – the ‘political 
crimes’ they or their families have committed during and before the revolution left 
them eligible to be arrested by the regime’s forces.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the number of businessmen with the two types of 
expectations in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan were significantly different. Most Egypt 
and Jordan-based Syrian businessmen did not expect a quick return, but the 
Turkey-based Syrian businessmen did, whether at the beginning of their settlement or 
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later. During fieldwork in Egypt and Jordan, I did not meet or hear of any Syrian 
businessmen claiming that they were waiting to return to Syria, or whose friends were 
waiting to return to Syria, or who did not have any economic investment in Egypt or 
Jordan. The opposite was true in Turkey where the number of Syrian businessmen 
who were just waiting there and not setting up any economic investment was much 
higher than in Egypt and Jordan.  
 
This difference was mainly due to: cheaper costs of establishing an investment in 
Egypt and Jordan than in Turkey, and the familiarity with the local societies. First, 
since most businessmen lost a great amount of capital, the high cost in Turkey would 
limit their motivation to establish a new investment project. As mentioned earlier 
about the cost of establishing a company and local tax, and the labour cost in Turkey, 
Egypt, and Jordan, the latter two countries cheaper cost enhanced the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen’s motivations for starting new investments. Second, Egypt and 
Jordan are both Arabic countries so Syrian businessmen based in Egypt or Jordan who 
wanted to embark on a new business project would not encounter cultural issues, such 
as the language barrier in Turkey. As the Damascene clothes businessman no11 who 
had moved to Cairo stated, “It’s just like Syria here. We speak the same language, we 
have the same culture. And Egypt is bigger, they have a larger population. And the 
taxes here are lower [than in Syria].”448 These two reasons encouraged the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen to start new investments in Egypt and Jordan since the risk would 
be lower than opening a business in Turkey where they would have to pay more and 
where they were not familiar with the local culture. This also made those Syrian 
businessmen to have less intentions of a quick return to Syria, since they could 
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establish new investments easier in the host countries. It was due to the expectations 
of the conflict, the economic structure of the countries into which they relocated, and 
the political leanings that those expatriate Syrian businessmen did not have quick 
return expectations as Harpviken has suggested.449     
 
Different minds, different ends: waiting, investment, and politics 
 
The two opposing expectations that Syrian businessmen had of returning to Syria led 
them to have different activities in the host countries. These activities in the host 
countries can be mainly divided into three groups: waiting without doing anything or 
working on a small-scale business, economic investment and political participation.  
 
The businessmen who were looking for a quick return were very low-key and never 
fully engaged in starting new activities in the host countries. The businessmen who 
had given up the idea of returning to Syria in the near future had the opposite scenario 
whereby they needed to actively embark on new activities for their new life in the 
host countries.  
 
During field research in Mersin, Turkey in 2014, I visited the ‘Syrian Businessmen 
Forum in Mersin’ and interviewed four businessmen. Even though the place was 
called ‘Businessmen Forum,’ and more than thirty businessmen were there that night, 
the location of the Forum was in a large café restaurant close to the beach and not in a 
business-formal setting.  
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The Forum was first established in 2013 by some Aleppan businessmen who had 
moved to Mersin in 2012. The original intention was to use it as a public place for 
Syrian businessmen to gather. Nevertheless, the Forum became more of a café rather 
than a place to discuss serious issues. The Aleppan automobile industrialist no21 was 
one of the founding members of this Forum. He brought me there and arranged 
interviews. He explained, “Even though most businessmen sitting here are 
millionaires in Syria, they do not do any work. Rather they have coffee or play 
ṭaāwila (a Syrian table game).”450  
 
The businessmen in the Forum were an example of those who had enough capital with 
them but were not thinking about anything but returning to Syria. As an Aleppan real 
estate investor no40 who was a millionaire before the war stated, “Why should I work? 
My properties in Syria are worth more than a million US dollars. You see, the war is 
going to end soon, and we will start to work at that time.”451 This attitude of waiting 
and not doing anything was common for some Syrian businessmen at the beginning of 
their settlement.  
 
As mentioned previously, other Syrian businessmen who also expected a quick return 
still worked on small projects like a restaurant, dessert shop, or café. The reason to 
work was not that they would make a profit during their stay, but rather it seemed like 
something to do to kill time before returning to Syria. Moreover, these businessmen 
did not participate in any political activities at the beginning of their settlement 
because of their expectations – they believed the Bashar regime would stay in power. 
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As such, the ‘cleaner’ their record was during this ‘waiting period’, the simpler it 
would be to return to Syria.  
 
On the other hand, the Syrian businessmen who did not expect to return to Syria soon, 
acted in a completely different way. Economically speaking, these businessmen 
established companies, factories, and workshops as soon as they had entered the host 
countries. Since some no longer hoped to regain their estates in Syria and some knew 
that their lives would be in risk in Syria under the rule of Bashar, they realised that 
they settle in to start making profit and maintain their former foreign customers. 
Politically, since some Syrian businessmen left due to their political leanings, they 
continued their political participation in anti-regime activities in their host countries. 
For example, some were founding members of anti-regime political organisations 
which I will discuss their political participation in chaper 6.452 
 
In the early stages of the expatriate Syrian businessmen’s settlement in host countries, 
there were opposing ideas regarding return to Syria which were due to different 
expectations of the end of conflict in Syria, economic properties in Syria, and political 
participation after the eruption of the 2011 revolution. Different points of view also 
led them to different activities in their host countries. Nevertheless, the ‘quick return’ 
businessmen changed their stance once the conflict went stalemate and dashed their 
hopes of returning to their homeland. 
 
b. Transition: from sojourners to settlers 
 




As mentioned above, there were originally two opposing schools of thought as to 
when it would be possible to return to Syria. However, the majority of businessmen 
who expected to return soon gradually shifted to the realisation that they were in for a 
long-term residence abroad. It is not possible to pinpoint when their beliefs changed 
since each businessman had his own economic and political conditions and had had 
different experiences during expatriation. However, due to the prolonged conflict and 
the complications of battles, the businessmen realised that they would not be returning 
to Syria for a long time.  
 
Generally speaking, mid-2012, mid-2013, and the beginning of 2014 can be seen as 
the three major turning points in the expatriate Syrian businessmen’s expectations to 
return to Syria. In mid-2012, the conflict between the rebels and the regime forces 
reached a critical point which threatened the regime’s political authority. The rebels 
attacked prominent al-Assad regime leaders in Damascus on 18 July 2012, they 
occupied economic and military strategic areas in Aleppo, and the regime reacted 
with harsher suppressions of civilians.453 The battles between both sides of the 
regime forces and the rebels caused great damage to the economic facilities inside 
Syria whereby many properties of Syrian businessmen were destroyed.  
 
Furthermore, the expansion of ISIS in the northeast region of Syria in mid-2013 was 
another turning point for the businessmen since most of their transportation routes 
were blocked by ISIS.454 This blockade impeded the businessmen from transporting 
their resources and their economic activities in Syria to a halt. “Before ISIS seized 
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al-Raqaa in mid-2013, I could send my products from Jordan to Iraq. But now, it is 
too dangerous for me to send products through al-Raqqa,” stated the Aleppan plastic 
industrialist no26.455  
 
Finally, 2014 was a major turning point when most Syrian businessmen lost any 
remain hopes of a quick return and realised they should work seriously in their host 
countries. At this point, the conflict had been going on for more than three years, 
other international players, such as Russia and Iran, were actively supporting the 
Bashar regime, and the U.S. was bombing ISIS in al-Raqqa. The long-term battles, 
lack of any winner in the foreseeable future, and the loss of the Syrian businessmen’s 
economic capital made them lose the last hopes of returning to Syria.456 
 
These three turning points indicate the complications and prolongations of the Syrian 
conflict so that Syrian businessmen could no longer expect that the conflict would 
finish soon. Furthermore, the longer the conflict continued, the more damaged their 
properties would be, and the less hope the expatriate Syrian businessmen have for 
returning to Syria. As argued earlier, the expectation of a quick end to the conflict and 
the remnants of real estate in Syria were two reasons as to why some Syrian 
businessmen believed that they would return to Syria soon. Thus, the prolonged 
conflict changed the beliefs of those businessmen who used to think that their exile 
was short term.    
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This transformation of beliefs directly impacted how they acted in their host countries. 
They started to realise that there was almost no hope of returning to Syria, or that if 
they did return, there would be no physical assets left. The businessmen became much 
more active in the host countries. In addition to economic enlargement, most 
continuously devoted their time and money to philanthropic activities. Some 
expatriate Syrian businessmen started to actively engage in anti-Assad political 
activities. The following two chapters will discuss these expatriate Syrian 




This chapter has examined the relocation and settlement of Syrian businessmen from 
Syria to three host countries. It has demonstrated that the decision-making process for 
a place to relocate to for Syrian businessmen was mainly affected by the distance 
between the host country and Syria, the economic structures of the host countries, the 
political relationships between the host governments and the Syrian government, and 
existing social ties. After the businessmen relocated, they encountered issues of entry 
and residence, uncertain policy changes towards Syrians, anti-Syrian atmospheres, 
and different local cultures and negative public opinions about them. Even though at 
the beginning of their settlement process most Syrian businessmen expected a quick 
return to Syria because they thought that the conflict would end soon and they would 
still have great amounts of property in Syria, the escalations and prolongation of 





This suggests that the relocation and settlement process of Syrian businessmen was 
mainly affected by economic, political, and social conditions of the host countries. 
More importantly, the political relations between the host and home governments 
regarding the relocation of the migrants have been argued to play an important role in 
addition to other factors including distance, economic structures in the host countries, 
and personal ties. And when both host and home governments had a similar political 
attitude towards the on-going Syrian conflict, the host governments might be less 
willing to receive Syrians, and vice versa. The Syrian businessmen’s political 
activities in the host countries were also directly affected by these relationships since 
it is not possible for Syrian businessmen to participate in political activities which are 
against the host governments.  
 
Different from previous studies which suggest the importance of social networks on 
migrants’ choice of place of relocation, the case of Syrian businessmen’s relocation 
shows that economic consideration played a more important role than social networks 
did during the process of relocation. This has been shown in cases of brothers and 
business partners choosing different countries due to the calculation of their own 
investments.   
 
Finally, even though most Syrian businessmen believed their stays were temporary in 
the beginning, as former studies have suggested, the expectation of a temporary stay 
was not fixed. Rather, the complications and prolongation of conflict made them 
realise that the chance of returning to Syria in the short term was low. This shift of 
attitudes from sojourners to settlers would also influence their work and engagement 
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in the host countries. The following two chapters will discuss how the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen started to seriously engage in their economic, philanthropic, and 
political activities in the host countries after the change of their expectations of return. 




Chapter 5 The Economic Investments of Syrian Businessmen: Migrated 
Thoughts and Actions, Network Expansion, and Adjustment of Business 
Behaviours 
 
In analysing the transformation of the Syrian business community through the 2011 
revolution, the situation of the business community in pre-2011 Syria has already 
been investigated, as has the relocation and settlement of the Syrian businessmen. 
Since the expectations of the businessmen changed from patiently waiting for a quick 
return to understanding that they might have long-term stays, they started to seriously 
engage in different activities in the host countries.  
 
This chapter will focus on the economic investment of expatriate Syrian businessmen 
in the host countries, and the following chapter will examine their philanthropic and 
political activities. After accepting their long-term exile in foreign lands, most Syrian 
businessmen embarked on various economic investments. The types of investment 
were diversified and varied in size, from small and medium sized ventures (such as 
grocery shops, cafés, restaurants, or trading companies) to large investments in 
construction and industrial fields. Also, the number of Syrian registered companies 
and the economic capital that they brought with them from Syria had spectacularly 
high economic value.  
 
First, the state of the economic investment of expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan will be delineated. The sizes and scales of the investments 
in these three countries will be examined, including the number of Syrian companies, 
the sectors of investments, and the capital inflow from the Syrian business community 
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on local societies. Second, business operations of the expatriate Syrian businessmen 
will be examined. Most Syrian businessmen worked in the same economic fields after 
their relocations, and economic, social, and political factors determined whether they 
would have enough trust to build up business partnerships with their fellow business 
countrymen or not. Third, even though Syrian businessmen left Syria, their ties to the 
home country – including the Assad regime, their relatives and properties inside 
Syria – continued to affect their economic investment in the host countries. Fourth, 
even though the Syrian business networks remained fragmented and people continued 
to behave cautiously while in exile, the expatriate businessmen used trade fairs and 
telecommunication apps to strengthen and improve the fragmented networks in the 
host countries. Finally, due to different local dynamics in the host countries, the 
expatriate Syrian businessmen were required to adapt to local business culture for the 
sake of their business investments.   
 
Business migrants would need to adjust the ways in which they used to conduct 
businesses in host countries to conform to the new environments as suggested by 
Harris.457 Due to the host countries’ environment, the Syrian businessmen needed to 
adjust some of their former business practices and get used to the different institutions 
in the host countries. Nevertheless, examining the expatriate Syrian businessmen’s 
economic investment will show that, in addition to adaptation that expatriate Syrian 
businessmen have made in host countries, their previous specific ways of thinking and 
acting have accompanied them and continued to affect their business operations in the 
host countries. After assessing threats by the Syrian regime or when they could not 
engage with local institutions, they would seek help from their previous civil 
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mechanisms (such as non-interest loans or informal arbitration) or rely on their 
previous ways of thinking to protect their own interests. Furthermore, the networks 
still maintained fragmented and they continued to apply other pre-2011 civil 
mechanisms in their business life while in exile. Despite the reality of lacking capital 
in the host countries while expecting that business would improve, many Syrian 
businessmen attempted to overcome the fragmented trust in the business community 
and build up new networks and associations with other expat Syrian businessmen. 
This indicates that the Syrian business networks were gradually expanding during this 
transformation, and political, economic, and social considerations were the three main 
criteria for improving trust among expatriate Syrian businessmen.  
 
5.1 State of the economic investment of expatriate Syrian businessmen  
 
Turkey has official data accessible that can help to provide a clearer picture of Syrian 
businesmen’s investment in Turkey, whereas the data of economic investments of 
Syrian businessmen in Egypt and Jordan are mostly based on news and official 
announcements. After the eruption of the 2011 revolution, thousands of Syrian 
businessmen left Syria taking $10 billions out of Syria. Moreover, thousands of 
Syrian companies have been established in these three countries. In Turkey Syrian 
businessmen mainly conducted commercial investments, whereas in Egypt and Jordan 






In Turkey, most Syrian businessmen’s business took place in Turkey’s economic 
capital, Istanbul, as well as other metropolitan cities such as Bursa, Mersin, and 
Gaziantep, and the Turkish-Syrian border city of Kilis. The reasons that these five 
cities were the main destinations for the Syrian businessmen were because of distance 
or the potential for profit that these locations could bring. The close distance between 
Gaziantep, Mersin, and Kilis, to the northern part of Syria would only take a few 
hours of travel. As such, the close distance encouraged Syrian businessmen who 
attempted to continue business with Syria or the neighbouring countries. Furthermore, 
the port in Mersin was also a hub for goods transportation to Syria and other countries. 
Also, most of these cities were metropolitan cities in Turkey (except Kilis), whose 
economic environments also attracted Syrian businessmen.   
 
As shown below in table 5.2, there were only 112 Syrian companies in Istanbul, 
Mersin, and Gaziantep before 2011. However, between 2011 and 2014, 1,608 Syrian 
companies were established in these three cities, meaning the number of Syrian 
companies grew 14 times in these four years. Table 5.1 indicates the extreme growth 
of Syrian registered companies in Turkey since 2012. Data from the Turkish Ministry 
of the Economy indicates that by the end of June 2016, there were 49,933 companies 
in Turkey with foreign capital, and 4,823 of them were Syrian, meaning nearly one 
out of ten companies with foreign capital in Turkey was Syrian.458 The actual 
numbers of Syrian companies in Turkey should be higher since some businessmen 
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registered their companies either using their second nationalities or under the names 
of their foreign business partners.  
 
Chart 5.1 demonstrates that 54% of Syrian companies in Turkey were working in 
wholesale and retail trade, 9% construction, 9% transportation, 9% manufacturing, 6% 
real estates, and 13 % in other business activities. The reason that most Turkey-based 
Syrian businessmen were working in the commercial sector was because the already 
strong local industrialists in Turkey which made it difficult for the newly arrived 
Syrians who had just experienced a great loss of capital to establish industrial 
activities. “We cannot compete with the Turkish industrialists since costs here are 
much higher, and it requires more capital to establish a factory, especially after we 
lost most of our capital during the war in Syria,” stated an Aleppan food industrialist 
no41.459 Regarding the capital that Syrian businessmen brought with them, the 
Turkish bank agency indicates that by 2013, Syrians had deposited $4 billion into 
Turkish banks.460 At the end of 2014, “a consultancy in Mersin, estimates that some 
$10 billion of Syrian money has flowed into Turkey’s southern provinces in the past 
three years, and most of it is now invested in business.”461 
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Syrian businessmen chose these Egyptian cities as their main settlement places due to 
the economic benefits of the metropolitan area and the satellite cities. 
 
In December 2012, the vice chairman of the Egyptian Investment Committee Nevin 
El-Shafei claimed that there were 15,000 Syrian investors in Egypt who invested in 
various sectors, almost half in the food industry.464 In addition, the top 10 Syrian 
businessmen had reportedly relocated to Egypt in the same period.465 Moreover, 
between 1 January and 31 October 2012, Syrian businessmen established 365 
companies in Egypt.466 However, the number of Syrian investments experienced a 
decrease due to the coup where one-third of Syrian capital moved to Turkey.467 
Nevertheless, the Egyptian Syrian Business Council’s president, Khaldūn al-Muwaqqʿ, 
stated that the number of the Syrian industries in Egypt accounted for no less than 80% 
of the overall Syrian industries abroad and that most Syrian industries in Egypt were 
working on textiles by the end of 2015.468 The capital of Syrian businessmen in 
Egypt was between $400-500 million by the end of 2012.469 Although it is not 
possible to calculate the exact numbers of Syrian companies in Egypt due to the lack 
of official statistics, news reports show that there were between hundreds and 
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thousands of Syrian companies in Egypt, mainly investing in textiles and food. Syrian 
capital in Egypt is at least in the hundreds of millions of US dollars.  
 
As previously mentioned, the cheap cost of labour in Egypt and Jordan, in contrast 
with Turkey, was one of the main reasons why Syrian businessmen were attracted to 
their industrial fields. As a reminder, in 2012, the minimum wage in Egypt was 
around $115, and in Jordan it was around $266, while in Turkey it was around $443, 
more than one and a half times higher than in Jordan, and almost four times higher 
than in Egypt.470 Therefore, if the businessmen did not want to break the law and pay 
less than minimum wage, Egypt offered the cheapest labour, making it a financially 




Amman, Irbid, and al-Mafraq were the main Jordanian cities where the Syrian 
businessmen relocated to. The reasons for choosing these cities were similar to those 
for Turkey: the distance and economic benefits. Amman is the primary metropolitan 
city and capital of Jordan so Syrian businessmen chose to settle here because living in 
a large city makes it easier to contact other companies, purchase goods or sell their 
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products. Irbid and al-Mafrq are around 10 miles from southern Syria, which made 
them convenient not only for travel but also to transport goods.471  
 
Syrian companies in Jordan accounted for around 25% of the 9,024 foreign registered 
companies in August 2014.472 The number of Syrian restaurants in Jordan by the end 
of 2014 reached 1,100 and had a total capital of about 15 million Jordanian dinars 
(around $21 million).473 Between the beginning of 2012 and the end of 2013, there 
were 500 Syrian companies registered in Jordan: 44% in industry, 25.1% in service, 
23.5% in trade, 7% in agriculture, and 0.4% in real estate.474 As mentioned earlier, 
cheap labour costs in Jordan encouraged Syrian businessmen to invest in their 
industrial sectors. Finally, the economic capital Syrian businessmen brought to Jordan, 
reached $161 million in 2012 (around 114 million Jordanian dinars), and during the 
first half of 2013, a further $69 million (around 49 million Jordanian dinars) were 
brought in.475 
 
5.2 What to work on, with whom and where?  
  
a. Starting up business: giving up hope of return vs. still hoping to return 
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I think people have started to get together and build up business partnerships now, 
like two of my business friends. One established business partnerships with ten 
other businessmen here [in Gaziantep] and opened restaurants; the other built up 
business partnerships with another four businessmen to invest in construction 
companies. It is a good thing for us [Syrian businessmen] to gradually trust each 
other. 
-An Aleppan food industrialist no42476 
 
Networks are not only important for businessmen to facilitate their business activities, 
they are also significant in the process of migration. However, while establishing a 
business in host countries, networks did not affect Syrian businessmen’s decision 
unless they were looking for business partnerships. Once they decided to start 
economic investments in the host countries, they mainly invested in the same fields as 
they did in Syria since they were more familiar with them. Businessmen also started 
up in the same fields to maintain old customers they had. However, for the 
businessmen who were still undecided about their resettlement, opening a small sized 
investment such as restaurants or cafés was a good choice as previously mentioned. 
The Damascene ceramic industrialist no18 who used to work in the ceramics industry 
and now has two restaurants in Cairo stated,  
 
I used to work in the ceramics industry, but now I’ve opened two restaurants and 
have 50 workers here in Cairo. However, once the war is finished, I will just sell the 
restaurants and return to Syria. Because in that time, the country will need 
businessmen like me who have experience and money.477  
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As previously mentioned, Syrian businessmen preferred running businesses by 
themselves or in family-oriented ventures during the pre-revolution era.478 However, 
while establishing businesses in exile, the limited and small business partnerships had 
started to expand such that more than half of the interviewees had built up 
partnerships in host countries, mostly with other Syrians though sometimes with 
locals. Out of the 182 Syrian businessmen interviewed who were working in the same 
business sectors after their resettlement, 94 had established business partnerships, and 
15 of those 94 did so with local businessmen. 88 did not have any business 
partnerships, or they established their businesses with relatives as a family business. 
This shows how the business networking of Syrian businessmen has started to 
transform from individually or family-oriented to partnership based. 
 
The main reason that Syrian businessmen would build up business partnerships was 
because they lacked economic capital. The Syrian conflict has lasted more than six 
years and almost no Syrian businessman could avoid the negative effects. Many of 
their companies, factories or goods were occupied by either regime or rebel forces, or 
burnt down. The businessmen who used to work in industry experienced greater loss 
since their capital was mostly derived from the machines inside their factories, which 
were easy targets for the armed groups.  
 
This loss of capital made the businessmen to have limited budget, and forced them to 
be extremely cautious when investing in new businesses in the host countries and 
when developing business partnerships since could not take another failure. “We only 
have 25% of our capital with us. All the rest is in Aleppo or has been turned into 
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ashes,” said an Aleppan food industrialist no43.479 The Aleppan clothes industrialist 
no13 who relocated to Gaziantep claimed that his economic capital used to be $4 
million before the revolution, but now he only has one tenth of that with him. In the 
end, the lack of capital was a double-edged sword.480 On the one hand, it had 
increased the individualism for some Syrian businessmen. On the other hand, other 
businessmen had no choice but to start business partnerships if they wanted to 
continue working.  
 
In order to choose a place to restart their businesses, it is understandable that Syrian 
businessmen would choose places that were already popular for certain business 
activities. In addition, Syrian businessmen who had already relocated played a role in 
encouraging and facilitating newly arrived businessmen to pick a place for their 
investments. Previous migration studies argue that the existing networks in host 
countries facilitate and encourage people to migrate to the places where their 
acquaintances are located.481 When the expatriate Syrian businessmen decided to 
seek help from their existing networks or other fellow business countrymen, they 
specifically went to other expatriate Syrian businessmen who came from the same 
hometown. When choosing a location, new expatriate Syrian businessmen would seek 
help from personal acquaintances who had already been living in the host countries 
for a long time. Nevertheless, this help was mostly basic and non-financial. The 
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dozens of Syrian shops in Gesr El Suez in Cairo was an example of how former 
acquaintance influence choosing the place for business. An Aleppan44 traditional 
Arab clothes industrialist explained how previously resident Syrian businessman 
helped the later arrivals settle in the area,  
 
There are around 63 Syrian shops in Gesr El Suez now, whereas before 2011, there 
was only one Aleppan businessman who opened a shop there 20 years ago. And 
because his relatives in Aleppo were thinking about coming to Egypt, they 
contacted him first. Then this businessman helped them to open another shop in 
Gesr El Suez. Later on, other businessmen also went to this businessman’s relatives 
for advice. Then the Syrian businessmen started to gather there. Of course, they are 
mostly Aleppans.482 
 
Another Aleppan general trade businessman no45 who started his businesses in 
Mersin in the 1980s claimed that once the Syrian businessmen started to come to 
Turkey, he did not hesitate to give them information about how to run businesses 
inside Turkey.483  
 
This non-financial yet still information-based help from the Syrian businessmen who 
had already begun investing in the host countries decades ago also existed in Jordan. 
Another Damascene money transfer businessman no28 had been investing in Jordan 
since the early 2000s stated that he too helped Syrian businessmen who arrived in 
Jordan after 2011 with their livelihoods and business investments.484 Nevertheless, 
this kind of supports from the long-term expatriate Syiran businessmen to the newly 
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arrived Syrian businessmen only played a minor role regarding their new investments 
in the host countries.    
 
b. Building up partnerships: unpacking the trust among Syrian businessmen 
 
Most people here who meet up are mostly either relatives or were friends before the 
war. 
-An Aleppan clothes businessman no46485 
 
There are various factors that influenced Syrian businessmen in choosing partnerships. 
Nevertheless, trust was the most crucial criterion. The exploration of the business 
partnerships suggests that Syrian businessmen might build up business partnerships if 
they worked in the same field of investments (economic); they had known each other 
for a long time, they could be assured of the other person’s reputations, they had been 
business partners previously or they had had business interactions previously (social); 
and they did not hold opposing political opinions about the revolution in Syria 
(political). Out of the 94 Syrian businessmen who had built up business partnerships 
in the host countries, none of them had opposing political opinions to their business 
partners. These factors suggest that the businessmen built up business partnerships 
because of the potential economic interests they could gain and the trust which they 
had or could have with each other.    
 
Although previous studies on Syrian businessmen did not say much about the political 
opinions of the Syrian business community, this situation has changed since the 
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eruption of the revolution in 2011 and has led to a division of political opinions in the 
Syrian business community. The difference of political opinion significantly affected 
the ways Syrian businessmen would interact with each other. The clearest example is 
in the interactions between the anti-regime businessmen and the pro-regime 
businessmen, as well as in the interactions between the self-proclaimed neutral 
businessmen with the other two groups. “We know some business family have split 
into two because of their different political ideas. And even brothers are not 
contacting each other because of different political opinions about the incident in 
Syria,” stated the Aleppan automobile industrialist no21.486  
 
When the revolution started, some businessmen decided to stand up and aid the 
popular uprising. Most ended up being wanted by the regime or else they paid bribes 
to sneak out of Syria after a period of imprisonment. However, they did not achieve 
what they were demanding, which was the fall of the Assad regime. They left Syria 
with their capital and accompanied by their relatives, as well as with resentment of the 
regime and resentment of their fellow business countrymen who remained silent 
during the 2011 revolution. One Lattakia food trading and clothes industrialist no2 
and who was also a member of the Syrian Business Forum stated that, “did you see 
other people dare to put this flag (the three starred flag) in their office? No! Because 
they are opportunists! They just care about themselves. And I look down on this kind 
of people who consent tacitly to the unjust regime and I will not meet any of these 
people.”487 He further emphasised that he would never sell his products or do any 
business with pro-regime businessmen.488 
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At the time, the pro-regime businessmen considered the anti-regime businessmen to 
be ‘traitors’ of the country. “These people (the anti-regime businessmen) are 
supporting the terrorists. They did not help their country to fight the terrorists, rather 
they support this Western-led plan trying to destroy our country,” stated a pro-regime 
Damascene household goods industrialist no29 in Amman.489 Both the anti- and pro- 
regime businessmen proclaimed they were right and denounced the others as vicious 
traitors. The pro-regime businessmen condemned the anti-regime businessmen as 
‘betrayers,’ and the anti-regime businessmen considered the other group as the 
henchmen of the regime. The clash of political opinions stopped these two groups 
from staying in contact with one another. In particular, the anti- and pro-regime 
businessmen despised each other’s actions during the revolution. Differing political 
beliefs affected how businessmen interacted with each other. They preferred not to be 
related to or be in contact with any businessmen who were publicly known for their 
political beliefs. As such, when a Syrian businessman was looking for a business 
partner, he would never look for someone from the other side. 
 
Self-proclaimed neutral businessmen were extremely careful when interacting with 
businessmen from these two groups. One Aleppan textile businessman no47 stated, 
 
We are businessmen and we just care about our business. One time my customer 
came into the store and started to talk about politics. I told him if he wanted to talk 
about politics then he should please leave the premises. We only deal with 
businesses here, not politics.490 
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The self-proclaimed neutral businessmen have an understanding when they interact 
with the others that they will not mention anything that might express political belief.  
 
The reason why different political opinions affected the networking of expatriate 
Syrian businessmen in host countries was the fear of retaliation. The situation in Syria 
is still unstable and no one is sure which side will win out in the end. Even though 
Syrian businessmen have their own interpretations and political opinions on the future 
of Syria, they worried that if they exposed their opinions – which turned out to be on 
the ‘wrong’ side at the end – they might stay in exile forever. The mukhabarat system 
increased this uncertainty for anti-regime businessmen since no one was certain about 
another person’s political stance. The pro-regime businessmen were also afraid if their 
current patronage lost the battle, a new regime would punish them for supporting the 
Assad regime. They were also worried that the rebel groups might kidnap them while 
they were abroad. Self-proclaimed neutral businessmen were too afraid to be 
associated with any political discussion about Syria. 
 
In addition to the political consideration, the economic interests they could create and 
a certain amount of trust in each other were the other two factors which facilitated 
business partnerships. Syrian businessmen would choose business partnerships with 
the people who were working in the same field because they would be more familiar 
with the specifics of that area. However, the same economic field alone was not 





As shown previously, the roots of another businessman – mainly their city of origin 
and family names – would affect how Syrian businessmen judged one another. Now 
that Syrian businessmen were considering business partnerships in their host countries, 
city origin and family name still taken into consideration, but so as a background 
check. During the interview with the brother of a former vice president of the Aleppan 
Chamber of Industry – Aleppan food industrialist no2, another plastic trading 
businessman who had been considered one the top 10 businessmen in the plastic field 
in Syria came up in discussion. The brother of the former vice president called a 
friend to ask about the plastic businessman’s activities in Syria. The conversation 
included not only economic activities but also his relationship with the Syrian regime. 
After finishing on the phone, he explained, “my friend told me I cannot trust that guy. 
He used to be dishonest with his business dealing.”491  
 
To make sure they could trust a business partner, Syrian businessmen would choose to 
build up partnerships mostly with people who they knew or used to work with before 
leaving Syria. Moreover, they usually chose businessmen who were from the same 
city as they were. By doing so, confirming the reputations of another businessman 
would be easier. Only 6 interviewees out of 94 had business partners who were from 
different cities. Out of these 6 interviewees, 2 were from Aleppo and Damascus but 
based in Turkey; 1 Turkey-based Homsi food industrialist had an Aleppan business 
partner; 1 Turkey-based Aleppan food industrialist had a Turkey-Homsi industrialist 
partner; 1 Egypt-based Damascene clothes industrialist had an Aleppan business 
partner; and 1 Jordan-based Daraa food industrialist had an Aleppan business partner. 
In these cases, it was because those businessmen used to have business interactions 
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inside Syria prior to the year of 2011 which they have already known each other for a 
longer period and have a basis of trust for building up the business partnerships. The 
businessmen’s economic activities were affected not only by what they thought of 
their fellow business countrymen, but also by the role of their home country.  
 
5.3 Homeland factors: migrated thoughts and actions, and transnational ties   
 
Even though the Syrian businessmen left Syria, their home country still played an 
important factor which affected their business activities in the host countries. Civil 
mechanisms (non-interest loans and informal arbitrations) which were developed by 
Syrian businessmen as a result of poor institutions have already been examined in 
chapter 2. After resettlement, the businessmen continued to depend on and applying 
these mechanisms in their business operations. Furthermore, the fear of the regime 
was still prevalent in the minds of the expatriate businessmen. This further impeded 
networking for businessmen who were scrupulous about interacting with their fellow 
country businessmen. Finally, the ties of family and immovable property in Syria 
constrained the businessmen’s economic activities in the host countries. This suggests 
that the Syrian businessmen had moved away from Syria physically, but that their 
specific thoughts and actions about doing businesses and about the Syrian regime 
accompanied them and stayed almost exactly the same, due to the difficulty in 
engaging with the local institutions and assessment of possible damage the regime 
might do to them. In addition, the homeland factor rose to a transnational level which 
affected their economic activities in the host countries.  
 





My restaurant was intentionally damaged by a Turkish taxi driver due to some 
misunderstanding. Although I have Turkish citizenship, and I sued him in the 
[Turkish] court providing all the evidence, the judgment result was that he was 
innocent. How will you expect me to go to the court here? In the end, I’m still a 
foreigner in their [Turkish judges’] eyes. 
-An Aleppan furniture industrialist no33492 
 
When expatriate Syrian businessmen have issues of money or business disputes, they 
seek help using the same civil mechanisms which they depended on in pre-revolution 
Syria. When a Syrian businessman arrived in a host country with a need for capital to 
establish new investments, seeking help from his former business friends for a 
non-interest loan was still an option. Although Syrian businessmen relocated to 
different cities in different countries, the application of this non-interest loan was the 
same. The Aleppan plastic industrialist no26 in Amman contacted his former Aleppan 
businessman friend who was a raw materials provider in Istanbul for financial help at 
the end of 2012 to set up a factory in Jordan. “He lent me all the machines I needed in 
the beginning without any charge. The machines he lent me were worth more than $1 
million. Later on, I returned the money to him after I started to make profit.”493 
Another similar case was the Aleppan plastic industrialist no9. He relocated to 6th of 
October in Egypt in mid-2012. With the help of his former Aleppan business friend 
who was working in machines trading and who had relocated to Gaziantep, Turkey, 
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he also received machines without paying at the beginning.494 Non-interest loans 
were not restricted to machines, but could also be cash. These non-interest loans were 
still common among expatriate Syrian businessmen.  
 
In addition to the non-interest loans, the informal arbitrations were another civil 
mechanism which the expatriate Syrian businessmen used to arrange a dispute. When 
a business dispute arose, businessmen would do as they had done in Syria during the 
pre-revolution era: they would not seek a solution from the local judicial system but 
they would form a civil court by themselves. The Aleppan real estate investor no20 in 
Mersin, Turkey stated, 
 
A Syrian buyer and I had a business dispute regarding our transactions in Turkey. 
Even though we were both legally registered companies in Turkey, we did not go to 
the local court to solve the problem. We both found another two Syrian 
businessmen who we trusted, one was from my side and the other was from his side. 
Then we invited another Syrian businessman who also had knowledge of sharia’. 
Then the five of us sat down and discussed the justice was with whom.495  
 
Since the Syrian businessmen were the new settlers in the host countries, they were 
afraid of accessing the local court and would not trust the local judicial system. An 
Aleppan tanker industrialist no49 explained his worries about the local courts,  
 
How long will it take for arbitration here in Turkey? Three months? Five months? 
Or even longer? It’s not only because it may take a long time to get the result of the 
arbitration, but also, we want to be ‘clean,’ – we do not want to have any negative 
judicial labels from the country we live in now after we leave. God knows what will 
happen then.496  
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Thus, the Syrian businessmen used the same informal arbitration mechanism in the 
host countries when they had business disputes with their fellow business countrymen. 
Nevertheless, the application of these civil mechanisms as limited to Syrian 
businessmen who had already known each other or trusted each other enough and 
were from the same cities before their expatriation. 
 
b. The fear of the regime – living in its shadow 
 
Trust me my friend, all my friends think the Syrian mukhabarat sent you here. 
-An Aleppan dessert industrialist no50497 
 
After meeting the above Aleppan industrialist, he promised that he would try to 
arrange some interviews with other Syrian business friends of his. However, he called 
after three days and apologised. It seems that the notoriety of the Syrian mukhabarat 
in the Syrian businessmen’ minds was almost infinite. The expatriate Syrian 
businessmen thought that the Syrian mukhabarat would recruit a Taiwanese person to 
work for them and spy on their people.  
 
The Syrian businessmen had dreaded the regime since they had been in Syria. This 
fear made distrust each other such that anyone could be from the mukhabarat or be 
sent by them. They did not overcome this fear by being far away from the regime. 
Rather, it stayed in their minds and continually limited their networking, even in an 
strictly economic setting. For example, a Syrian businessman was kidnapped in 
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August 2014 in Gaziantep, and some Syrian businessmen believed it was directly 
linked to the mukhabarat, even though there was no further information about who 
had done the kidnapping.498 The power of the Syrian mukhabarat in the minds of 
Syrian businessmen reached a certain level of ‘omnipresence.’ The Damascene 
general trade businessman no19 in Istanbul explained that he was looking for a 
business investment opportunity in Turkey. I gave him the names of a few 
businessmen who might be willing to participate, but he immediately rejected them. 
The reason was, “they are anti-regime businessmen. Even though I personally do not 
like the regime, I need to think about my family who is still in Syria. The regime has 
informers all over the world, and they know who we are in touch with.”499  
 
The fear of the regime was not merely imaginary because they did occasionally 
threaten businessmen even when they were physically distant. Threats from the 
regime on businessmen could even happen in Turkey, a country whose government 
was strongly anti-regime. “Some businessmen participated in a trade fair in Istanbul, 
and a pro-regime businessman came to them and asked why they did business in 
Turkey? He told them that they should do business in Syria to support their country,” 
stated the Damascene clothes industrialist no21.500 “Even though we are in Turkey, 
we still need to be careful about what we say and who we meet. Because our houses 
and relatives are all in Syria, if we criticise the regime or meet with opposition groups 
here, then all our stuff and relatives may be put in danger,” said an Aleppan textile 
                                                          
498“ikhtiṭāf rajul aʿmāl Ḥalabi fī Ghāzī ʿAntāb .. wa al-khāṭifūn yuṭālibūn bi-fidya,” [The kidnap of a 
Aleppan businessman in Gaziantep .. and the kidnappers demand a ransom] Aksalser, August 31, 2014, 
accessed March 14, 2017, 
http://3ksalser.com/?page=view articles&id=499a24e670155406b280bd02703d4736; Interviews. 
499 Damascene general trade businessman no19, personal interview, Istanbul, April 02, 2015. 
500 Damascene clothes industrialist no21, personal interview, Istanbul, March 13, 2015. 
232 
 
businessman no51.501 The fear of the regime was not limited to the expatriate 
businessmen about themselves, but they worried that their families and property 
estates in Syria would be at risk. As such, the fragmented network of the Syrian 
business community endured even though they had physically left Syria thanks to the 
fear of ‘omnipresent mukhabarat.’ 
 
c. Transnational ties of family and immovable property in Syria 
 
I worked for almost 40 years to build up my career in Syria, to buy a villa in Aleppo. 
alhamdulillah, they are still in Syria. I talk with my brother who is still in Aleppo. 
He is more than 60 years old. Every time he tells me they have no heat or electricity 
in the country, I feel pained, but what can I do? This kind of emotion distracts me 
from concentrating on my new investment here. 
-An Aleppan automobile industrialist no21502 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the beginning of the exile many Syrian 
businessmen thought the uprising would end in few months, and therefore did not 
bother to carefully consider what they should bring with them. The majority departed 
and left their businesses and elderly family members in Syria. As the Aleppan interior 
design businessman no32 who was in his early thirties stated,  
 
I drove to Turkey from Syria in the summer of 2012. At first I thought it was just a 
short holiday for my wife, my son, and me. The only luggage I had was just 
summer clothes and some cash. I did not bring my parents with me, nor the 
expensive printing machines I bought from Europe since I never imagined the war 
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would last so long. If I had known the war would continue, I would have spent a 
few more weeks transporting all my family and machines out of Syria.503  
 
Under the context of being unprepared and making a rapid departure, most expatriate 
Syrian businessmen later suffered as a consequence of these transnational ties. 
 
Transitional bonds affected the daily life of the forced migrants since supporting their 
family members in the home countries was their responsibility due to social pressure 
and could also lead to repercussions for people living abroad when sending money 
back home.504 Transnational bonds which restricted the activities of expatriate Syrian 
businessmen can also be perceived in their daily lives. The bonds made more serious 
impacts, especially when the conflict in the home country was still on-going, and 
people needed to be cautious about further possible harm they may encounter at the 
hands of the regime. Even though Syrian businessmen had been in exile for few years, 
the mental burden of separation from relatives and material assets has significantly 
distracted them and damaged their daily activities. One 60-year-old Aleppan art 
trading businessman no52 left his interview to answer a phone call. It was clear from 
his eyes that he had been crying. He explained,  
 
My wife just called me from Aleppo. When I answered the phone, I said ‘hello’ to 
her, but she did not answer. I said ‘hello’ again and she just started to cry without 
saying anything. I did not know what to do so I just cried with her. She was with 
me in Turkey last month, but because she wanted to take care of our daughter who 
is still in Aleppo, she went back to Syria. But now she cannot return because the 
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border between Turkey and Syria was shut down since ISIS is getting closer to the 
border.505  
 
The separation and uncertain circumstances of relatives made the businessmen suffer. 
More seriously, many received calls from their family members who were still in 
Syria, sometimes asking for money, sometimes giving news of the loss or absence of 
another relative. This limited many Syrian businessmen’s ability to devote themselves 
to the new investments in the host countries.  
 
In addition to family ties, the majority of the Syrian businessmen still have their 
houses, villas, companies, or factories in Syria, with some factories or companies 
were still working, but just barely. It was not easy for these Syrian businessmen who 
had worked, for example, for more than 20 years to give up their assets so quickly. 
Some left behind a few family members to protect the assets since if the property was 
vacant it could be taken over by either side, or by armed gangs which emerged during 
the war. “Some of my relatives are still in Syria, and I want to visit them. My house is 
still there. If I do anything which could anger the regime here, then my relatives and 
house may be in trouble,” stated an Aleppan money transfer businessman no53.506 
 
Transnational ties between expatriate Syrian businessmen and their home country 
were another factor that affected Syrian businessmen since they were not just living or 
working for themselves, but were also struggling to protect their family members and 
their real estate in Syria. “If we criticise Bashar here, the government can easily send 
a jet to bomb our house in Syria.” There was a real fear of the regime’s invisible hand 
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that could damage their property and family. 7 out of 31 businessmen interviewed 
during the mid-May to mid-June 2014 pilot fieldwork admitted to having been 
imprisoned before, and 4 are wanted by the regime.507  
 
Transnational suppressions such as physical threats and verbal warnings from the 
Syrian intelligence service to the expatriate Syrians and their relatives within Syria 
make it difficult for them to build trust with each other or even to gather socially. “A 
businessman in Turkey told me that a few weeks before the mukhabarat had gone to 
his house in Aleppo and asked for him. His parents told them that he is in Turkey. 
They told his parents to warn their son not to criticise the regime on his Facebook 
page,” stated the Aleppan food industrialist no2.508 “If we gather here, the regime 
might think that we are planning to overthrow them. Even though we claim that we 
are gathering only for the sake of our investment,” said the Damascene household 
cleaning industrialist no25.509  
 
The homeland factors and former civil mechanisms that they used to use have 
continuously affected the ways in which the expatriate Syrian businessmen act in their 
host countries. When they started to develop new business networks, they took some 
special facilities or occasions to improve the chances of having a comfortable 
environment, such as trade fairs and communication applications. 
 
5.4 Trade fairs and communication applications (Apps)   
 
                                                          
507 Interviews. 
508 Aleppan food industrialist no2, personal interview, Gaziantep, February 02, 2015. 
509 Damascene household cleaning industrialist no25, personal interview, Mersin, February 8, 2015. 
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Although the networks of expatriate Syrian businessmen remained fragmented and 
people were suspicious of each other, there was a main social venue where expatriate 
Syrian businessmen felt more comfortable and frequently participated or gathered in 
to improve and build up networks. ‘Social venue’ here indicates places where dozens 
of businessmen may go to either as a group or as an individual. Even though fear and 
distrust still existed and affected their interactions with each other, for the sake of 
strengthening or establishing their business networks and to improve their business 
after resettlement, trade fairs became comparatively safe venues. It is important to 
examine how and why Syrian businessmen used trade fairs to sustain, reinforce or 
expand their connections in the context of fragmented networking. The reasons for 
choosing specific places for networking will be analysed, as will how to maintain 
distant or transnational ties with their fellow business countrymen. Looking into the 
expatriate Syrian businessmen’s participations in trade fairs and the use of 
communication Apps will indicate that even though the expatriate Syrian businessmen 
still had different considerations and impediments to their networking, they took 
advantage of different opportunities and means for improving and expanding their 
fragmented networks as well as improving their investments abroad.   
 
a. Participation in trade fairs 
 
Participating in trade fairs was an indispensable part of the Syrian businessmen’s 
careers. Almost all Syrian businessmen who owned companies or factories would 
attend trade fairs related to their investments. During fieldwork research, I personally 
attended four trade fairs with expatriate Syrian businessmen. I went to two trade fairs 
with two separate businessmen, and two additional separate groups of businessmen 
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brought me to two other trade friars as a ‘Syrian guest.’ The latter two of the events 
lasted for more than one day, and one event included one overnight stay, and other 
one included two overnight stays.510     
 
The primary reason why businessmen participate in trade fairs was that they could 
improve their business. Syrian businessmen could not only benefit from the 
knowledge of markets but they could also enlarge their business networks. They 
might attend the event as a visitor or rent a booth for their companies. As a visitor, 
they would learn about the new products on the market, see who else was working in 
the field, and meet potential future competitors or customers. As an exhibitor, they 
aimed to sell their products and promote their companies’ names in the market. As 
such, most Syrian businessmen who owned companies or factories would attend these 
business exhibitions. In addition to the economic motives, the fear of the Syrian 
mukhabarat and the intention to form business organisations were the other two 
reasons which drove them to partake in the trade fairs.  
 
As previously demonstrated, Syrian businessmen were afraid of the mukhabarat. 
They were vigilant at any social gatherings; any indiscretion might attract people from 
the mukhabarat to them. Trade fairs were a social venue where Syrian businessmen 
could perfectly justify attendance. Even in the pre-war era, it was easy to participate 
in exhibitions held in their country or overseas. Due to the war, business exhibitions 
turned into social venues where expatriate Syrian businessmen can gather. They use 
the opportunity as a reunion with their former business acquaintances from the same 
                                                          
510 Observations, Istanbul, Bursa, Adana, and Gaziantep, 2014-2015. 
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field from different cities or countries. They have the chance to understand other 
countries’ investment environments and to sustain friendships in other countries.  
 
In addition, some Syrian businessmen who intended to form an expatriate Syrian 
business organisation used the chance to discuss, since they were usually either too 
busy to have these people meet, or too afraid to meet in another place. One case from 
a fair with around 30 Turkey-based Syrian businessmen confirms that in addition to 
the economic motivations of attending trade fairs, the intentions of strengthening the 
networks of fellow country businessmen could be observed. That is, during leisure 
time at one of the trade fairs, the businessmen gathered to discuss the idea and 
on-going project of establishing an expatriate Syrian business association. Due to the 
high rate of frequency of attending trade fairs, in less than a year a business 
association was established, with the registration of around 200 Turkey-based Syrian 
companies in the association. 
 
The evening of one trade fair, around 30 Syrian businessmen who were mostly 
investing in the construction field, but who were based in three different Turkish cities 
(Istanbul, Mersin, and Gaziantep) go together to discuss the possibility of establishing 
a business association in Turkey. After all the Syrian businessmen sat in a circle, the 
Aleppan businessman, Mr K., who owned a construction company in Turkey and was 
also the organiser of this trade fair trip, introduced himself. He gave his own name, 
his former business experiences in Syria, and what he was currently working on in 
Turkey. He then asked the other participants to also introduce themselves while he 
wrote down their names and contact details. Many questions were raised at this point. 
“Why we need to leave this information?” asked a Syrian businessman who seemed to 
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be nervous about his name and contact information being written down.511 “I don’t 
like to write down my name or contact information on paper,” stated another Syrian 
businessman.512 Mr K. and his business partners needed to further clarify that this 
information would only be kept by them for arranging the second meeting.   
 
They discussed issues such as the name of the association, its aims, administrative 
details, and the arrangement of another meeting at the next trade fair. Syrian 
businessmen also used this opportunity to exchange their experience with conducting 
businesses in Turkey and to provide others with information regarding legal issues or 
business environments. At the end of the gathering, they decided to raise their hands 
and vote on decisions which they had proposed. One businessman stated “no, I have 
no interest in politics. I do not want to raise my hand.”513  
 
Reactions during this gathering demonstrate that even though all the participants were 
comfortable with each other, when it came to writing down their personal information 
or voting, the Syrian businessmen might choose to withdraw because they considered 
it suspicious or politicised. The fear of transnational suppressions still affected their 
activities at the trade fair since no one was completely convinced that they would be 
fine after the meeting or that their participation in the gathering would not be reported 
back to the regime. “We were prohibited from gathering in Syria like this. We needed 
to apply for permission first to the government for the gathering, and then the 
                                                          





government might send another person from the public sector to supervise our 
meeting,” stated an Aleppan medicine industrialist no54.514   
 
Although participating in the trade fair still showed their fear and distrust of each 
other, in the minds of the Syrian businessmen, a trade fair was not merely a place for 
economic business; rather, it provided a place for old friends who had been separated 
to discuss their new investments and possibly establish an organisation for expatriate 
businessmen. More importantly, it was considered safer to gather and discuss other 
forms of ‘businesses,’ since that would avoid the attention of the omnipresent 
mukhabarat. 
 
b. Communication applications (Apps) – a tool for bridging the long distance 
 
You see this WhatsApp group? We have 40 Syrian businessmen in this group, and 
we are all working in the same field. We are all old friends from a long time ago. 
See, this guy sent me an Eid Mubarak during the Eid. 
-An Aleppan plastic businessman no55515 
 
Expatriate Syrian businessmen were living in different cities and countries, as 
demonstrated above. To maintain their friendships and stay in touch with one another, 
the most common way was through mobile phones. Mobile phone software such as 
Viber and WhatsApp were the crucial means for expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
different places to keep in touch. Syrian businessmen also used these software’s ‘chat 
room’ functions to set up group chats for up to 40 Syrian businessmen living in 
                                                          
514 Aleppan medicine industrialist no54, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 20, 2015. 
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different countries. Usually, the members who were in these groups were from the 
same field or had the same objectives for improving their investments. These chat 
room groups not only maintained their connections such as by sending regards or 
congratulations for the special events, but they were also considered as a secret 
location for other information.  
 
In addition to the social aspects of their messages, businessmen might send messages 
to the group for suggestions about their projects, such as making inquiries about a 
customer’s reputation or finding cheaper raw materials, etc. Furthermore, they also 
used the chat room groups to arrange meetings of future gatherings. For example, 
there was one person from one of the trade fairs who was responsible for arranging 
the trade fairs. He set up a chat room where other businessmen who were willing to 
participate in the trade fair could talk to each other. This was for sorting out 
arrangements about the trade fair, but also to discuss establishing an overseas Syrian 
businessmen organisation which they were planning to exhibit.  
 
This means of connection was in a bounded space, where no one but the members of 
the group could access its information. Since the information might be confidential, 
they did not want to attract attention from other businessmen who could become a 
threat to their business or the mukhabarat who might question them about the 
conversations. Thus, people who were allowed in these chat groups were considered 
highly trustworthy and were cautious about adding new members.  
 
Both participating in trade fairs and using mobile phone groups were the two means to 
how Syrian businessmen sustained and reinforced their limited networking during 
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their expatriation. They show that even though some businessmen were seeking to 
expand networks, the same old suspicion and dread of the Syrian regime’s monitoring 
and suppression continued to constrain their business network.      
 
5.5 Host land factors: adaptation to local institutions and business culture   
 
In Syria, we do not pay tax. Rather, we pay some money to the officials who can 
help us to waive the tax we need to pay. By doing so, we can lower the cost of tax. 
- An Aleppan real estate investor no56516 
 
The migrant businessmen needed to adapt to the local environment in order to 
improve their business. As Harris argues, the reasons UK-based Polish entrepreneurs 
adapted new business strategies into their business activities in the UK were due to 
the growth of their businesses and the hostile environment where their businesses 
were located.517 Doing businesses in a foreign country is not an easy thing; varying 
degrees of discrimination by host societies may occur.518 In addition to their own 
issues and concerns with the homeland factors, the expatriate Syrian businessmen also 
faced other matters from the host countries which directly affected their business 
operations. That is, Syrian businessmen were required to adapt to the countries where 
they relocated. Although the expatriate Syrian businessmen were required to adapt 
some of their former ways of doing business to conform to the local culture in order to 
make new investment in the host countries easier, some of their specific ways of 
                                                          
516 Aleppan real estate investor no56, personal interview, Istanbul, December 10, 2014. 
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thinking and acting have remained the same after assessing the possible threats from 
the regime or if they could not engage in the local institutions.   
 
On the one hand, Syrian businessmen were required to obey the local governmental 
institutions, even if the local institutional context was different from the one they were 
used to working in. On the other hand, the Syrian businessmen needed to engage and 
interact with the local societies, especially with local businessmen since their main 
professions were in investments. This adaptation indicates that Syrian businessmen 
have transformed some of the ways in which they dealt with the issues of tax payment 
and how they conducted their businesses. 
 
In pre-revolution Syria, Syrian businessmen lived in an environment lacking the rule 
of law. In this context, the businessmen knew how to pay bribes or seek help from 
individuals who would ease business operations in the country. They could decrease 
the amount of tax they needed to pay or even be exempted from the tax payments 
through their privileged networks. 519  Nevertheless, after establishing their 
investments in the host countries, those privileged networks could not facilitate their 
work abroad. What the Syrian businessmen were facing were new local governments 
and institutions that they had no choice but to obey. Thus, they could either follow the 
local business regulations or find other solutions to cope. An Aleppan machines 
trading businessmen no6 in Gaziantep explained his observations of fellow Syrian 
businessmen’s situations,  
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Now we need to pay taxes and do all the requirements which the Turkish 
government asks us to do. Honestly, it was not easy because before we just paid 
money to officials who we knew and they would solve it for us. This is why some 
Syrian businessmen do not know how to run a business here in Turkey; they never 
ran a business according to the local regulations before, but rather exploited their 
personal ties with regime’s officials.520 
 
Nevertheless, some Syrian businessmen in Egypt who did not officially register their 
business investments applied the old tricks, which was to find the ‘wasta’ for their 
work. The word of ‘wasta’ indicates “a middleman or ‘connection’ between 
somebody who wants a job, a license or government service and somebody who is in 
a position to provide it.”521 Egypt ranked 88 out of 167 countries on the corruption 
perceptions index in 2015. Turkey and Jordan ranked 66 and 45 respectively.522 
Addition, a report from the Centre for International Private Enterprise indicates that 
42% of small and medium-sized enterprises in Egypt needed to pay illegal payments 
or gifts to obtain licenses for their businesses, and 29% needed to do so for operating 
their businesses.523  This means that the likelihood of small and medium-sized 
businesses to pay bribes for doing businesses in Egypt is high, and thus, many 
Egypt-based Syrian businessmen also managed to find the right individuals to pay 
bribes in order to facilitate their business operations. Out of 38 Syrian businessmen 
interviewed in Egypt, a police state, there were still five Syrian businessmen who 
would tell a complete stranger that they had paid bribes to the local officials to make 
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their business activities easier, whether regularly paying the bribes or only on 
occasion. This may indicate that the actual practice of bribing officials might be 
higher and more widespread. “Well, it is just like Syria here, the police or security 
men come to your shops. And you know what you need to do. Just give them some of 
your products or money, and then they will not bother you,” stated the Damascene 
clothes businessman no11 in Cairo.524 
 
In addition to the local institutions, different business practices of the local 
communities were another issue the Syrian businessmen needed to face. Since the 
local businessmen sometimes had their specific ways of doing business, and because 
the Syrian businessmen also had their own ways of doing businesses, the Syrian 
businessmen needed to adjust to the local business practices in order to continue in the 
host lands. As previously shown, the two most frequent ways of doing business in the 
host countries were the use of cheques, and the custom of a one-year product return in 
Egypt. The expatriate Syrian businessmen needed to adapt their former ways by 
getting accustomed to using cheques in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan and the one-year 
product return in Egypt in order to simplify their business operations. The adaptation 
of expatriate Syrian businessmen regarding tax payment and business operations 
indicates that they changed some of their former customs due to the host countries’ 
institutions and local customs. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
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Syrian businessmen left Syria with their economic capital after the 2011 revolution. 
Thousands of Syrian businessmen and their billions of US dollars relocated to Turkey, 
Egypt, and Jordan, where they established thousands of Syrian companies. Even 
though they left Syria, homeland factors still played roles in their daily economic 
activities in the host countries, which maintained the networks among the expatriate 
businessmen in a fragmented way. The businessmen needed to adapt to the new 
environments and certain behaviours changed after interacting with local institutions 
and businessmen. Two examples are taxes and business operations. Nevertheless, 
some specific ways of thinking and acting remained the same after they relocated to 
the host countries. This indicates that the previous specific ways of thinking and 
acting migrated with the businessmen to the host countries and continued to affect 
their behaviours. This was due to their assessment of risk that the regime could 
impose on them so they needed to remain cautious. They could not engage with 
specific local institutions so they needed to rely on previous civil mechanisms to 
facilitate their work in the host countries. How the homeland affected the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen economic activities also conforms to the diaspora concept that the 
diasporans have a homeland orientation even though they are away from their home 
countries.  
 
Furthermore, even though the legacy of the fragmented network among the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen still existed after their resettlement, they embarked on building 
new business networks since they lacked economic capital and hope to improve 
investment. This indicates that the business networks of Syrian businessmen were 
gradually expanding during this transformation. During the network expansions, the 
political opinions, economic interest, and social acquaintances were the three main 
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factors that determined whether a new business partnership could be established. To 
counter the suspicious atmospheres, participating in trade fairs and using mobile 
phones’ communication applications strengthened their business networks and 
sustained social ties with other fellow country businessmen. After examining how the 
specific ways of thinking and acting accompanied the businessmen and how it 
affected them as well as examining the expansion of the fragmented Syrian business 
networks from their economic activities in the host countries, the philanthropic work 
and political participation of the expatriate Syrian businessmen in the host countries 




Chapter 6 Charitable and Political Mobilisation in Exile: Continuation and 
Emancipation 
 
The emergence of the economic investments of expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan not only demonstrates a physical emigration of the great 
amount of economic capital and businessmen out of Syria, but their emigration also 
indicates that their previous specific ways of thinking and acting continued to affect 
their later activities in the host countries. Nevertheless, due to the impediments they 
have faced in the host countries, the Syrian businessmen have managed to strengthen 
the fragmented business networks they used to have and further expand their networks 
with their fellow business countrymen. In order to provide a broader picture of the 
transformation of the Syrian business community, in addition to the examination of 
their economic investments, the continuing philanthropic works and political 
participation of the expatriate Syrian businessmen will be analysed.  
 
Philanthropic works and political participation from migrant communities in host 
countries are not a new phenomenon. Many studies have discussed the positive 
contributions which created or can be created by diaspora groups’ philanthropic 
activities towards their homeland development.525 The Syrian business community 
used to actively engage in philanthropic works in the pre-2011 era, such as hosting 
charities or raisings funds for needy people, as previously mentioned in chapter 2. At 
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the same time, these private donations were ‘welcomed’ by the Syrian regime since 
they could supply the insufficient institutions of the government, as long as these 
activities did not threaten the regime’s power.526 Since 2011, any charitable or 
political activity thought to be against the Bashar regime might lead to punishment 
from the regime, such as the confiscation of Syrian businessmen’s economic 
properties in Syria in the name of ‘founding terrorist groups’.527 Nevertheless, after 
resettlement, most Syrian businessmen continued to contribute to philanthropic 
activities. Different from previous studies on diaspora philanthropy, the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen not only gave help to their fellow countrymen who were still 
inside the war-torn Syria, but more importantly they also provided aid to those who 
had fled Syria.   
 
Additionally, various previous studies have demonstrated the political participation of 
refugees, migrants and diasporas in the countries where they resettled, and theses 
activities usually have a feature of homeland orientation, such as studies on the Kurds, 
the Tamils, the Philippines, the Palestinians, the Jews, and the Armenians.528 After 
the Syrian businessmen left and settled into the host countries, at least eighteen of 
them took important posts in anti-Assad political organisations and broad political 
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coalitions outside of Syria. This was a new state of being for the Syrian business 
community. As shown previously, except for the few business figures that were 
comparatively active in the participation of political affairs, members of the Syrian 
business community were for the most part politically apathetic in Syria due to the 
authoritative regime in pre-revolution Syria since politics were considered a taboo for 
most Syrians inside the country. The studies on diasporans that engage in homeland 
politics mostly focus on the people who left their home countries decades ago. 
However, of those eighteen expatriate Syrian businessmen who have actively taken 
part in anti-Assad political campaign, twelve left Syria after 2011. This indicates a 
different understanding; that the diaspora political engagement is mostly conducted by 
the people who left long ago, but the people who left more recently may also devote 
themselves to homeland politics.  
 
In order to analyse how philanthropic works and political participation of Syrian 
businessmen have been mobilised in their host countries, the motivations and patterns 
of expatriate philanthropic works will first be investigated. This will demonstrate that 
the expatriate Syrian businessmen continuously engaged in philanthropic activities 
due to the former culture of giving and the social pressure which was imposed on 
them by their fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, they not only focused on charitable 
works in their home country, but they also provided aid to their fellow countrymen 
who had relocated to the host countries. Second, the specific conditions which 
emerged after the 2011 revolution that politically divided Syrian businessmen will be 
analysed. Based on different political ideas, the Syrian businessmen will be divided 
into three groups: those who are against the revolution and pro-regime, those who are 
for revolution and against the regime, and those who are self-proclaimed neutral. 
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Third, the motivations and patterns of the political participations will be examined. 
This analysis will demonstrate that there were at least eighteen expatriate Syrian 
businessmen actively participating in anti-Assad political activities who played 
important roles. They participated mainly because of their long-term resentment and 
personal experiences of suppression by the regime and the reduced levels of fear of 
further political suppressions by the regime. This also suggests that the people who 
left more recently have the abilities or willingness to take part in political 
participation in line with that of their fellow countrymen who left a long time ago.   
 
The continuation of the Syrian businessmen’s philanthropic works in exiles was due 
to their customs of charity and the social pressures they felt by their fellow 
countrymen. Furthermore, the political divisions and participation of the expatriate 
Syrian businessmen denotes the political emancipation of the Syrian business 
community. The Syrian business community, which had been low-politicised prior to 
the 2011 revolution, was experiencing a certain growth of political emancipation due 
to their long-term resentment and personal experiences of suppression from the Assad 
regime. In addition, personal ties of migrants and diasporans have been suggested to 
be important social capital which they can rely on to facilitate their activities in the 
host countries.529 The examination of the philanthropic and political activities of 
expatriate Syrian businessmen demonstrates that their networks have moved from 
local-level in Syria to a transnational level to which Syrian businessmen from 
different countries devote themselves, with dynamic input from previously exiled 
Syrian businessmen who had departed Syria prior to 2011. Finally, even though most 
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expatriate Syrian businessmen have devoted themselves to philanthropic works and 
some of them have actively taken part in anti-Assad political activities, the 
fragmented networking of the Syrian business community and the restraint from 
political issues were, to a certain extent, still significant. Thus, this will reaffirm the 
argument that the specific ways of thinking and acting migrated with the businessmen 
and continued to affect their activitie.        
 
6.1 The continuation of social help – motivations and patterns 
 
Previous studies on diaspora philanthropy suggest that due to the diasporans’ sense of 
connection to the homeland and their consideration that charitable actions were a 
responsibility for supporting their fellow countrymen who were in need, the 
diasporans provided financial aid and built up investments in their home countries to 
improve the social and economic wellbeing of their fellow countrymen who remained 
in their homelands. 530  The participation of expatriate Syrian businessmen in 
charitable activities was common not only in the pre-revolution era but also after their 
resettlements into the host countries. Out of the 191 Syrian businessmen interviewed, 
rarely did any businessmen state that she/he did not give aid or help fellow 
countrymen. Rather, any differences between them were in the amount of aid and in 
what forms the aid was distributed.  
 
Although it is not possible to calculate the exact numbers or amount of aid contributed 
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by the expatriate Syrian businessmen to their fellow countrymen, some cases of 
philanthropic activities of expatriate Syrian businessmen suggest that the amount of 
aid from the business community was enormous. For instance, the former president of 
the Aleppan Chamber of Industry who left Syria for Egypt in mid-2012 personally 
donated $5 million to establish a Syrian orphanage for 300 Syrian orphans in 
Turkey.531 Another example is Abdu al-Qadir Sankari, the founder of the Abdu 
al-Qadir Sankari foundation who was a UAE-based Syrian businessman and owns a 
fashion and hospitality company in Dubai (Paris Group), has provided different 
charitable activities in and outside of Syria, holding hundreds of development and 
relief projects including education, health, protection and hygiene, food, shelter and 
community development, as well as reconstruction projects.532 Furthermore, Walīd 
al-Zuʿbi, who was originally from Daraa and based in the UAE since the mid 1980s 
and worked in real estate, alone has donated 3 million UAE dirham ($800,000) to 
Syrian refugees.533 Finally, the Syrian Business Council based in Dubai, which was 
established at the beginning of 2012 by long-term exiled Dubai-based Syrian 
businessmen, also raised around $6 million from its members to provide food to the 
Syrians in the country, especially for those who were living in the rebel held areas.534 
 
                                                          
531 Aleppan dessert industrialist no15, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 02, 2015. And Personal 
observation. 
532 Paris Group, accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.parisgroup.ae/pg/index.html; (ʿAbd al-Qādir 
Sankari) muʾassasa rāʾida tasʿā li-bināʾ al-insān fī al-dākhil al-Sūrī,” [The leading (ʿAbd al-Qādir 
Sankari) institution to seek for building the humanity inside Syria] All4Syria, February 7, 2016, 
accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/291002. 
533 “al-sīra al-dhātiyya li-wazīr al-baniyya al-taḥtiyya wa al-zirāʿ mu. Walīd al-Zuʿbi,” [CV of the 
Minister of Infrastructure and Agriculture engineer Waliyd al-Zuʿbi] All4Syria, November 12, 2013, 
accessed March16, 2017, http://www.all4syria.info/Archive/110771. 
534 “majlis rijāl aʿmāl li-daʿm al-shaʿb al-Sūrī,” [Business Council supports Syrian people] Newscenter, 
March 9, 2013, accessed March 16, 2017, http://www newscenter news/ar/news/view/4552 html; 
Syrians at Home and Abroad Try to Ease Humanitarian Crisis, The Washington Post, December 18, 
2012, accessed March 16, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle east/syrians-at-home-and-abroad-try-to-ease-humanita




The philanthropic activities of the expatriate Syrian businessmen had at least two 
distinct features: the providers of the aid and the receivers of the aid. Firstly, the 
expatriate Syrian businessmen’s philanthropic aid was not restricted only to their 
fellow countrymen who were still living within war-torn Syria, but it was also 
distributed to Syrians who had fled Syria and were settled in the host countries. 
Second, the aid providers were not limited to the Syrian business diasporans who had 
left Syria decades ago. In addition to the long-term exiled Syrian businessmen who 
had already established non-profit organisations to help their fellow countrymen in 
the pre-2011 era (such as Ayman Asfari and Wafic Saïd) the post-2011 expatriate 
Syrian businessmen also participated in philanthropic activities. Ayman Asfari was 
originally from Idlib and became the CEO of Petrofac (a petrol company) in the UK. 
He established the Asfari foundation in the UK in 2006 which aims to provide aid to 
Syrians based on three dimensions: youth empowerment, civil society, and relief.535 
Wafic Saïd was from Damascus, but in the 1960s he went to the UK and Saudi Arabia 
and invested in the field of construction. He later became the middleman for the 
Al-Yamamah arms deal between the UK and Saudi Arabia. He also founded the 
Karim Rida Said Foundation (now the Said Foundation) in 1982, which aims to 
“ improve the life chances of children and young people by providing them with 
opportunities to receive good education and care,” focusing on young people in Syria, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and the UK.536 In this context, the networks of Syrian 
businessmen’s philanthropic works have also become a platform for the old and new 
expatriate Syrian businessmen to work together for providing aid to their fellow 
countrymen, whether in Syria or in the host countries. The motivations of expatriate 
                                                          
535 Petrofac, accessed March 16, 2017, http://www forbes.com/profile/ayman-asfari/; Asfari foundation, 
accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.asfarifoundation.org.uk/who-we-are/. 
536 Saïd Foundation, accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.saidfoundation.org/our-vision-and-values. 
255 
 
Syrian businessmen to engage in philanthropic works and the different patterns of 
philanthropic activities conducted by those expatriate Syrian businessmen will be 
examined. 
 
a. Motivations of charitable behaviours: a culture of giving and the diaspora 
philanthropic  
 
I am a Muslim, and I believe in Allah. It is my duty to help my brothers who are in 
desperate need of help. 
- An Aleppan textile tycoon and former president of Aleppan Chamber of 
Industry537 
 
The motivations for diasporans to contribute to philanthropic works in their homeland 
are, as Flanigan and Abel-Samad suggest, due to the homeland sentiments that the 
diasporans feel to be their responsibility.538 Moreover, diasporans who use to live in a 
culture where social needs were provided for by families, clans, or ethnic groups have 
transported this social norm into the diaspora and passed it on to the next 
generation.539  
 
                                                          
537 Syrian tycoon1 who used to be the leading figure in the one of the Syrian Chambers, personal 
interview, Gaziantep, December 12, 2014. 
538 Shawn Teresa Flanigan and Mounah Abdel-Samad, “Syrian Diaspora Members as Transnational 
Civil Society Actors: Perspectives from a Network for Refugee Assistance,” Contention: The 
Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Protest, 4, no. 1-2 (2016): 54; Pnina Werbner, “The Place which is 
Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion and Gender in the Making of Chaordic Transnationalis,” Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28 (2002); Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Diaspora Philanthropy in an 
At-Risk Society: The Case of Coptic Orphans in Egypt,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37, 
no. 3 (2008); Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, “Creating an Enabling Environment for Diasporas’ Participation 
in Homeland Development,” International Migration, 50, no. 1 (2009). 
539 Tchouasi, “Altruistic preferences as motivation,” 2. 
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On the one hand, the motivations of the Syrian business diasporans who left Syria 
decades ago and were not affected by the recent conflict in Syria but who were still 
motivated to help their homeland and fellow countrymen, can be explained by 
homeland sentiment and a cultural of social needs. On the other hand, for the Syrian 
businessmen who left Syria after the year of 2011 and suffered the same physical 
damages of properties and loss of family members as their countrymen, the reasons 
for them to contribute to philanthropic aids after their resettlement into the host 
countries deserved a deeper discussion: since their economic wealth have been 
majorly affected by the on going Syrian conflict since 2011, this made a major 
difference between those who left after the year of 2011 and those who have been 
exiled since decades in terms of their social economic situations. Thus the Syrian 
businessmen who left Syria after the year of 2011 and their connections to the 
long-term exiled Syrian businessmen will be examined. 
 
Prior to the 2011 revolution, the Syrian business community used to actively engage 
in different forms of charitable activities on different scales in Syria to help their 
fellow countrymen who were in need. This indicates that the Syrian businessmen used 
to have a social norm of philanthropic activity. The above quote by a businessman 
(who donated $5 million in Turkey to establish an orphanage for 300 Syrian orphans) 
explains one of the main reasons that most Syrian businessmen participate in 
philanthropic works. In Islam, the “institution of charity amongst Muslims is one of 
the five basic tenets which adherents have to conform to.”540 As Muslims, Syrian 
businessmen believed that by doing good to others could lead them to a better afterlife 
and gain Allah’s blessings. As such, the religious factor was one of the main reasons 
                                                          
540 Sultan Khan, “The Nature and Extent of Philanthropy amongst the Rainbow South African Muslim 
Community,” Man In India, 91, no. 1 (2011): 169. 
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which drove them to donate their time and money to needy people. After the Syrian 
businessmen experienced great losses due to the conflict in Syria and relocated to host 
countries, the culture of giving accompanied them and can be broadly perceived in 
their expatriate philanthropic activities. However, the amount of financial support of 
the Syrian businessmen who left after 2011 has shrunk. “Before the conflict, we used 
to give money to the poor people in Syria, even the ones who we personally do not 
know. But now, we’ve lost a lot of our money because of the conflict, so we can only 
help the people who we know,” stated the Aleppan plastic raw material businessman 
no37.541  
 
Nevertheless, the altruistic mind-set which originated from the Islamic faith does not 
alone explain this culture of giving. Pierret argues that in the pre-2011 era, Syrian 
businessmen used philanthropic events as means to achieve or raise their social 
popularity, or even to instrumentalise it for reaching political goals.542 Since those 
businessmen used to engage in charitable activities, they were also well known among 
non-businessmen Syrians. After experiencing damage from the conflict and relocating 
to host countries, the social reputations of giving turned into a certain extent of ‘social 
responsibility’. An Aleppan furniture industrialist no56 stated,  
 
Even I experienced the same disaster as other Syrians, my economic conditions are 
still far better than most of theirs after we all resettled in Turkey. But at the same 
time, it means that I have more social responsibility than the others since I’m richer. 
Or the others consider that I have more responsibility. After I settled and 
established my business in Turkey, sometimes I do not like to respond to other 
[Syrians’] phone calls even if I knew them before because too many people call me 
just to ask for financial support. I would love to do so, but it’s becoming too much. 
                                                          
541 Aleppan plastic raw material businessman no37, personal interview, Istanbul, December 8, 2014. 
542 Pierret, “Sunni Clergy Politics,” 77. 
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This not only happens to me but to many of my business friends. I just give the 
money to people I know, such as my relatives or really close friends. This is what I 
can do for now.543  
 
Even though the businessman quoted here responded negatively to his fellow 
countrymen’s calls for help, in the end he still provided financial aid to his relatives 
and close friends. This suggests that although Syrian businessmen may try to avoid 
the social responsibility that they felt, they still did give help to those who they had 
close relationships with.  
 
Thus, the reasons that Syrian businessmen who left after 2011 contributed to 
philanthropic works in the host countries were that their culture of giving 
accompanied them, and that they felt a ‘social responsibility’ to their fellow 
countrymen. This led them to continuously work on philanthropic activities as before, 
even if their economic situations were not as strong. Nevertheless, the ways in which 
they conducted those charitable activities might or might not be the same as before.  
 
b. Patterns of philanthropic works – individuals vs. groups  
 
In June 2014, we established the Baraka Charity Institution in Mersin. In the 
beginning, it was just me and a few close business friends. Now we have around 
forty people working together for this charity, not all of them were businessmen. 
- An Aleppan real estate investor no57544 
 
                                                          
543 Aleppan furniture industrialist no56, personal interview, Al-Obour, November 7, 2015. 
544 Aleppan real estate investor no57, personal interview, Mersin, February 3, 2015. 
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Although it was argued that Syrian refugees in Irbid, Jordan who used to seek 
financial help from other expatriate Syrians as their livelihood no longer did so due to 
the prolongation of conflict, expatriate Syrian businessmen continued to devote 
themselves to charities and donate money to their fellow countrymen.545 The charity 
provided by the expatriate Syrian businessmen to their fellow countrymen came in 
various forms. It was not only providing relief goods, such as money, food, or 
medicine, but it also came in the form of scholarships, building schools and 
orphanages, or setting up religious courses. Syrian businessmen might either donate 
cash directly to the charities so that they could buy required goods for the poor, or 
they might donate things such as clothes or foods. These donations would be further 
distributed by the charities to the people who were in need, whether to Syrians who 
had relocated in host countries, or to Syrians who were still living in Syria, 
particularly those in the rebel held areas. 546  Furterhmore, expatriate Syrian 
businessmen primarily conducted philanthropic activities in two patterns: as 
individuals, or as groups. Although they continued to engage in philanthropic 
                                                          
545 Matthew R. Stevens, “The Collapse of Social Networks among Syrian Refugees in Urban Jordan,” 
Contemporary Levant, 1, no. 1 (2016). 
546 Distributing heaters to Syrians who lived in Antakya from the Freedom Floka, “fulūka al-ḥurriyya ll 
ḍimn ḥamlat tawzīʿ al-madāfiʾ ʿalā ukhwata-nā al-Sūrīyīn fi madīnat Anṭākiyā al-Turkiyya,” [Floka 
Freedom ll part of the distribution campaign of heaters to the Syrian brothers in the Turkish city of 
Antakya] Youtube, December 20, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=71fp4egS8tI; Distributing four lambs to the Syrians in the eastern 
Ghouta at the countryside of Damascus from the Freedom Floka,  “jamʿiyya fulūka al-ḥurriyya - 
mashrūʿ aḍāḥī al-ʿīd - al-Ghūṭa al-Sharqiyya,” [Floka freedom association - Project of sacrificial 
festival – eastern al-Ghūṭa] Youtube, September 13, 2016, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5upOdwaFHTg; mashrūʿ fulūka al-ḥurriyya min al-dākhil al-Sūrī 
ilā dākhil Turkiyā,” [Floka Freedom Project from inside Syria into Turkey] Youtube, August 25, 2016, 
accessed March 17, 2017,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SZFDZoAUGPA; distributing cash for 202 families in the 
countryside of Darra – western Almaliha, from the Syrian Business Forum,“muʿawwināt māliyya 
muntadā rijāl al-aʿmāl - al-Malīḥa al-Gharbiyya,” [Financial aid Business Forum - Western al-Maliyḥa 
2013-5-23] Youtube, May 23, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZifJ6L2iyg; medicines and medical machines to the countrymside 
of Homs, from the Syrian Business Council, biṭāqat shukr min idārat al-mashfā al-maydānī li-majlis 
rijāl al-aʿmāl al-Sūrī wa-l-maktab al-ṭibbī al-Sūrī al-muwaḥḥid,” [Thanks from the field hospital of the 
Syrian Business Council and the United Syrian Medical Office] Youtube, May 23, 2013, accessed 
March 17, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UpKiDcLPjlk. 
260 
 
activities, as they had pre-2011, for various reasons after they relocating, their 
charitable networks transnationalised to include expatriate Syrian businessmen from 
different countries. 
 
Donating individually: a lack of capital and a lack of trust 
 
Syrian businessmen who donate individually provided aid to their fellow countrymen 
in the host countries or in Syria without interacting with other Syrian businessmen. 
Usually, the amount of aid from this category was less than the amount from the latter, 
and most were the ones who left Syria after 2011. This was because the conflict in 
Syria lost them their capital and caused them to be suspicious of other Syrian 
businessmen’s intentions. On the one hand, since the conflict damaged the 
businessmen’s wealth, they sometimes attempted to avoid giving aid. This decrease in 
economic capital of Syrian businessmen also lowers their abilities to engage in 
charities as much as they had before the eruption of the 2011 revolution. On the other 
hand, the conflict divided the Syrians into different groups, whose stand with or 
against the Bashar regime, and those who stayed silent. When the businessmen 
provided aid, they would be suspicious of where the aid went. An Aleppan plastic raw 
material businessman no37 explained his personal donation experience, 
 
I used to donate a lot before the conflict. I built schools; I gave goods to the poor. 
Even when the conflict started and people came to me to ask for help, I did what I 
could, as before. But there was one time I gave a man a great amount of money, and 
later I found out that he used the money I gave him to buy weapons. This was not 
my intention; I totally disagree with armed activities. Since then, I do not give 
money to groups or work with other people for charities; I prefer to do it by myself 
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and give the money to people I know. Because I do not know whether the money I 
donate will cause more bloodshed or not.547  
 
This was not only clear for businessmen who were pro- and anti-regime, but also for 
the self-proclaimed neutral businessmen. They were also cautious to not give aid to 
any people who might be related to politics since their donations might get them into 
political trouble with the regime, as in the cases of businessmen whose properties 
were confiscated and who were considered to fund terrorist groups.  
 
Cooperating with others: religion and regionalism 
 
Although many Syrian businessmen preferred to conduct philanthropic works 
individually, others decided to work with their fellow business countrymen. Those 
who provided aid as a group either established charitable organisations or they 
conducted the philanthropic works without an official organisation. The amount of aid 
the Syrian businessmen provided as groups would usually be much higher than that of 
individuals.  
 
As suggested by the NGOSyria website, there were 780 charitable organisations 
aimed at helping Syrians.548 Nevertheless, not all these organisations were related to 
or funded by Syrian businessmen. Those who participated or contributed to 
philanthropic works preferred to keep a low-profile and were not willing to comment 
                                                          
547 Aleppan plastic raw material businessman no37, personal interview, Istanbul, December 8, 2014. 
548  The website is an electronic statistical database service for providing information of the 




on their altruistic actions since, from a religious perspective, they believed that when 
a person does good, he should not brag or advertising the good deeds.549  
 
Religion played an important role in the businessmen’s charities. Two Turkey-based 
Syrian charities, which had been established and funded by two businessmen 
interviewed during fieldwork, exemplified this religious connection: the Baraka 
Charity Institution (muʾassasat al-baraka al-khayriyya) and the Freedom Floka (fulūka 
al-ḥurriyya), both in Mersin, Turkey.550 These organisations were funded by 10 and 
15 expatriate Syrian businessmen respectively.  
 
Firstly, the two charities both had businessmen who were members of the charities but 
at the same time were sheikhs or could be considered as person with rich Islamic 
knowledge in the Syrian community. For example, one of the members from the 
Baraka Charity Institution was the son of the prominent Aleppan sheikh in the 1970s, 
and one of the members of Freedom Floka was often consulted by other members of 
the charity about religious issues.551 The founding member of the Freedom Floka 
even had ‘zebibah’ ink on his forehead, which is far less common in Syria even 
among pious people than in Egypt, and demonstrates his piety in the practices of 
religion. “The zebibah, Arabic for raisin, is a dark circle of callused skin, or in some 
cases a protruding bump, between the hairline and the eyebrows. It emerges on the 
                                                          
549 During my interviews, even I heard some informants were donating money or helping other needy 
Syrians, while I asked them about these activities, most of them refused to expose the amount of money 
they donated.  
550 Baraka Charity Institution, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www facebook.com/pg/barakacharity/about/?ref=page internal; the word ‘Floka’ is a one of the 
terms of heritages of the Lattkians, see Freedom Floka, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www facebook.com/pg/FreedomFloka/about/?ref=page internal. 
551 Personal observation. 
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spot where worshipers press their foreheads into the ground during their daily 
prayers.”552  
 
Secondly, both charities have spaces especially allocated for Islamic prayer. In 
addition to the material goods they distributed to the poor, they both provided 
religious courses such as memorising of the Quran, citing the Quran, and learning the 
al-Hadith and the Prophet’s biography.553 The religious perspective of the Syrian 
businessmen’s charities is consistent with religious motivation whereby religion not 
only motivated expatriate Syrian businessmen, but it also affected the establishment 
and operation of charities.  
 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, regionalism affected the ways in which Syrian 
businessmen used to interact with each other prior to 2011. Regionalism could also be 
perceived through businessmen’s charitable activities after their expatriations. When 
Syrian businessmen decided to embark on philanthropic activities in a group, not only 
did businessmen from the same cities in Syria work together in groups, but in some 
cases they might also avoid or not seek help from businessmen who come from a 
different city in Syria. All the founding members of the two charities mentioned 
above were Aleppan businessmen. One charity which was founded by a long-term 
exiled Damascene businessman in Jordan would not welcome, or would even refuse, 
                                                          
552 Michael Slackman, Fashion and Faith Meet, on Foreheads of the Pious, The New York Times, 
December 18, 2007, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/africa/18egypt html. 
553 This indicates that the Freedom Floka provided children courses including the remembrance and 
citation of the Quran, the explanation of the Prophet autobiography, “jamʿiya fuluka al-ḥuriya (minhaj 
al-ṭifl al-suri al-ḥur),” [Floka Freedom Association (free Syrian children approach)], Youtube, June 29, 
2015, accessed March 17, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0o1hMbGqNVY; From the 
Facebook page of the Baraka Charity Institution has many posts reagrding the religious courses or 




newly arrived non-Damascene Syrian businessmen.554 The orphanage which was 
funded by the former president of the Aleppan Chamber of Industry had another four 
Syrian businessmen helping with the project, and they were all from Aleppo.555 All of 
the executive board members of The Homs League Abroad, were originally from 
Homs.556 These cases indicate that once Syrian businessmen decided to cooperate in 
philanthropic activities, regionalism would play an important role. The persistence of 
regionalism illustrates the argument that the specific ways of thinking and acting 
migrated with the businessmen and continued to affect them. Despite being away 
from their home countries, previous features of networking continued to affect the 
ways in which they interacted with each other.          
 
As such, the formation and operation of these two charities demonstrate that religion 
was a main factor which contributed to the businessmen’s cooperation of 
philanthropic work, and that regionalism was a factor that shaped the way expatriate 
Syrian businessmen’s philanthropic activities were run.  
 
In addition to the motivations and patterns of the expatriate Syrian businessmen’s 
charitable activities, the philanthropic networks of expatriate Syrian businessmen 
have risen from a local level to a regional or even transnational level. As the quote 
above shows, the Saudi-based Homsi industrialist has cooperated with Turkey-based 
Homsi Syrian businessmen for charitable activities. This was also observed during 
fieldwork with businessmen from Daraa, Lattakia, Damascus, and Aleppo. It 
demonstrates that Syrian businessmen who were from the same Syrian city prior to 
                                                          
554 Aleppan food industrialist no31, personal interview, Amman, August 2, 2015. 
555 Personal observation, December 12, 2014. 
556 Homs League Abroad, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.homsleague.org/. 
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leaving Syria at different timings and being based in different countries after 
relocation, worked together for philanthropic activities after the 2011 revolution. 
Other cases include the former president of the Aleppan Chamber of Industry, who 
cooperated with the Turkey-based Aleppan businessmen on the orphanage. Although 
the charitable networks of expatriate Syrian businessmen have become 
transnationalised, regionalism under the context of homeland conflict has crossed 
national boundaries, whereby expatriate Syrian businessmen in different host 
countries who are from the same Syrian cities work together for the sake of 
philanthropic activities. 
 
6.2 The origins and features of political categorisation of expatriate Syrian 
businessmen 
 
Homeland politics may divide citizens who have left the homeland into different 
political groups.557 After the eruption of the 2011 revolution, the Syrian business 
community has also divided politically. Most Syrian businessmen intentionally tried 
to stay away from politically related affairs in the pre-revolution era and used to spend 
most of their efforts on business investments. Nevertheless, since the eruption of the 
revolution, some businessmen have actively taken part in anti-regime activities in 
Syria, as previously demonstrated. Following their resettlements to the host countries, 
those Syrian businessmen continued to actively take part in anti-regime political 
activities. Although most preferred to stay away from any political issues as before, 
and they were not willing to talk about current events in their country and were aware 
                                                          
557 Camilla Orjuela, “Divides and Dialogue in the Diaspora during Sri Lanka’s Civil War,” South Asian 
Diaspora, 9, no. 1 (2017). 
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of who was around them at all times. Most businessmen would not use the word 
‘revolution’ to describe the 2011 uprising in Syria, but rather, they would use more 
neutral words such as ‘incident’ (ḥāditha) or ‘disaster’ (maʾsā). This disassociation 
with politics did not mean that the expatriate Syrian businessmen agreed with the 
regime; it came out of fear of further political suppression. Nevertheless, the 
emergence of 18 anti-regime Syrian businessmen who actively took part in anti-Assad 
political organisations indicates a political breakthrough for the long-term, 
low-politicised Syrian business community. I will explain and give the backgrounds 
of these 18 politicised Syrian businessmen in the next section. 
 
The specific conditions which contributed to the political mobilisation of expatriate 
Syrian businessmen will be analysed by examining the origins and features of their 
different political beliefs after resettlement in the host countries. The political division 
was developed under a combination of opportunities, threats, attitudes of host 
countries, the influences from the home government, and the features of these 
different expatriate communities. 
 
Expatriate Syrian businessmen can be categorised into three groups based on their 
different political beliefs towards the 2011 Syrian uprising as shown in the previous 
chapter: the pro-regime businessmen, the anti-regime businessmen, and the 
self-proclaimed neutral businessmen. Although there were some expatriate Syrian 
businessmen in Turkey who had completely given up their former business activities 
and worked exclusively on political activities, and although more than half of the 
interviewees demonstrated their anti-regime political beliefs, most stayed politically 
low-profiled, while others maintained their loyalty to the Bashar regime. Since the 
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fear of political suppressions from the regime continued to deter most Syrian 
businessmen, especially the self-proclaimed neutral businessmen, from taking part in 
political activities, only political mobilisations of the pro- and anti-regime expatriate 
Syrian businessmen will be analysed. 
 
Lennders and Heydemann argue that opportunities and threats were significant, but 
not sufficient, factors for explaining popular mobilisation in Syria in the first few 
months of 2011. The opportunity and threat needed to first “be contextualized within 
the specific social and political environment…, in order to appreciate their local 
significance.”558 Host countries and home countries also affect the mobilisation of 
migrants in host countries, as Østergaard-Nielsen contends in the case of Kurds and 
Turks in Germany, stating that “an integral part of their [migrants’] agency is the 
perception and reaction of political actors, in both the countries of settlement and 
origin, to their activities.”559 Furthermore, the mobilisation of migrant groups in host 
lands are also influenced by the characteristics of the migrant groups themselves.560 
As such, to analyse the political mobilisation of the expatriate Syrian businessmen, 
not only do their opportunity structures and threats need to be differentiated and 
contextualised, but the impact from the host countries, the influences on their 
mobilisations from the home country, and their own characteristics also need to be 
took into considerations.  
 
a. Pro-regime businessmen  
                                                          
558 Leenders and Heydemann, “Popular Mobilization in Syria,” 139. 
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We can see that the problem in Syria is all from abroad. There was no revolution. 
Rather it was the Western powers instigating the people [Syrians] to conduct these 
activities. The world mainstream news is incorrect; it is our regime fighting against 
the terrorist. 
- A Damascene household goods industrialist no29561 
 
The pro-regime Syrian businessmen were opposed to the 2011 revolution and 
supported the Bashar regime. They believed that the Bashar regime was innocent and 
that it was being falsely incriminated by foreign powers, namely the United States, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. The above quote from a Damascene household 
items industrialist is an example of what this political group would state during 
interviews regarding the current situation inside Syria. They generally did not 
consider the event inside Syria to be a revolution, but rather they saw it as a rebel 
movement which was instigated by political powers out from Syria.  
 
The reason they leaned toward the Bashar regime’s side was because of their former 
politico economic roots: they were the crony businessmen whose wealth mainly came 
from their nepotistic network with the Syrian regime figures. Furthermore, some 
continued to do business with Syria or have their familial business partners and 
relatives run or take care of their business in Syria. This was especially true where 
business investments were restricted, such as in the regime held areas. The regime 
further attempted to boost or encourage the Syrian businessmen by announcing 
                                                          
561 Damascene household goods industrialist no29, personal interview, Amman, July 23, 2015. 
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millions of US dollars new investment projects in Lattakia or Tartus in 2015.562 
“Even though I left Syria at the end of 2012, my brother stayed in Syria to operate our 
family textile factory in Homs. Then he later moved the factory from Homs to 
Lattakia,” stated the Egypt-based Aleppan textile industrialist no22 who was on the 
100 prominent businessmen list in 2009.563  
 
Those businessmen’s fortunes were protected and built on personal relationships with 
the Bashar regime and the reason why they left the country was not due to the 
regime’s suppressions. Since the threats to the pro-regime businessmen were not from 
the Bashar regime itself and the opportunity they encountered was a possibility to lose 
their long-term patronage network if the revolutionists succeeded, there would be no 
reason to give up their loyalties to the regime, but rather their loyalties would remain 
with their former patrons. In addition, their properties and relatives who were still 
working and living in Syria required the regime’s protection and support.  
 
Nevertheless, the number of businessmen from this group was small compared with 
the other two political groups of businessmen outside of Syria because there was no 
significant departure of ruling family businessmen. Additionally, the number of crony 
businessmen in the pre-revolution era was not large in the country prior to the year of 
2011. 
 
The attitudes of the host governments towards the Syrian uprising also affected the 
appearances of the Syrian businessmen’s political beliefs. Due to the general 
                                                          
562 wizāra al-siyāḥa taṭraḥ mashārīʿ li-l-istithmār fī al-sāḥil wa Dimashq,” [Ministry of Tourism 
launches projects for investment in the coast and Damascus] aliqtisadi, August 16, 2015, accessed 
March 17, 2017, https://sy.aliqtisadi.com/668230-مشاريع-جديدة-لالستثمار-السياحي/. 
563 Aleppan textile industrialist no22, personal interview, Cairo, November 17, 2015. 
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anti-Assad political atmosphere in Turkey, Turkey was a less attractive destination to 
settle in for pro-Bashar businessmen. The Damascene clothes industrialist no21 
commented, “Even though they are with Bashar, they are too afraid to show their real 
opinions. Why? Because the environment here is all against Bashar!”564 Only 3 out of 
the 129 Syrian businessmen interviewed in Turkey expressed pro-regime opinions. 
Even so, these three businessmen did not directly praise the regime but rather they 
chose to ignore and not comment on the suppressions imposed by the regime, or they 
would blame all the casualties in Syria on the rebels. “Yes, the regime is bad, so curse 
them one time. But the rebels are worse, so curse them twice!” said the Aleppan shoes 
industrialist no58.565 In Jordan, only 1 out of the 19 Syrian businessmen interviewed 
could be categorised as pro-regime. In Egypt, since the Egyptian government was a 
strong supporter of the Bashar regime after the 2013 coup, the number of pro-Bashar 
regime business figures was higher than in Turkey and Jordan; 9 out of the 38 
businessmen interviewed were pro-regime.  
 
One interesting point here is that even if those businessmen claimed that they were 
supporters of the Bashar regime, there were no pro-regime political activities run by 
Syrian businessmen who left Syria after 2011. This might be explained by the 
sanctions that were imposed by the Western countries on the Bashar regime, which 
also decreased the political mobilisations of the pro-regime businessmen in 
undertaking further political activities in support of the Bashar regime while in exile.  
 
The only expatriate Syrian businessman who was involved in political related 
activities was the president of the Egyptian Syrian Business Council, Khaldūn 
                                                          
564 Damascene clothes industrialist no21, personal interview, Istanbul, March 13, 2015. 
565 Aleppan shoes industrialist no58, personal interview, Gaziantep, December 28, 2014. 
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al-Muwaqqʿ. He has resided in Egypt for twenties years and did not publicly speak of 
the Syrian political events prior to the 2013 coup. In 2014, he did, however, organise 
a business envoy of Egypt-based Syrian businessmen to visit Syria and discuss 
economic investment plans with the Syrian Commerce Minister.566 This indicates a 
political significance and pragmatic approach of pro-regime businessmen who 
participated in business delegations with Assad Syria because they could finally show 
their support of the Assad regime after the political environment in the host country 
had firmly declared a political stance with the regime. 
 
b. Anti-regime businessmen 
 
Even before the 2011 revolution, Syrians wanted to have the revolution, but were 
waiting for the right time because the people could not bear this unjust [al-Assad] 
regime. 
- An Aleppan food industrialist no42567 
 
The anti-regime businessmen were those who publicly accused the Bashar regime of 
its injustice ruling and demanded a political change in Syria. This group did not 
hesitate to openly show their political beliefs or to criticise the regime’s behaviour. 
For example, there was a three-starred flag which represented the Syrian revolution, 
and some of the anti-regime businessmen kept it displayed on their desks inside their 
offices.568  
 
                                                          
566 “wazīr al-tijāra yaltaqī wafd.” 




Businessmen left the country due to the escalation of the conflict and worsening 
situations of security, economics, and politics. Among those who fled were some 
businessmen who had actively been participating in revolutionary events, as 
previously demonstrated. This presented the opportunity of overthrowing the 
long-term patronage and authority of the Assad regime. Nevertheless, this 
‘opportunity’ alone was not enough to encourage businessmen to partake in 
anti-regime political activities at the cost of losing their life or personal properties. 
The uncertainty of the aftermath for participating in political events shattered the 
businessmen’s faith. Along with this ‘opportunity,’ in the context of state-business 
relationships in pre-revolution Syria and the emigration background, different 
incidents of ‘threats’ by the Assad regime to some of its members from the Syrian 
business community or their relatives, whether economic or political, used to occur 
frequently, but after the revolution have been occurring with a greater frequency.  
 
Since the Syrian people began the revolution, the suppressions from the regime’s 
military forces have never stopped. The series of threats to the members of the 
business community and to their relatives, as well as witnessing brutal killings by the 
regime have fuelled some businessmen into undertaking political activities for 
achieving what they considered to be justice for their country. After the businessmen 
emigrated, the opportunity and threat accompanied them. Nevertheless, once the 
Syrian businessmen moved, the social political environment in which they resettled 
directly determined whether they could continue their political activities or not.  
 
As previously shown, the governments of Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan held different 
political attitudes towards the Syrian conflict. Turkey continued to demonstrate its 
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support for the end on the Assad regime from the end of 2011 until the end of 2016; 
Egypt switched its political support of opposing the Assad regime after the coup by 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in mid 2013; and Jordan persisted in being cautious or ‘vague’ 
about the Syrian uprising.  
 
The different political attitudes of the host governments not only affected the 
emigration of the Syrian businessmen, but also further determined to what extent the 
political mobilisation of the expatriate Syrian businessmen could put into practice. 
The diversified social political environments in the host countries led to different 
outcomes of political mobilisation. On the one hand, if the host governments’ political 
position towards the Assad regime was negative, there would be a greater chance that 
the businessmen who were planning anti-regime political activities would be 
mobilised. For instance, in Turkey, the anti-Assad environment allowed Syrian 
businessmen to organise anti-Assad oriented political activities in the country. Most 
anti-Assad political activities by the Syrian businessmen were mobilised and took into 
practices inside Turkey. Turkey-based Syrian businessmen participated in various 
anti-Assad regime business organisations, or broad political coalitions, or political 
party and organisation. The same situation occurred in Egypt during Mohammed 
Morsi’s presidency between mid 2012 and mid 2013 since he was opposed to the 
regime. For example, Egypt-based Syrian businessman participated in the operation of 
the Coordinating Committee of the Syrian Revolution in Egypt between 2011 and 
2013.569  
 
                                                          
569 “Nizār Kharāṭ li-niyūz santar: al-inqilābīyīn fī Miṣr ḥārabū al-thawra al-Sūriyya Wa-qaṭaʿū ʿan-ha 
al-daʿm,” [Nizār Kharāṭ to News Center: the coup in Egypt fought the Syrian revolution and cut off its 
support] Newscenter, December 14, 2015, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www newscenter news/ar/news/view/15048 html. 
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On the other hand, when the local social political environment was either pro-regime 
or vague, no anti-Assad political activities could be developed. As for the period of 
Sisi’s rule in Egypt, since his political support favoured the Bashar regime, it was not 
possible for the anti-Assad Syrian businessmen to partake in anti-regime political 
activities. As a result, few anti-Syrian regime activities developed in Egypt after Sisi’s 
reign. In Jordan, when the local authority did not have a clear political response to the 
Syrian conflict, no distinct political activities from the Jordan-based Syrian 
businessmen were reported.   
 
Thus, the conditions for Syrian businessmen to mobilise in political activities not only 
required having the opportunity or threat, but the importance of the host countries’ 
political stances was another crucial factor for the emergence of political mobilisation. 
Nevertheless, the homeland and the characteristics of the migrant groups also need to 
be taken into account to analyse the mobilisation of migrants. 
 
6.3 From business to politics – reasons and patterns of political participations of 
expatriate Syrian businessmen 
 
Out of the three groups of expatriate Syrian businessmen based on political ideas, the 
pro-regime and self-proclaimed neutral businessmen rarely took part in any form of 
political activity during their exile. Even though more than half of the interviewed 
expatriate Syrian businessmen were anti-regime (110 out of 191) the actual number 




There were at least 18 expatriate Syrian businessmen who had personally taken part in 
political activities and whose political participations could be seen in the broad 
anti-Assad political coalitions: the Syrian National Council, the Syrian National 
Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, and the Syrian Interim 
Government; the two business organisations which were established by expatriate 
Syrian businessmen: the Syrian Business Forum, and the Syrian Economic Forum; the 
Muslim Brotherhood political party: the Justice and Constitution National Party 
(Al-Waad); and the other two non-governmental organisations: the Tayyār al-Waʿd 
al-Sūrī, and the Coordination of the Syrian Revolution in Egypt.  
 
And their political participations have been involved in forms of leading 
opposition-oriented political parties or organisations, having active positions in 
opposition-oriented political parties or organisations, or financially sponsoring these 
political organisations.570 In addition to these 18 politicised Syrian businessmen, the 
political participation of Gazwan Masri, who was originally from Aleppo but moved 
to Turkey in the 1980s has became a successful businessman with strong personal 
links to the Turkish authority and the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association (MÜSİAD) will be discussed at the end of the subsection a in this 
section.571  
 
The results for expatriate Syrian businessmen to participate in anti-Assad regime 
political activities were not only that their personal or relatives’ safeties could be 
faced with the threats from the Syrian regime’s political suppressions, as I have 
                                                          
570 I have interviewed with 13 out of the 18 Syrian businessmen who partook in political activities. 
571 Musiad, accessed March 17 2017, http://www.musiad.org.tr/en. 
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shown in the previous chapter about the case of the intelligence visit of the parents of 
an expatriate Aleppan businessman who criticised the regime’s on his Facebook 
page;572 but also, the Syrian businessmen who joined or publicly showed sympathy 
towards the rebels, their economic investments or properties inside Syria would be 
confiscated by the regime forces in the name of sponsoring the ‘terrorist groups,’ as 
mentioned previously.573  
 
Since it was difficult and risky for businessmen to partake in anti-regime political 
activities, only the Syrian businessmen with a strong, long-standing resentment of the 
Assad regime who were less concerned with their safety or property could take part. 
The 18 politicised Syrian businessmen have at least two social contexts in common: 
they all experienced different degrees of persecutions from the Assad regime, and 
they did not have significant economic property or close relatives in Syria because 
they had left Syria decades before or they did not have close family members in Syria 
after the eruption of 2011. 
 
a. The political organisations and politicised Syrian businessmen 
 
Syrian National Council (SNC) 
 
                                                          
572 See page 235.  
573 See page 249. 
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The SNC was the first representative organisation for the Syrian oppositions in exile, 
formed on 2 October 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey.574 Its aims were to overthrow the 
Bashar regime, to affirm the national unity of Syria, to safeguard the non-violent 
Syrian revolution, and to protect the national independence and sovereignty against a 
foreign military intervention in Syria.575 3 out of the 18 Syrian businessmen were 
founding members of SNC: Maḥmūd ʿUthmān, Yāsīn al-Najjār, and Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh. 
Another two Syrian businessmen Ezzat Baghdadi and a Lattakia foods and clothes 
businessman also eventually became members of the Council.  
 
Maḥmūd ʿUthmān was from Aleppo, but left Syria in 1983, completed his studies in 
Turkey and later became a businessman in international general trading.576  
 
Yāsīn al-Najjār was from Aleppo, worked as an engineer and has business in the 
textile industry. He was the son of Ghassān al-Najjār. Ghassān was a member of the 
General Secretariat of the Damascus Declaration and was arrested by the Bashar 
regime in 2007.577 The Damascus Declaration “Is a secular umbrella opposition 
coalition named after a statement drafted in 2005 by numerous opposition groups and 
individuals demanding a multiparty democracy in Syria. It calls for a gradual and 
                                                          
574 Yezid Sayigh, The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem, Carnegie Middle East Center, April 3, 
2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/04/03/syrian-opposition-s-leadership-problem-pub-51373; “muʿāraḍa 
Sūriyya tushakkil majlisan waṭaniyyan,” [Syrian opposition form a national council] Al-Jazeera, 




575 Syrian National Council, accessed March 17, 2017, http://syriancouncil.org/en/about html. 
576 Aleppan general trade businessman no59, personal interview, Istanbul, March 10, 2015. 
577 “ḥukūma al-muʿāriḍa al-Sūriyya .. masʾūlīyāt taqārub al-mustaḥīlāt  fī ẓill fawḍā al-silāḥ wa 
al-māl,” [Syrian opposition government .. responsibilities convergence impossible in light of the chaos 
of arms and money] Alarab, November 19, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://alarab.co.uk/?id=8697; “malaff muʿtaqalī iʿlān Dimashq li-l-taghyīr al-waṭanī al-dimuqrāṭī,” [File 
of the detainees of the Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change] The Syrian Human 
Rights Committee, January 27, 2009, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.shrc.org/?p=9364.  
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peaceful transition to democracy and the equality of all citizens in a secular and 
sovereign Syria.”578 Yāsīn stated that due to his family’s active political record, the 
government investigated them before the eruption of the revolution and put his name 
on a wanted list. As such, he left Syria for Qatar on 4 February 2011 as he had family 
members there579.  
 
Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh was from Lattakia and left Syria for the Gulf due to security 
detention and prosecution by the Hafiz al-Assad regime. He then became a 
businessman and invested in industry and trade between Europe and the Gulf.580 He 
also took important leading roles in the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces as secretary-general and the Syrian Business Forum as president. 
He was thought to use his post for serving the interests of the Qatari authorities.581 
 
Ezzat Baghdadi was from Damascus and used to work in the wholesale of office 
equipment, furniture and university housing equipment.582 When the war started, the 
regime sent him to mediate with the rebels in Daraa. He and his friends recommended 
the government apply multi-party system, but the regime believed him to be allied 
with the rebels. He was prisoned twice after this incident.583  
                                                          
578 The Damascus Declaration, Carnegie Middle East Center, March 1, 2012, accessed March 17, 
2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=48514. 
579 Aleppan textile industrialist no59, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 7, 2015. 
580 Syrian Businessman Mustafa Sabbagh, Arabisk, January 13, 2016, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.arabisklondon.com/syrian-businessman-mustafa-sabbagh/. 
581 Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution, 
Financial Times, May 17, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www ft.com/content/f2d9bbc8-bdbc-11e2-890a-00144feab7de; Phillips, The Battle for Syria: 
International Rivalry in the New Middle East, 116; Raphaël Lefèvre, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian 
Brotherhood, Middle East Institute, September 27, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www mei.edu/content/saudi-arabia-and-syrian-brotherhood. 
582 Ezzat Baghdadi, Nahda Group, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www ngspm.com/1/2637/body/content/0/Ezzat-Baghdadi/#.WLqVEzuGM2w. 




Finally, the Lattakia foods and clothes businessman stated that he participated in the 
revolution in Lattakia at the beginning, but afterwards he was imprisoned for two days 
in mid 2012. He left Syria for Saudi Arabia and later resettled in Turkey.584   
 
Syrian National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (SOC) 
 
In November 2012, the Syrian oppositions agreed to form a more inclusive 
organisation to include various minority groups and other groups operating inside 
Syria under pressure from the U.S. and other countries.585 The blueprint of the 
framework of the SOC was outlined by Riyāḍ Sayf, who was a veteran dissident and a 
businessman. The SOC was later widely recognised by most countries.586  
 
3 of the 18 politicised businessmen have taken part in the SOC: Riyāḍ Sayf was 
elected vice-president; Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh was elected secretary-general but withdrew 
in January 2014 due to the differing political opinions; and Yāsir Dhākirī was the 
representative of the SOC in Gaziantep.587  
 
                                                          
584 Lattakia food trading and clothes industrialist no2, personal interview, Mersin, February 11, 2015. 
585 A Backgrounder on the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, 
Carnegie Middle East Center, January 13, 2013, accessed April 14, 2017, 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50628?lang=en. 
586  Guide to the Syrian opposition, BBC, October 17, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15798218. 
587 National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Carnegie Middle East Center, 
January 11, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50628?lang=en; “liqāʾ maʿ 
raʿīs mumaththiliyyat al-iʾtilāf fī Antāb,” [A meeting with the head of the Representative of the 
Coalition in Gaziantep] Hama Council, May 7, 2014, accessed March 17 2017, 
http://hamacouncil.org/?p=737; Mustafa al-Sabbagh, Former SNC leader Explains Decision to 





Riyāḍ Sayf was from Damascus. He was a prominent businessman and worked in the 
garment industry, but was also a parliamentarian who actively campaigned against the 
Assad regime for two decades. He was also a major figure in the Damascus 
Declaration. As previously mentioned, he spent most of the 2000s in jail due to his 
outspoken political activities in Syria.588  
 
Yāsir Dhākirī belonged to an old family in Aleppo that used to work in the fields of 
flour and cement. His family was also well known in the Aleppan business 
community in the field of flour industry.589 He left Syria in mid 2012 because he 
became wanted by the Bashar regime due his participation in the revolution for 
distributing foods to the needy.590       
 
Syrian Interim Government (SIG) 
 
During the Syrian oppositions meeting which formed the SOC in Doha, Qatar in 
November 2012, the Syrian oppositions also agreed to establish the SIG once the SOC 
was recognised internationally.591 On 18 March 2013, the SOC elected the first prime 
minister of the SIG.592 Their aim was to “ensure the continuation of public services, 
  
                                                          
588  Riad Seif, Carnegie Middle East Center, November 14, 2012, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50018?lang=en. 
589 Interviews and stated by other Aleppan businessmen. 
590 Aleppan food industrialist no42, personal interview, Adana, April 15, 2015. 
591 “ittifāq al-Dūḥa ḥawl natāʾij ijtimāʿ al-muʿāraḍa al-Sūriyya,” [Doha agreement on the outcome of 
the Syrian opposition meeting] National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, 
December 12, 2012, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.etilaf.org/%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE
%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1/news/agreement.html. 
592 Anne Barnard, Syrian Rebels Pick U.S. Citizen to Lead Interim Government, The New York Times, 
March 18, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/middleeast/syria-warplanes-hit-lebanon-for-first-time html. 
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legal duties, and basic services in liberated territories” as suggested by the SOS.593 
 
Walīd al-Zuʿbi and Yāsīn al-Najjār were working as ministers in the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Agriculture and Water Resources and the Ministry of 
Communications and Transport and Industry of SIG respectively. Another Aleppan 
machine and textile businessman was a consultant in the Ministry of Communications 
and Transport and Industry.  
 
Walīd al-Zuʿbi was originally from Daraa but moved to the UAE and established the 
Tiger Group in the mid 1980s for real estate and construction. He conducted various 
philanthropic works among his careers.594 He was a member of the SNC and also 
participated in the election of the prime minister of the SOG in March 2013.595  
 
The Aleppan machines and textile businessman left Syria for Egypt at the beginning 
of 2012 due to the escalation of conflict, and moved to Turkey in October 2013. At 
the beginning of 2015, he took the post of consultant in the SIG.596   
 
Justice and constitution national party (Waad) 
 
The Waad party was established on 30 June 2013. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
“hoped [that the Waad] would be part of a democratic transition in Syria.”597 The 
                                                          
593  National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://en.etilaf.org/about-us.html. 
594 “majmūʿat tāyjar,” [Tiger Group] Tiger Group, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://tigergroup.net/ar/pages/About.aspx. 
595 Barbara Surk, 12 Candidates for Syrian Rebel Interim Premier, The Sandiego Union Tribune, 
March 17, 2013, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-12-candidates-for-syrian-rebel-interim-premier-2013mar17
-story html. 
596 Aleppan machines and textile businessman no60, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 27, 2015. 
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party defines itself as “an independent national party with an Islamic and centrist 
framework [marjaiyyah], and work to consolidate the principles of freedom and 
justice, by democratic means.”598  
 
Saʿad Wifāʾī who was from Aleppo and used to have a medicine factory in Idlib 
worked as the Secretary-General of Waad.599 In 2006 he and his friends visited the 
Syrian government trying to persuade them to reform the country, but they failed and 
he was banned from traveling out of Syria. When the revolution erupted in 2011, the 
government arrested him directly due to his previous political activities. He left Syria 
for Turkey in September 2012.600  
 
Another Aleppan medicine industrialist who used to work in the medicine industry 
also joined Waad. In 1982, two of his uncles were imprisoned by the Assad regime 
due to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria. He participated in the protest in 
Aleppo in 2012, and the regime then threatened him. Afterwards, he fled to Belarus 
but later returned to the city of al-Bāb and took the post of managing foreign relations 
in the Civil revolutionary council in the city of Bāb and its countryside. With the 
expansion of ISIS in his city, he left Syria and relocated to Gaziantep, Turkey in 
February 2014.601 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
597 Aleppan medicine industrialist no54, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 20, 2015. Who he is 
also a founding member of Waad, January 20, 2015; Raphaël Lefèvre, New Leaders for the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood, Carnegie Middle East Center, December 11, 2014, accessed March 17, 
2017,http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/12/11/new-leaders-for-syrian-muslim-brotherhood-pub-57453. 
598 Waad Party. 
599 “Saʿad Wifāʾī,” [Saʿad Wifāʾī] Geroun, December 7, 2016, accessed March 17, 
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Syrian Business Forum (SBF) 
 
The SBF was established by Syrian businessmen and women on 6 June 2012 as an 
independent and non-profit organisation, consisting of over 300 Syrian businessmen 
and women inside and outside of Syria, though mostly exiled Syrian businessmen 
based in the Arab Gulf.602 Its aims are “finding an umbrella which includes the 
largest number of Syrian businessmen and businesswomen inside and outside Syria, 
who are seeking to develop the Syrian economy to reach modern Syrian, country of 
flourishment and prosperous.”603 On 6 June 2012, the SBF announced the financial 
support for the Syrian revolution worth $300 million in Doha, Qatar.604 The president 
of SBF Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh stated that “we supported the Free [Syrian] Army to protect 
civilians.” 605  Moreover, the SBF was thought to be sponsored by the Qatari 
government to support the Syrian rebels.606  
 
In addition to Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh, another Aleppan businessman who worked in the 
glasses industry also took an administrative position in the SBF in the humanitarian 
and civil training sections. He personally participated in the protest in Aleppo during 
the revolution, was imprisoned four times and had his name on the wanted list of the 
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605 Fund Launched to Back Syrian Rebels, Al-Jazeera, June 7, 2012, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201266133319930526.html. 




Syrian regime. He left Syria to Turkey in the summer of 2013 after his release from 
the prison. Finally, a Kurdish Aleppan pipeline businessman joined the SBF as a 
consultant. He left Syria for Turkey at the end of 2011 due to the fragile economic 
condition in the country. 
 
Syrian Economic Forum (SEF) 
 
The SEF was established by a group of Syrian businessmen with the Centre for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in March 2012. 607  The SEF works on 
“promoting and strengthening the Syrian economy for a democratic and sustainable 
development.”608 They also hold conferences and communicate with Turkish officials 
for promoting Syrian businessmen’s investments in Turkey. For instance, they 
discussed the suggestions of establishing a free industrial zone in Turkey for Syrian 
investors.609  
 
Ayman Ṭabbāʿ who was from Damascus and completed his bachelor degree in the US 
work in property development. He was the chairman of the SEF and was imprisoned 
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by the regime for his activities with them.610  Tamām al-Bārūdī who was the 
Executive Vice President of the SEF was from Hama and used to work in the field of 
construction and agriculture, and he had a factory for cutting tools in Syria. He and 
his family left for Saudi Arabia in 1964 due to the nationalisation of the Ba’th party. 
In 1985 he embarked on investments in Aleppo. Another Aleppan food industrialist 
who was also a founding member of the SEF, was mentioned earlier. His father was 
killed in the 1980s incident and he himself was also the founder of the ‘Appeal from 
Aleppo for the country.’ 611  He was arrested by the regime due to his active 
participation in the protests. He left Syria for Egypt in September 2012, and in the end 
of 2012 moved to Turkey.612  
 
Although the aims of the SEF do not include having a political agenda regarding the 
on going conflict, it considers itself a non-governmental organisation. Its two leading 
figures and other members illustrated above were suppressed by the Assad regime 
prior to 2011. The active engagement with the local government to discuss economic 
policy, such as the creation of a free industrial zone in Turkey, demonstrates the 
politicised feature of the organisation.  
 
Tayyār “al-waʿd al-Sūrī (the Syrian Promise) 
 
The Syrian Promise was established in November 2014. Firās Ṭallās, the son of the 
former Syrian Minister of Defence, stated that its aim was to “put up a road map 
                                                          
610  Board of Directors & Staff, Syrian Economic Forum, accessed, March 17, 2017, 
http://www.syrianef.org/En/board-members/; Aleppan construction businessman no61, personal 
interview, Gaziantep, May 27, 2014. He is also a member from the SBF. 




allowing each Syrian to live in the homeland that looks like them [they familiar 
with].”613 The Syrian Promise also worked on projects for helping Syrians who were 
living in the free area inside Syria (the rebels held area).614 According to one of the 
members of the Syrian Promise, the organisation was funded by Syrian tycoon Firās 
Ṭallās.615  
 
Ṭallās was from Homs. His father was the former Minister of Defence Muṣṭafā Ṭallās 
who also used to be close with Hafiz al-Assad.616 He left Syria in March 2012 to 
Paris.617 At the time, his expatriation from Syria was considered to be a betrayal 
against the Syrian regime.618 Ṭallās was one of the business tycoons in Syria prior to 
the 2011 revolution who was listed on the 100 prominent businessmen list in 2009 
and 2010.619 But after he left Syria, he announced his political position against the 
Bashar regime.620  
 
Coordination of the Syrian Revolution in Egypt (CCSRE) 
 
The Coordination was established by Nizār Kharāṭ and other Syrians between 2011 
and 2013 in Egypt. Under the rule of president Morsi in Egypt, the Coordination used 
to have great cooperation with the Egyptian government before the military coup in 
                                                          
613 “taʾsīs tayyār “al-waʿd al-Sūrī”,” [The founding of the current “the Syrian promise”] Dp-news, 
April 11, 2014, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www.dp-news.com/pages/detail.aspx?articleid=161795. 
614 tayyār “al-waʿd. 
615 Aleppan lawyer, personal interview, Gaziantep, December 1, 2014. 
616 “Profile: Mustafa Tlas.” 
617  “Firas Tlass,” Revolvy, accessed March 17, 2017, 
https://www revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Firas%20Tlass. 
618 “Interview with Firas Tlass.” 
619 “abraz 100 rajul aʿmāl Sūrī,” 2009, 2010. 
620 “Interview with Firas Tlass.” 
287 
 
2013. They worked in relief and help for Syrians in Egypt. Around 700,000 Syrians 
living in Egypt received help from them.621  
 
Nizār Kharāṭ was from Damascus, but he has been in Egypt for 47 years. He used to 
work in the field of furniture, services, and travels. Because of his participation in the 
anti-Assad regime activities in Egypt, when Sisi succeeded as president, he was 
forced to leave Egypt for Turkey.622  
 
Finally, Gazwan Masri, who was originally from Aleppo, left Syria for Turkey in 
1983 where he eventually gained Turkish nationality.623 His business investments 
mainly focus on trade, agencies, and marketing in Turkey and the Middle East 
countries. He was the President of the board of directors of the Santral Group.624 He 
was a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.625 Also, he was the former vice 
president of the MÜSIAD in Turkey, which was “formed to be a direct competitor 
with TÜSİAD [Turkish Industry and Business Association].”626 MÜSIAD is made up 
of pro-Islamic Turkish business groups, whereas TÜSİAD is made up of secular 
Turkish business groups.627 In addition, his close ties with the president of Turkey, 
Tayyip Erdogan, was also well-known, as “he is said to have served as Turkey Prime 
                                                          
621 “Nizār Kharāṭ li-niyūz santar.” 
622 Ibid. 
623 “Ülke Tanıtım Toplantıları,” [Country Promotion Meetings], Igiad, May 8, 2017, accessed March 
17, 2017,  http://igiad.com/faaliyet/ulke-tanitim-toplantilari-2/; “Eğitim için geldikleri Türkiye, 
onların yeni vatanı olduKaynak: Eğitim için geldikleri Türkiye, onların yeni vatanı oldu,” Risale Haber, 
July 27, 2009, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www risalehaber.com/egitim-icin-geldikleri-turkiye-onlarin-yeni-vatani-oldu-59474h htm. 
624 Santral Group, accessed March 17, 2017, http://www.santral-group.com/en/about html. 
625 Syria Media Roundup (November 25), Jadaliyya, November 25, 2014, accessed May 5, 2017,  
http://egypt.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20082/maghreb.jadaliyya.com/maghreb.jadaliyya.com/. 
626 Hamza Fakher, Michael Weiss, and Brian Milne, Revolution in Danger: A Critical Appraisal of the 
Syrian National Council with Recommendations for Reform, A Henry Jackson Society Strategic 
Briefing, The Henry Jackson Society (2012) 13, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SNC.pdf. 
627 Yıldız Atasoy, Islam’s Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 16. 
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Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s personal financier.”628 After the Syrian revolution erupted 
in March 2011, the Syrian oppositions held a conference regarding the civil uprising 
inside Syria. This conference was organised by MÜSIAD but the Hurriyet Daily 
News stated that Misri himself was the financier and real organizer.629 His political 
position was also anti- regime and he stood with the Syrian revolution.630  
 
b. Motivations and patterns of political participations  
 
We were doing good to be honest with you [before the revolution], and the business 
was great. Until the revolution started, then we felt that what’s happening was not 
the right thing to do, especially when the killing started. So during living in Syria, 
and dealing with the government and dealing with the laws in Syria, we of course, 
as everybody knows, there was a lot of corruptions in Syria, and the economy does 
not have any identity that we can even recognize…laws has been changing on a 
daily basis. So when the revolution started, me and a couple of, not a couple, a few 
of business people, and businessmen and women from Syria, we decided that we 
going to try to do something about it. Anything about the reform of the develop of 
Syria, and implementing democracy in Syria. 
- Ayman Tabaa, Chairman of the SEF in Gaziantep631 
                                                          
628 J. Millard Burr, Turkey- Syria: Muslim Brother Misirli’s Reckoning, ACDemocracy: American 
Center for Democracy, November 4, 2014, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://acdemocracy.org/turkey-syria-muslim-brother-misirlis-reckoning/. 
629 Sevil Küçükkoşum, Syria ‘Offended’ by Turkish PM’s Statement, Envoy Says, Hürriyet Daily 
News, May 17, 2011, accessed March 17, 2017, 
http://www hurriyetdailynews.com/archive-news-detail.aspx?pageid=438&n=syria-offended-turkish-le
aders-comparison-with-halepche--envoy-says-2011-05-17. 
630 An Interview with Syrian Businessman Gazi Misirli (Gazwan Masri), ORSAM (2013) accesses 
March 17, 2017, http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/OA/49/15gazimisirli.pdf. 
631 Democracy that Delivers Podcast #30: Syrian Economic Forum on the Role of the Private Sector in 






As previously mentioned, it was risky for Syrian businessmen to partake in 
anti-regime related political activities due to the possible suppressions from the 
regime, yet there were still 18 expatriate Syrian businessmen who publicly and 
actively partook in the anti-regime political activities. Table 6.1 below is based on 
these 18 politicised expatriate Syrian businessmen’s backgrounds and their positions 
in these organisations and broad political coalitions. It indicates the different posts 
and profiles of the 18 expatriate Syrian businessmen and political organisations, 
namely: what types of work they were doing in the organisations; their names and 
backgrounds; where they were from in Syria; when they left Syria; whether they or 
their families were suppressed by the Assad regime and whether they participated in 
political activities; and their posts in the organisations.  
 
This table shows that the political participation of the expatriate Syrian businessmen 
can be divided into two groups: those who left Syria prior to the 2011 revolution, and 
those who left after. Their activities were primarily practiced in three patterns: main 
leaders of the organisations, including the posts of presidents, vice presidents, or the 
ministers; those who took important posts in the organisations, such as being the 












SNC SOC SIG Waad SBF SEF SP CCSRE 
Pre
637 
Damascus Ayman Ṭabbāʿ √ √       Chairman   
Damascus Nizār Kharāṭ  √         Founder/ 
president 
Aleppo Maḥmūd ʿUthmān √   Founding 
member 
       
Hama Tamām al-Bārūdī √ √       Executive 
Vice-Chair 
  
Daraa Walīd al-Zuʿbi  √  Member  Minister      




  Founding 
member/ 
President 
   
Post
638 
Damascus Riyāḍ Sayf √ √ √  Vice-preside
nt 




Damascus Ezzat Baghdadi √  √ Member        
Aleppo Yāsīn al-Najjār √ √ √ Founder/ 
member 
 Minister      
Aleppo Yāsir Dhākirī √  √  Representati       
                                                          
632 D indicates the date of departure from Syria 
633 F indicates Syrian city of origin 
634 S indicates whether they or their families were suppressed by the Assad regime or not, in the forms of arrest, prison, torture, or death 
635 L indicates the businessman took the leading post 
636 E indicates that the businessman has experiences in political participations prior to their departure from Syria  
637 Pre indicates leaving Syria before the 2011 revolution 





Aleppo Aleppan machines 
and textile 
businessman 
  √   Consultant      
Aleppo Saʿad Wifāʾī √  √    Secretary-ge
neral 
    
Aleppo Aleppan medicine 
industrialist 
√  √    Member     
Aleppo Aleppan glasses 
industrialist 
√  √     Administrato
r 
   
Aleppo Kurdish Aleppan 
pipeline 
businessman 
       Consultant    
Aleppo Aleppan food 
industrialist 
√  √      Administrato
r 
  




Lattakia Latakia foods and 
clothes 
businessman 
√   Member        




Long-term exiled Syrian businessmen 
 
The reason that the six long-term exiled Syrian businessmen listed in the table left the 
country was their dissatisfaction of the Assad regime’s ways of governing or having 
been suppressed by the regime. Four had experienced political suppression or 
persecutions by the regime. They had lived abroad for between ten and forty years 
prior to the revolution in Syria. They either resented the regime for what the regime 
had done to them or to their family, or they were discontent with the previous 
governance of the regime and chose other countries for their economic investments. 
Tamām al-Bārūdī stated that,  
 
[After the Ba’th party came into power in 1963,] my family left Syria for Saudi 
Arabia. I was child at that time. So because they get everything what we are, what 
we own. My father was a rich man; he had agencies for big companies, and he has 
big land, my cousins, all our families, they [the regime] get everything from us. So 
from that time we hate al-Ba’th party, when Hafiz al-Assad came, uh, we don’t like 
him. Me, my father, all my family, or my wife at the moment, from the beginning 
we don’t like these kind of people. Anyway, at 1982, Hafiz al-Assad killed 48,000 
people in Hama.639 
 
Nevertheless, when the uprising started in Syria in 2011, they did not immediately 
become involved in anti-regime political activities as other Syrian businessmen who 
were in in Syria at the time. Rather, they mostly embarked on anti-regime political 
activities after mid-2012 once the opposition in Syria had reached a better position. 
Maḥmūd ʿUthmān, who left Syria in 1983 and has been based in Istanbul since, stated 
                                                          
639 Democracy that Delivers Podcast, 12:28 – 13:19. 
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how he became one of the founding members of the Syrian National in September 
2011, 
 
In 1983, due to the dangerous situation in Aleppo, my brother suggested that I go to 
Turkey. I came here [to Istanbul] to study engineering. In 1992, I started my 
business, in the field of general international trading and some dessert industries. 
When the revolution started in Syria, we knew that the conflict would continue 
since many people who were just like us have been suppressed by the regime for 
decades and have been waiting for this moment to happen. At that time, the Turkish 
government also wanted us to form a political organization to support the 
revolution. Then I stopped working for my business for one and a half years. I feel 
that I should participate to change this unjust regime.640  
 
Due to their long-term periods of living abroad, those businessmen have less concern 
regarding further retaliation from the regime on their properties or relatives in Syria. 
On the other hand, the investments and relatives of the Syrian businessmen who were 
based in Syria for most of their lives were mostly in the country. Given the long-term 
resentment and lack of potential ‘targets’ that the regime might attack, the chances 
that they would join the revolution were higher. More importantly, leading roles in the 
parties and organisations were mostly taken by long-term exiles. 
 
Out of the eight Syrian businessmen who took leading posts in the anti-Assad political 
organisation, five were long-term exiles. The leading positions of anti-Assad 
organizations were mostly long-term exiles because they were more capable in terms 
of their economic, political, and social status. Economically, their investments did not 
suffer great damage. Politically, they would not encounter the threat of suppression 
from the regime. Socially, they were bilingual and possessed dual citizenship (or had 
                                                          
640 Aleppan general trade businessman no62, personal interview, Istanbul, March 10, 2015. 
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long-term residential permits in another country) which facilitated their further 
anti-Assad political. Maḥmūd ʿUthmān left Syria for Turkey in the early 1980s. 
Ayman Ṭabbāʿ has US nationality and was fluent in English. Muṣṭafā Ṣabbāgh and 
Tamām al-Bārūdī both have lived in Gulf countries, namely, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
for more than a decade. Nizār Kharāṭ embarked on investment in Egypt almost five 
decades ago. Walīd al-Zuʿbi left Syria for the UAE in the 1990s.  
 
Furthermore, their long-term residence in these countries made it easier for them to 
access or cooperates with local or foreign authorities or organisations to seek 
resources, whether economic, political, or human resources, for their political 
activities, and vice versa for the local authorities to contact them. The case of the 
establishment of the SBF through the interactions with the Qatari authority, the 
cooperation with the Centre for International Private Enterprise for setting up the SEF, 
and the cooperation between the CCSRE with the Morsi government regarding the 
political affairs are all examples of this.  
 
Since those figures were comparatively safer and more socially-economically stable 
than the Syrian businessmen based in Syria, they had a higher chance of leading 
anti-regime political organisations or parties. Thus, it was not only because they had 
left Syria longer ago and did not have significant properties or relatives inside Syria 
anymore, but also because they had a resentment of the regime for suppressing them 
and their families and a higher possibility of accessing foreign resources that made it 
possible for those Syrian businessmen to participate in anti-regime political activities.  
 




Out of the remaining 12 Syrian businessmen, nine personally took part in other social 
or political activities before taking positions in these political parties or organisations 
before and after the 2011 revolution. This shows a different picture from what 
previous studies have shown, that people who left their homeland more recently may 
also actively engage in homeland politics from abroad.641 For example, the Aleppan 
food industrialist who was working in the SEF was also the founding member of 
‘Appeal from Aleppo for the country’ after the eruption of the revolution in Syria.642 
They were more sophisticated in motivating and participating in social or political 
activities than other fellow businessmen. Furthermore, during their emigration from 
Syria, either they brought most of their relatives and capital with them, or their 
investments had been destroyed.  
 
Finally, nine out of 12 personally experienced political suppressions from the regime 
before and after the eruption of the revolution. This long-term suppression by the 
regime encouraged them to take part in the anti-regime activities. As stated by the 
Aleppan medicine industrialist who was also a member of the Waad, “We were 
suppressed during the 1980s by the [Assad regime’s] brutal killing. Around 50 people 
from our family were imprisoned, and another 100 people from our family fled 
Aleppo.”643  
 
                                                          
641  Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diasporas; Fuglerud, Life on the Outside; Wayland, “Ethnonationalist 
Networks;” Tyner and Kuhlke, “Pan-national Identities”; Lesch, “Palestinians in Kuwait”; Gillespie, 
“Edward Sayre and Liesl Riddle”; Lindholm and Hammer, The Palestinian Diaspora; Cohen, “From 
Ethnonational Enclave to Diasporic Community”; Weingrod and Levy, “Social Thought and 
Commentary”; Pattie, “Longing and Belonging”; Manaseryan, Diaspora: the Comparative Advantage 
for Armenia. 
642 Aleppan dessert industrialist no15, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 02, 2015. 
643 Aleppan medicine industrialist no63, personal interview, Gaziantep, January 30, 2015. 
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Thus, the profiles of these 18 expatriate Syrian businessmen’s political participations 
suggest that the reasons to take part in political activities were mainly long-term 
resentment and personal political suppressions by the regime, and the lack of relatives 
or properties for the regime to target. Furthermore, most leading position roles in 
these political activities were taken by long-term exiled businessmen since not only 
did they have fewer concerns about future repressions by the regime, but they also 
had a higher chance for accessing foreign aid – whether economic or political – to 
support their activities. The Syrian businessmen who left after 2011 mostly had a 
stronger sense or experience in the political participation prior to or during the 2011 
revolution. Finally, the participation of Syrian businessmen who left Syria prior to 
2011 in the political activities were more diversified than the Syrian businessmen who 
left after 2011 in terms of their city origins. The members of the latter group were 
mostly from Aleppo since Aleppo experienced greater damage and conflict between 
the regime forces and the rebels. As such, those businessmen have less concern about 
further risk against their properties.        
 
These different political organisations and parties not only demonstrate a new wave of 
the long-term, low-politicised businessmen who took part in anti-Assad political 
participations, but also show that the political participation of expatriate Syrian 
businessmen was formed from a mixture between the old and new expatriate Syrian 
businessmen. Nevertheless, it was only when the social, economic, and political 
conditions of the Syrian businessmen were safe and stable, and with the long-term 







This chapter has demonstrated that the expatriate Syrian businessmen were actively 
participating in philanthropic and political activities in the host countries. Due to the 
culture of charitable participation and social responsibility which was imposed on 
them by their fellow countrymen, Syrian businessmen routinely engaged in 
philanthropic activities in the host countries to help their fellow countrymen inside 
and outside of Syria, after their resettlement into the host lands. Nevertheless, 
different from the previous studies, they not only contributed to their fellow 
countrymen in the home country, but also provided aid to those who relocated to the 
host countries after 2011. Moreover, not only had the businessmen who settled 
outside of Syria decades ago contributed to philanthropic activities, but so did those 
who left Syria after 2011.  
 
Furthermore, the eruption of the 2011 revolution not only divided the Syrian 
businessmen into different political groups, but it also made at least 18 expatriate 
Syrian businessmen partake in various important roles in anti-regime organisations 
and broad coalitions. The reasons they took risks and participated in these activities 
were their long-term resentment and personal suppression by the regime which had 
started in the 1970s. Only the businessmen who had few properties or relatives in 
Syria would partake in these political roles since the fear of further political 
suppressions deterred other businessmen. Even though the number of expatriate 
Syrian businessmen who personally took part in these anti-regime activities was not 
great, the division of political ideas and the 18 Syrian businessmen who became 
important figures in these organisations and coalitions demonstrate a political 
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emancipation for the long-term low-politicised Syrian business community. More 
importantly, the political participation of expatriate Syrian businessmen in their 
homeland politics also shows that not only did those who left longer ago participate 
and contribute, but so did those who left more recently.  
 
In addition, the networks not only facilitated the philanthropic and political activities 
of the expatriate Syrian businessmen, but the examination of their networks of 
charities and politics also indicated that their activities no longer remained local; 
rather, they had risen to cross-border or even transnational levels. More importantly, 
the Syrian businessmen who left Syria decades ago also contributed to these activities 
and cooperated with the newly expatriate Syrian businessmen.  
 
Finally, even though the philanthropic and political activities of the expatriate Syrian 
businessmen demonstrate their charitable continuation and their political 
emancipation, the fear of the regime’s transnational suppression, the previous 
fragmented networking and the lack of willingness to relate to political events still 
affected the expatriate Syrian businessmen. This reaffirms that although the behaviour 
and ideas of the expatriate Syrian businessmen have changed in certain ways, some 




Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
After the eruption of the 2011 revolution in Syria, thousands of Syrian businessmen 
fled to Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. As shown previously, the amount of emigration of 
Syrian businessmen not only indicates a huge outflow of businessmen themselves, but 
also billions of US dollars to the host countries. With the escalation of conflict inside 
Syria, most expatriate Syrian businessmen have already started their new life in the 
host countries and actively engage in and work on different economic investments and 
philanthropic and political activities. The emergence of the expatriate Syrian business 
community after 2011 not only shows a great loss of economic capital from Syria, but 
the activities in the host countries also demonstrate the economic, social, and political 
dynamic and resilience of the war-induced expatriate Syrian businessmen.    
 
The networks of the Syrian business community have been fragmented under the rule 
of the Assad family since the 1970. Nevertheless, Syrian businessmen developed their 
own specific ways of enhancing this fragmented network. They used to spend most of 
their efforts on business investment prior to the 2011 revolution, and actively 
contributed to charities and only participated to a limited extent in political activities. 
After the break out of the civil uprising in 2011 and their later emigration out of Syria, 
Syrian businessmen demonstrated their abilities and energies not only in the economic 
field, but also in philanthropic and political activities. Their emigration and settlement 
indicated that they still were not able to rid themselves of their former specific ways 
of thinking and acting which accompanied them during the emigration and continued 
to affect their later activities in the host lands. Nevertheless, the Syrian business 
community is heading towards a formation of long-term war-induced business 
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diaspora as a consequence of the 2011 revolution since the domestic conflict did not 
show any sign of ending and they established new careers in the host countries. This 
further indicates that this business diaspora was going through a reorganisation of 
their business networks, that new investments were established in the host countries, 
that they continue to contribute to philanthropic activities, and that a political 
emancipation merged through this business community transformation by the 2011 
revolution.    
 
This thesis has drawn on a range of former literature on Syrian business community 
and business diaspora to set up the framework of this research in a particular context: 
that of expatriate Syrian businessmen in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. On the one hand, 
former literature on Syrian business community has demonstrated the important role 
of the Syrian businessmen in Syria prior to the year of 2011, and their symbiotic but 
lack of trust relationships with the Assad regime. On the other hand, the former study 
on business diaspora analysed the ties between the business diaspora with their home 
and host countries, and the impacts they made on their home or host governments. 
The aim of this research was to examine how the Syrian business community has been 
transformed through the 2011 revolution, focusing on expatriate Syrian businessmen 
in Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. I argue that not only are the Syrian business networks 
reorganising from a fragmented network to more cooperative networks, but also that 
the networks have risen to a transnational level to include businessmen who are living 
in different host countries; and the unprecedented massive and prompt outflow of 
Syrian businessmen and their economic capital from Syria, along with the escalation 
and prolongation of the conflict in Syria, the expatriate Syrian business community is 




Five principle findings have been demonstrated throughout the thesis. Two of the 
findings contribute to the studies on Syrian businessmen: the attributes of the 
fragmented business networks in pre-2011 Syria, and the context of the political 
division and participation of Syrian businessmen during the 2011 revolution. The 
other three findings address the studies on migration and diaspora: the significance of 
the economic considerations of Syrian businessmen regarding their relocations has 
been shown to overpass what previous studies have suggested about the influence of 
personal networks regarding migration; the importance of political relations between 
the host and home governments, in addition to the factors during the relocation and 
settlement process; and the specific ways of thinking and acting have migrated with 
businessmen and continue to affect them.   
 
The important economic roles of the Syrian business community in pre-2011 Syria 
have been shown through work on the Syrian political economy and business 
networks between state-business ties. This research has not only revised how the 
previous Syrian political economic environment affected the operations of the Syrian 
business community and led to the low-trust but symbiotic ties between the state and 
its business community, but it has also argued that the networks among the Syrian 
businessmen were fragmented between large numbers of businessmen’s small 
networks that did not trust each other, but within which were networks with a high 
level of trust. This fragmented networking among the Syrian business community was 
mainly caused by the previous political economic environment in Syria. Corruption 
combined with nepotism, injustice accompanied by state intervention into 
businessmen’s activities, and a lack of efficiency and opaqueness in the public sectors 
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were the three main factors that made this network fragmented. The fragmented 
nature of the business networks restricted interactions among Syrian businessmen in 
Syria prior to 2011. Nevertheless, they have developed specific civil mechanisms 
such as informal arbitration and non-interest loans to address their lack of trust of 
each other.  
 
I have re-categorised Syrian businessmen into the ruling family, the crony, the 
strategic, and the independent businessmen based on their ties with the Assad regime 
in the pre-revolution era. The main contribution of this re-categorisation is the 
inclusion of the majority low-profile and modest businessmen who also had important 
economic roles in pre-2011 Syria, which most previous literature on the Syrian 
business community has neglected. Each of the four types of Syrian businessmen also 
reacted differently to their different degrees of dependency and ties with the Assad 
regime during the revolution. The fact that the long-term, non-politicised Syrian 
business community has been divided into different political groups throughout the 
revolution has also been demonstrated. After the eruption of the 2011 revolution, 
some Syrian businessmen played important roles in the civil uprising, especially in 
funding and humanitarian aid. Most Syrian businessmen who participated in the 
revolution did so due to their long-term dissatisfaction against with and their personal 
experiences of suppression by the Assads. Speculating the results of the revolution 
also encouraged some Syrian businessmen to take part. Nevertheless, due to the 
worsening situation of security, economy, and politics in Syria, most Syrian 
businessmen had no choice but to leave. The phenomenon of the limited Syrian 
businessmen who took part in anti-regime political activities during the revolution in 
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Syria and the massive outflow of businessmen from Syria suggest that the 
pre-revolution symbiotic state-business relationships were wavering.   
 
The personal networks of migrants and diasporans have been argued to be an 
important factor which enhances or decreases the motivations of potential migrants or 
diasporans to settle or relocate into the host countries. Nevertheless, expatriate Syrian 
businessmen who emigrated from Syria to the host countries after 2011 had utmost 
consideration that was not whether they had acquaintances in the countries into which 
they attempted to move or not. Rather, it was under their economic calculation about 
the possibilities for their future investment. As shown in chapter 4, even brothers in a 
business family or business partners would not choose to relocate to the same 
countries unless they could sense the chances to embark on new economic 
investments. This may be due to their pre-departure professions that they looked 
forward to continue working on, and the economic capital they still had with them.     
 
Although previous studies on migration and diaspora demonstrate how the home/ host 
countries affect the development of the migrants and diasporans, the way the relations 
between the host and home countries affect the migrants and diasporans is 
understudied. The process of the relocation and settlement of Syrian businessmen 
showed that not only did the host country play an important role in their relocation 
and settlement, but so did the political relations between the host and home 
governments. Syrian businessmen not only encountered and needed to deal with 
various issues from legal, social, or political perspectives in the host countries, but 
they also needed to adjust to the local institutions and business cultures. If the home 
and host governments were in opposite political positions, then the host governments 
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would be more willing to accept the migrants; if the home and host governments had 
the same political position, then the host governments would be more unfriendly 
toward the migrants. Also, different from the former war-induced migration whereby 
social ties of emigrants played a crucial role in deciding where or how to relocate, the 
main factor which affected the emigration process of the Syrian businessmen was 
economic. 
 
Businessmen needed to adapt their behaviour to the local culture into which they had 
moved. Nevertheless, although expatriate Syrian businessmen did indeed change 
some of their business behaviours to accommodate to the new environments, the 
examination of their economic, philanthropic, and political activities demonstrates 
that the businessmen’s activities were significantly affected by their former specific 
ways of thinking and acting which migrated with them. A reproduction of fear of the 
Assad regime, application of previous civil mechanisms, and features of fragmented 
regionalism are the businessmen’s three specific ways of thinking and acting prior to 
their departures that can be observed from their behaviour in the host lands. The 
reason those three specific ways of thinking and acting still remain important is a 
dependence on context and assessment of risk. Most expatriate Syrian businessmen 
maintained their fear of the Assad regime if they still had close relatives or important 
properties inside Syria or if they were expecting to return to Syria after the conflict 
finishes. As such, if they acted against the regime, their actions might imped their 
hope of return to the country. Furthermore, once the businessmen were newly arrived 
in the host lands and they encountered financial difficulties or business disputes with 
their fellow business countrymen, they preferred to use the previous civil 
mechanisms – the non-interest loans and informal arbitrations – to improve or solve 
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the issues since they were not confident that they could seek help from local financial 
or judicial institutions. Finally, the origin of the fragmented regionalism among the 
business community was due to fragmented trust in the previous Syrian environment. 
When they went through the war with great financial loss, they needed to minimise 
the chances of another wave of loss. Thus, their networking mostly remained 
regionally fragmented to ensure that they would not be cheated by their fellow 
business countrymen.     
 
I have argued that the Syrian business networks were reorganising from fragmented 
business networks to more cooperative networks and have been transnationalised, and 
the Syrian business community has been developing into a long-term war-induced 
business diaspora.  
 
First, the networks of expatriate Syrian businessmen have reorganised due to the lack 
of capital and the difficulties in Syria, where the businessmen were required to expand 
their former limited networks. Although fear and fragmented networks accompanied 
the Syrian businessmen out of Syria to the host countries, more than half have to 
enhance this fragmented trust and to expand their limited business partnerships with 
other businessmen. To improve this fragmented business network, family names and 
city origins are the two main factors for improving trust. Divisions based on political 
ideas also increased or decreased the trust of their networks. This suggests that their 
fragmented business networks are gradually expanding during their settlement in the 
exile. Nevertheless, the new expanded partnerships mostly remain regional, whereby 
the expatriate Syrian businessmen prefer to establish business partnerships with 
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businessmen who were from the same Syrian city as them. More importantly, the 
Syrian business networks have risen to a transnational level to include businessmen 
who are living in different host countries. This transnationalisation of the Syrian 
business networks can be observed not only from their economic activities, but also in 
their other different philanthropic and political activities in the host countries. The 
transnationalisation of Syrian business networks has strengthened their abilities and 
contributions to the fields of economic investment and philanthropic works. 
 
Second, the expatriate Syrian business community is developing into a long-term 
business diaspora in the countries which they relocated into. Brubaker defines the 
diaspora as people who have the characteristics of dispersion, homeland orientation, 
and boundary-maintenance.644 The examination of the expatriate Syrian business 
community suggests that the expatriate Syrian business community also conform to 
this definition of diaspora. Syrian businessmen have relocated to different countries in 
the Middle East due to the Syrian conflict. Even if they were far away from their 
home country, their economic, philanthropic, and political activities were all strongly 
linked to Syria in a homeland orientation. Their economic and philanthropic works 
suggest that they preferred to maintain their Syrian ties rather than expand to include 
local ties. For instance, they preferred to have business partnerships with their fellow 
Syrian business countrymen, and their philanthropic works were also conducted 
through the cooperation between Syrian businessmen. And their political participation 
was all devoted to the on-going conflict in Syria.  
 
                                                          
644 Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” 5-7. 
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Previous studies on business diaspora have demonstrated the important role of the 
business diaspora on their home country, especially in the field of economic 
contributions.645 As opposed to previous business diaspora literature which was about 
voluntary emigration and/or emigrants becoming entrepreneurs after emigrating, by 
analysing the emergence of the expatriate Syrian business community, it is a business 
diaspora which was formed as a result of domestic conflict that is examined in this 
thesis. The formation process of war-induced business diaspora, from their 
pre-departure within the home country, to their actual emigrations, and their later 
activities inside the host countries are also examined. The formation of business 
diaspora is not restricted to the voluntary or new entrepreneurships types. Even if the 
businessmen experienced conflicts in their country and later emigrated, the great 
numbers and prompt emigration of businessmen will lead to the formation of a 
business diaspora.  
 
More importantly, although the war-induced business diaspora is understudied, the 
research does demonstrate that while massive emigration started, among the high 
numbers who were forced to leave their homeland, thousands had belonged to the 
economic class prior to their departures. Based on their greater economic capital and 
on their business skills and knowledge, they have a greater resilience for both 
economic abilities and actively contributing to philanthropic and political affairs. 
Most Syrian businessmen continued to take part in economic investments, but others 
switched their careers from business to philanthropic or political activities. Regarding 
                                                          
645 Alessandro Monsutti, “Cooperation, Remittances, and Kinship among the Hazaras,” Iranian Studies, 
37, no. 2 (2004): 220; Heather Williams, “Both Sides Now: Migrant Philanthropy, State Power, and the 
Struggle for Accountability in Zacatecas, Mexcio,” in Politics from Afar:Ttransnational Diasporas and 
Networks, ed. Terrence Lyons and Peter G. Mandaville (London:Hurst & Company, 2012) 59; Lyons, 
“Conflict-generated diasporas,” 537. 
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their philanthropic activities, even though they experienced a great loss of economic 
capital because of the conflict, they continued to engage in philanthropic activities to 
help their fellow countrymen whether inside or outside of Syria. This was attributed to 
the culture of the Syrian business community helping needy people and the social 
expectations imposed on them by their fellow countrymen. The Syrian business 
community used to be politically low-profile or had limited political participation. 
The low-politicised business community experienced a political emancipation not 
only since the break out of the revolution, but also after the businessmen relocated. 
Some actively participated in anti-Assad political activities or even led political 
movements. The Syrian business community was one of the main economic elements 
in Syria prior to the 2011 revolution. Even after they left Syria, the billions of dollars 
capital and thousands businessmen leaving, and their active economic, philanthropic, 
and political engagements in the host countries made them important actors. They 
were different from the other forced migrants or war-induced refugees in terms of 
their economic, political, and social perspectives before their departures and their later 
resettlements. 
 
The research provided an analysis of the Syrian business community from the 
pre-2011 revolution period to later reactions towards the civil uprising in 2011 and 
emigration from Syria, to their resettlement and new lives in host countries. The 
results not only provide a base for future study of the Syrian business community, but 
also give a case study of the formation of a war-induced business diaspora.  
 
The research also demonstrated the importance of the triadic conceptual framework 
between the home country-host countries-diaspora. By examining the development of 
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the case of the expatriate Syrian business community through the triadic conceptual 
framework, it not only took the relationships between the home country-diaspora and 
the host countries-diaspora into analysis, but also included the crucial impacts of how 
the relations between the home-host governments could make on the war-induced 
business diaspora. This suggests that further studies could look at the business 
diaspora through this triadic lens. In addition to the Syrian business diaspora after the 
2011 revolution, future studies could include the interactions between the old business 
diaspora and the new business diaspora. For instance, there were many Iraqi 
businessmen and companies established by the Iraqi businessmen in Turkey after the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq. Even though the research did not discuss the interactions 
between Iraqi and Syrian business diasporas in Turkey, at least three Turkey-based 
Syrian businessmen had close business ties with Turkey-based Iraqi businessmen.646 
The existence of the conflict-driven Iraqi business community in Turkey also 
confirms the argument made here that when a country experiences domestic conflict, 
the business class cannot avoid its effects and it also has to leave the home country for 
another. More importantly, even if the situation in the home country may become less 
chaotic, war-induced business communities may continue living and working in a host 
country.    
 
Finally, since the expatriate Syrian business community is turning into a business 
diaspora and is actively taking part in economic, philanthropic, and political activities, 
future studies can also trace how those war-induced business diasporas contribute to 
and affect their economic, philanthropic, and political activities in the host countries.  
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